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The first part of the thesis challenges the widespread view that relative income – a
function of own income in relation to others’ income – affects subjective well-being (SWB).
This view is based on weak empirical evidence: mostly cross-sectional, small coefficients
and often a simplistic view about how social comparisons work. This chapter starts by
questioning the very basic way in which social comparisons are supposed to be made. It
then shows empirically that changes in relative position have no effect on life satisfaction
or mental distress, using data from the British Household Panel Survey. The rest of the
chapter is devoted to addressing the possible endogeneity of changes on relative income,
as well as to carrying out several robustness checks.
In most countries individuals of the upper class enjoy more positive emotions and fewer
negative emotions than the middle and lower classes. However the size of these differences
varies across countries. Chapter 3 attempts to explain where those differences come from
using a special SWB module from the European Social Survey that was carried out in
2006 and 2012. The analysis shows that most of the class differences in negative emotions
can be explained by differences in health, financial situation, and unemployment. Feeling
safe and socialising – while important for negative emotions – do not contribute to the
gaps in negative emotions because they are much more equally distributed across classes.
Having two rounds of data gives credibility to the results and allows a very interesting
description of the emotional changes that occurred with the 2008 economic crisis.
Chapter 4 tries to shed light on the issue of work-life balance by exploring the effects of
working hours on different SWB outcomes using time use data for employees. The anal-
ysis reveals that employees experience high levels of enjoyment and satisfaction, almost
regardless of how much they work. Unfortunately this is also the case for time crunch
– a shortage of time –, which is experienced to a non-negligible extent by all employees.
The analysis carried out suggests that there is indeed an optimal number of hours for
most of the subjective well-being outcomes considered, but these do not always coincide.
However, the trade-offs are greater for individuals that are less satisfied with their jobs.
Individuals that are above the median in terms of job satisfaction optimise enjoyment
and satisfaction at a positive and large number of hours, whereas for individuals that
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What is subjective well-being and why should we care?
This thesis is made up of three chapters that, while quite independent from each other,
share the common aim of trying to shed light on the causes of subjective well-being.
Each of the three chapters can be read on its own and therefore the purpose of this
first chapter is simply to introduce the reader to the area of subjective well-being. After
stating briefly why we should care about understanding SWB, the chapter will start by
defining subjective well-being, and explaining how it is measured. After this, some of the
main theories will be presented and the chapter will close by introducing the following
chapters.
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1.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF STUDYING SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING
“One of the most annoying songs in the often annoying history of popular
music begins with this line: “Feelings, nothing more than feelings.” [. . . ]
What could be more important than feelings? Sure, war and peace may
come to mind, but are war and peace important for any reason other than
the feelings they produce? If war didn’t cause pain and anguish, if peace
didn’t provide for delights both transcendental and carnal, would either of
them matter to us at all? War, peace, art, money, marriage, birth, death,
disease, religion—these are just a few of the Really Big Topics over which
oceans of blood and ink have been spilled, but they are really big topics for
one reason alone: Each is a powerful source of human emotion. If they
didn’t make us feel uplifted, desperate, thankful, and hopeless, we would
keep all that ink and blood to ourselves.”
— Daniel Gilbert, Stumbling on Happiness (Gilbert, 2009, p. 132-3)
Objective well-being indicators such as life expectancy, per capita income, access to
health care, or education tell us about the objective conditions of the individual and
society, while subjective well-being (SWB) captures how the individual feels about those
conditions. Objective conditions can be a cause of SWB but they are not the same
as SWB. In other words, the relationship between objective and subjective well-being
is imperfect and that is why we need to pay attention to subjective indicators as well,
because they measure something very important that cannot be captured in any other
way.
But, regardless of what we think that societies or policy makers should be concerned
with, individuals want to be happy because it feels good to feel good (King and Broyles,
1997; King and Napa, 1998; Scollon and King, 2004). Besides, happiness is not only
an end in itself but also has very desirable consequences. Happy individuals are better
citizens, more successful, live longer, have better health, heal more quickly, and recover
from disease faster (Cohen et al., 2003; Danner et al., 2001; Harker and Keltner, 2001;
Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 2002; Lyubomirsky et al., 2005; Veenhoven, 1989, 1988, 2008a).1
Even those that do not think that feeling good is something we should aim for may still
be interested in understanding it because, like it or not, feeling well is a strong drive of
human behaviour and thus understanding SWB can help us understand much better why
we and others behave in the way we do.
It has not been until relatively recently, however, that scholars, policy makers and
1For instance, in one experiment, individuals were exposed to a cold virus and their symptoms mon-
itored. Those who had reported a higher level of life satisfaction at baseline were less likely to come
down with a cold and quicker to recover if they did (Cohen et al., 2003). In a similar vein, Kiecolt-Glaser
et al. (2002) found that individuals that were more satisfied with their lives healed more quickly from a
controlled wound.
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other professionals have paid attention to SWB. It all started in psychology where there
was an overwhelming emphasis on negative states, partly in the belief that happiness
and well-being simply meant the absence of clinical pathology, but probably also because
it seemed natural to worry first about those who suffer most. But there is more to
SWB than avoiding misery, and that is why positive psychology was founded (Seligman,
1990, 2002). The number of articles in this subject has boomed since then (especially in
psychology and economics).
Economists have in the past used income to proxy utility. Now, however, many
economists use measures of subjective well-being to proxy utility, and by doing so have
made significant contributions to happiness research. Frey and Stutzer (2002) provide an
excellent account of that progress.2 The wider economic community has been made aware
of the subject, mainly by a small symposium of the Economic Journal in 1997 with papers
by Frank (1997), Ng (1997) and (Oswald, 1997) but it is worth highlighting some earlier
contributions by Frank (1985, 1999) and Scitovsky (1976). In sociology, however, the
study of happiness has been somewhat neglected (Veenhoven, 2008b). Many believe this
should be left to psychologists since much of the variance of both experienced happiness
and life satisfaction is explained by variation in personal dispositions that probably have
a significant genetic component (Diener et al., 1999; Lykken, 1999). It is true that
personal dispositions play a significant role but this is not the whole story. For example,
in rich countries people are, on average, happier than in poorer countries and, for a given
income level, there is a great variation in happiness. The former suggests that happiness
is not genetically determined, and that there is some social dimension to its creation
(Veenhoven and Hagerty, 2006a). Hence, there is room for social science to make a
contribution. Economists have already started but there is some neglect within sociology
that may now be fading away. A remarkable exception to this is Ruut Veenhoven who
has made an enormous contribution to the study of SWB by producing numerous papers
on the subject and making it easier for other researchers to study SWB through the
World Database of Happiness that he founded, and with the creation of the Journal of
Happiness Studies.
The interest from policy makers in the subject has also increased lately. The British
economist Richard Layard, for instance, has advocated for a prominent role of happi-
ness research in policy making since the 1980s (Layard, 1980, 2005, 2006), and he has
influenced the British government in the serious consideration of SWB as a policy aim.
Some years ago, Nicolas Sarkozy assembled a group of experts in order to prepare a re-
port that made proposals for measuring society’s progress going beyond GDP (Stiglitz
et al., 2010), and subjective well-being occupied an important part of this report. One
remarkable example of taking happiness seriously, seems to be that of Bhutan, where
2Other examples are Bruni and Porta (2005), Frey and Stutzer (1999, 2000, 2010), Di Tella et al.
(2001), Layard (2005) (especially chapter 9), Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006)
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they measure Gross National Happiness and use that indicator to review policy decisions
and allocation of resources with the aim of fostering happiness among their citizens. In
relation to national accounts of well-being, we cannot forget to mention the efforts that
have taken place within time use research. Several authors have long acknowledged the
value of time use data to measure quality of life. In particular the use of enjoyment
of activities combined with time use data, to produce accounts of well-being (National
Time Value accounts). This was first proposed by Juster and Stafford (1985) who spoke
about “process benefits”, referring to the utility we derive from the things we do, and
how those should be taken into account when building national accounts. Other authors
that have worked in this direction are Gershuny and Halpin (1996) and Krueger (2007).
These initiatives were, however, more interested in the measurement of the more affective
components of SWB, i.e. the enjoyment of activities, rather than life satisfaction or self-
reported happiness. But in essence, they aim at the same thing, incorporating measures
of subjective well-being to evaluate societies’ progress.3
Most of the concerns or prejudices against happiness being part of policy makers’
agendas have to do with the fact that, on the one hand, we are still unable to explain
most of its variation, which leads many to the premature conclusion that happiness is
somehow random. The other reason why many have issues with the study of SWB
involves the way it is measured. Most people think that SWB cannot be measured in an
appropriate or scientific way, and therefore it cannot be studied. However, as soon as one
looks into this subject it becomes clear that subjective well-being can indeed be measured
with a decent degree of accuracy. If that were not the case it would be impossible to find
the patterns that we actually identify in the data. It is true that people’s feelings are
harder to measure than income or years of education, but this does not mean that we do
not get good enough measures. The aim of the next section is to convince you of this.
3These initiatives will be described in greater detail in Chapter 4.
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1.2 THE CONCEPT OF SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING, ITS MEASUREMENT AND
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
1.2.1 The concept of subjective well-being
Subjective well-being (SWB) is a very broad concept; it refers to how people experience
the quality of their lives and includes both emotional reactions and cognitive judgements.
In other words, it is a combination of satisfaction with life and the relative frequency
of positive and negative affect (Diener, 1984). The affective part refers to the amount
of pleasant feelings (positive affect) and unpleasant feelings (negative affect) that people
experience in their lives. The cognitive component instead refers to how people feel when
they think about their life. Some of the most frequently used scales to measure subjective
well-being will be introduced further below – which, I believe, should make very clear
what these different components capture.
This former distinction between cognition and affect is very useful at the theoretical
level, but in practice the various self-report measures of SWB are saturated to a varying
degree with judgment and affect. According to Diener et al. (1999), measures of SWB
can be ordered along a dimension varying from evaluative judgments of life at one end to
experienced affect at the other. At the affective end, we would find Kahneman’s objective
happiness, comprising people’s feelings of pleasure and displeasure summated over time
(Kahneman, 1999). At the other end would be global judgments such as life satisfaction
where people step back and think of certain factors that they deem to be important and
salient at the time of the judgment. Although no well-being measure is ever totally free
of either of these components, it is plausible to argue that a measure of life satisfaction
might be more heavily weighted with judgment. Whereas the questions included in the
General Health Questionnaire, which ask about things such as sleep quality, confidence,
or the ability to concentrate, may be closer to the affective side.
Before getting into the details of each of these two components and its measurements,
it is worth mentioning that within the study of SWB there are two distinct approaches:
the hedonic approach – which emphasises positive feelings (Kahneman et al., 1999), and
the eudaimonic approach – which emphasises positive functioning (Keyes, 2002; Ryan
and Deci, 2001; Sen, 1993). The eudaimonic approach has been operationalised in various
ways, and typically includes concepts such as autonomy, interest and engagement, positive
relationships, and a sense of meaning, direction, or purpose in life (Deci and Ryan, 2000;
Ryan and Deci, 2001; Ryff and Singer, 1998; Seligman, 2002). While I believe these are
very interesting concepts, and very likely connected or leading to high SWB, it should be
clarified that this thesis is only concerned with purely hedonic outcomes.
5
1.2.2 Positive and negative emotions
There are several scales that have been designed for measuring positive and negative
emotions. Here I present the most popular ones, such as the Warwick-Edinburgh Mental
Well-being Scale – WEMWBS (Tennant et al., 2007), the CESD – Center for Epidemio-
logic Studies Depression Scale (Radloff, 1977), and the PANAS – Positive and Negative
Affect Schedule (Watson et al., 1988). Validity and reliability issues are discussed along-
side.
Figure 1.1: The Warwick-Edinburgh Mental Well-being Scale (WEMWBS)
The Warwick-Edinburgh Mental Well-being Scale (WEMWBS) (Tennant et al., 2007)
is a 14-item scale that enquires about how people have been feeling and functioning over
the past two weeks, and then a single total score is obtained that summarises mental well-
being. It has been used in population surveys in Scotland, the North West of England
and Iceland (Bartram et al., 2013, 2011; Stewart-Brown and Janmohamed, 2008; Stewart-
Brown et al., 2011), and its use has been recommended by the US National Institutes of
Health. Validity and reliability issues are discussed in depth in Tennant et al. (2007) and
Tennant et al. (2006).4
4A 7-item version of the scale (the Short Warwick-Edinburgh Mental Well-being Scale SWEMWBS)
has also been shown to have good psychometric properties (Stewart-Brown et al., 2009).
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Figure 1.2: The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS)
Another example of an affective questionnaire is the Positive and Negative Affect
Schedule (PANAS) developed by Watson et al. (1988). This scale asks individuals to
report the frequency with which they experience certain states (positive and negative), see
Figure 1.2. The PANAS scales provide reliable, valid, and largely independent measures
of positive and negative emotions, regardless of the subject population or time frame used.
For more information regarding the reliability and validity of these scales, see Watson
(1988), or Watson and Clark (1999).
A third very widely used mental well-being scale is the Center for Epidemiologic Stud-
ies Depression Scale (CES-D) developed by Radloff in the late 1970s (Radloff, 1977). The
CES-D scale is a short self-report scale designed to measure depressive symptomatology
in the general population. It therefore focuses on negative states. The CES-D helps
identify individuals at risk of clinical depression, with good sensitivity and specificity and
high internal consistency (Lewinsohn et al., 1997).5
5“Everyone occasionally feels blue or sad, but these feelings are usually fleeting and pass within a
few hours or a couple of days. When people have a depressive disorder, they feel really sad for a long
7
Figure 1.3: The Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D)
The CES-D questionnaire has been used widely (e.g Huppert et al., 2009) and its va-
lidity and reliability has been extensively assessed. For example, Roberts (1980) assessed
the reliability of the CES-D scale in different ethnic contexts, (Lewinsohn et al., 1997)
used the CES-D successfully across wide age ranges, and Van de Velde et al. (2010) have
shown that cross-country comparisons of CES-D scores are valid. In particular they con-
clude that CES-D scores can be compared across countries because although the different
items have a different weight in the score in different countries, meaning that separate
items cannot be used to compare negative emotions across countries, the summary score
can be compared. This measure will be used in Chapter 3 because it was part of two
rounds of the European Social Survey that is used in that chapter.
1.2.3 Happiness and satisfaction
It is worth remembering that no measure is ever free of affect or judgement. However
there are some measures, such as life satisfaction or happiness, that have a greater cog-
time and cannot shake this feeling. It interferes with their ability to do things in their lives that they
can normally do well; and it causes pain for both the people with the disorder and those who care about
them. Depressive disorder is a common but serious illness. Almost 85% of those found to have depression
after an in-depth structured interview with a psychiatrist will have a high score on the CES-D. However,
about 20% of those who score high on the CES-D will have rapid resolution of their symptoms and not
meet full criteria for major or clinical depression” (the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale
web site, available at: http://cesd-r.com).
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nitive charge than the measures seen so far. These are also the questions that are most
commonly asked in surveys to capture SWB, e.g.: “All things considered, how satisfied are
you with your life as a whole these days?”, or, “Taken all together, how happy would you
say you are?” These two questions have been asked for many years in the General Social
Survey, in the World Values Survey, in the European Social Survey as well as in many
panel studies such as the British Household Panel Study or the German Socio-Economic
Panel, to cite some examples.
Being aware of the limitations of single items in terms of reliability due to, for instance,
the influence of a preceding item in the questionnaire, Diener et al. (1985) designed the
Satisfaction with life scale, a 5-item scale designed to measure global cognitive judgments
of one’s life satisfaction. Participants indicate how much they agree or disagree with
each of the 5 items using a 7-point scale that ranges from strongly agree (7) to strongly
disagree (1), see Figure 1.4. A short version of this scale is used in some rounds of the
European Social Survey.6
Figure 1.4: The Satisfaction with Life Scale
However, the single items that are commonly used – such as, “All things considered,
how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?” – are still useful. For a
start, respondents find answering these questions relatively straightforward. For instance,
Kahneman and Krueger (2006) note that, in the 1998 General Social Survey, less than 1
per cent of respondents refused to provide an answer, or answered “don’t know”, to the
general happiness question (by contrast, 17 per cent of respondents refused to provide
6Other efforts in this direction are the 7-item Personal Well-being Index (PWI) developed by Cummins
and colleagues (Cummins et al., 2003; Lau et al., 2005).
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their earnings). Similar proportions of missing values, that is, very low ones, are what I
have encountered in the first chapter of this thesis where one of my dependent variables
is the general life satisfaction question.
Next, the validity and reliability of these general questions will be discussed. Note that
this was not done to any significant extent for the affect scales for the very simple reason
that the validity and reliability of those is very well established. Very good discussions
and reviews on the methodological concerns about life satisfaction or happiness measures
can be found in Kahneman et al. (1999), Ng (1996), or Kahneman and Krueger (2006),
among others. What follows is just a very brief review of those.
The measures of SWB available are derived from survey questions, which ask respon-
dents for subjective assessments of their own level of well-being. Unlike height, weight,
income, or years of education, which can be assessed by looking at official documents
or some objective external source, SWB needs to be measured by asking the individuals
themselves. But how can we be sure that these responses actually measure individuals’
well-being in a satisfactory way? In other words, are they valid and reliable measures of
SWB? Whether respondents report their true feelings, and the possible biases resulting
from the context in which the question is asked, have been extensively studied and there
are some valid concerns (Clark and Oswald, 2002; Conti and Pudney, 2011; Veenhoven,
1993), but, in general, the fact that SWB self reports are, strongly correlated with other
outcomes that are signs or symptoms of happiness, and predict future behaviour, suggest
that self reports are valid (Kahneman and Krueger, 2006).
For instance, the following observable phenomena have been shown to correlate with
high life satisfaction and happiness: smiling frequency, the frequency of real smiles, i.e.
the ‘Duchenne’ smiles, the “unfakeable smiles” (Ekman et al., 1990),7 ratings of one’s
happiness made by friends; frequent verbal expressions of positive emotions; sociability
and extraversion; sleep quality; self-reported health, among others (Diener and Suh,
1999; Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Layard, 2005), all cited in Kahneman and Krueger (2006).
If individuals that smile more do report higher life satisfaction and happiness, and if
self reports coincide with peers assessments and so on, this means that self reports do
actually tell us something. In other words, they are somewhat valid measures of SWB.
But, in addition to external evidence detectable to the human eye, magnetic resonance
imaging scanners have allowed researchers to learn that activity in the left prefrontal
cortex of the brain is more active when individuals are experiencing happy thoughts,
while the right prefrontal cortex is more active when individuals are experiencing sad
7A Duchenne smile involves contraction of both the zygomatic major muscle (which raises the corners
of the mouth) and the orbicularis oculi muscle, which raises the cheeks and forms crow’s feet around
the eyes. A non-Duchenne smile involves only the zygomatic major muscle. The PanAm smile is
the name given to a fake smile, in which only the zygomatic major muscle is voluntarily contracted
to show politeness. It is named after the airline Pan American World Airways, which went out of
business in 1991, whose flight attendants would flash every jet-setter the same perfunctory smile (from:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smile)
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thoughts (Urry et al., 2004). Another piece of evidence invisible to the human eye is that
individuals’ happiness self reports are inversely correlated with their cortisol levels – a
hormone released in response to stress that is related to the risk of obesity, hypertension
and autoimmune conditions (Steptoe et al., 2005).8
“Even a clock can be a useful device for measuring happiness, because startled people
tend to blink more slowly when they are feeling happy than when they are feeling fearful or
anxious” (Gilbert, 2009, p. 123). So, there seem to be many ways to measure happiness,
and some of them appear to be much more rigorous, scientific, and objective than a
person’s own claims. However Gilbert remind us that “of all the flawed measures of
subjective experience that we can take, the honest, real-time report of the attentive
individual is the least flawed. [...] After all, the only reason why we take any of these
bodily events – from muscle movement to cerebral blood flow – as indices of happiness
is that people tell us they are. If everyone claimed to feel raging anger or thick, black
depression when their zygomatic muscle contracted, their eyeblink slowed, and the left
anterior brain region filled with blood, then we would have to revise our interpretations
of these physiological changes and take them as indices of unhappiness instead. If we
want to know how a person feels, we must begin by acknowledging the fact that there is
one and only one observer stationed at the critical point of view. She may not always
remember what she felt before, and she may not always be aware of what she is feeling
right now. We may be puzzled by her reports, skeptical of her memory, and worried
about her ability to use language as we do. But when all our hand wringing is over, we
must admit that she is the only person who has even the slightest chance of describing
the view from in here, which is why her claims serve as the gold standard against which
all other measures are measured” (Gilbert, 2009, p. 122-124)
Feeling good has consequences, which offers further support in favour of the validity
of self reports. For instance, in one experiment, individuals were exposed to a cold virus
and researchers observed that those that had reported a higher level of life satisfaction
at baseline were not only less likely to come down with a cold, but they also recover
faster if they do become ill (Cohen et al., 2003). Similar findings have been found by
Kiecolt-Glaser et al. (2002) with controlled wounds, where individuals that were more
satisfied with their lives at the baseline healed more quickly. Other interesting studies,
although using non-experimental evidence, are Danner et al. (2001) and Harker and
Keltner (2001). Danner et al. (2001) found a relationship (most likely a causal one)
between the expression of positive emotions in early life of nuns – measured by rating the
autobiographies of catholic nuns before starting a nun’s life, at around 20 years of age –
and compared with their survival many years later. In a similar vein, Harker and Keltner
8Other articles that discuss the validity of global self reports are Diener et al. (1999), Frey and
Stutzer (2002) (chapter 2 in particular), Larsen and Fredrickson (1999), Diener (1984), Diener et al.
(2006), Kahneman and Krueger (2006), and Van Praag and Ferrer-i Carbonell (2008) among others.
11
(2001) assessed positive emotions through facial recognition techniques exploring the
photos of many young women taken from their college yearbook, and observed that there
was a strong relationship between the expression of emotion and several life outcomes
across adulthood up to 30 years later.
A measure is reliable if it produces similar results in different measurements. Measure-
ments of people’s height and weight are good examples of very reliable measures, because
height or weight are unlikely to vary a lot from one measurement to another. SWB
measures are less reliable than the former but they are reliable enough. For example,
Krueger and Schkade (2008), with a sample of 229 working women, analysed the reliabil-
ity of various subjective well-being questions over a two-week period. They found that
both life satisfaction self reports, and affective experience measures had test-retest cor-
relations between .50 and .70. Reliability increases with a succession of questions rather
than a single item. For example, Lucas et al. (1996) found a test-retest correlation of 0.77
over four weeks for a measure of life satisfaction that resulted from averaging a battery
of life satisfaction questions. “While lower than the reliability ratios typically found for
education, income and many other common micro economic variables, they are probably
sufficiently high to yield informative estimates for much of the research undertaken on
subjective well-being, particularly in cases where group means are being compared (e.g.
rich vs poor, employed vs unemployed) and the benefits of statistical aggregation apply”
(Krueger and Schkade, 2008, p. 1). Besides, the noise produced by context, mood, or
recent events, are likely to average out in representative population samples. See also
(Gilbert, 2009, p. 125-7).
Unlike affect scales, it is highly controversial whether happiness and life satisfaction
responses can be compared across countries due to the fact that culture has an effect on
the way in which people respond to these questions. If for instance Americans tend to
overstate their happiness and Russians understate it, happiness self-reports between these
two countries will not be comparable. In other words, individuals in different countries
could enjoy the same objective life conditions and still report different happiness levels due
to cultural ‘optimism’, ‘pessimism’ or some other factor. Differences in self reports can
also be the result of actual differences in SWB – as the result of differences in objective
life circumstances – but we cannot know in which of the two situations we are when
faced with differences in levels across countries. Therefore, cross-country comparisons of
happiness or life satisfaction self-reports are still problematic.
Besides, culture’s influence in responses could not only affect levels but also affect the
distribution of responses, invalidating the comparison of measures of inequality across
countries (such as standard deviations of happiness or life satisfaction). For example, if
it is true that the Japanese tend to present themselves as average and prefer the middle
category of response scales (Iijima, 1982), then, ceteris paribus, in Japan differences in
self-reports will tend to be smaller than in other countries. This would invalidate the
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comparison of the Japanese distances – as a measure of SWB inequality – with that of
any other country where no such tendency exists. Furthermore, even when culture does
not affect the distribution of responses in such a clear way, the fact is that the distribution
of life satisfaction self-reports is limited and most responses are quite concentrated on just
a few positive values. This allows for greater differences among individuals of countries
where SWB levels are lower. Thus, countries that are more pessimistic will tend to see,
ceteris paribus, larger differences in SWB between the upper and the lower class, than
countries where people report higher levels of SWB. In this case too, the distribution of
answers is affected by culture and therefore the comparison of differences across coun-
tries is doubtful. So, until we know more about this, cross-country comparisons of life
satisfaction and happiness will remain highly controversial. This is not the case however
with measures of affects, especially negative affect, which has been well established to
have cross-national comparability (e.g. Van de Velde et al., 2010).9
9This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3
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1.3 INTRODUCTION TO THE MAIN SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING THEORIES
1.3.1 Need theories, relative theories and goal theories
Here, I will briefly review some the main SWB theories that are found in the literature.
These are essentially the following: need theories, relativistic judgements or comparison
theories, goal theories and cultural approaches. In a nutshell, need theories hold that
SWB depends on the satisfaction of universal needs while relativistic theories emphasise
the relative nature of needs. It is argued that SWB is not only a function of one’s
resources but one’s resources in relation to some standard of comparison. Goal theories,
on the other hand, put the emphasis on people’s goals or desires, and cultural approaches
discuss the effects of culture on SWB (however cultural approaches will not be discussed
here because they are less relevant to the chapters in this thesis).
These theories are to a degree compatible. Need theories have received support when
very basic needs are at stake, but the evidence is less clear beyond a certain threshold
due to the lack of conceptual precision. I believe that evolutionary theory can be very
helpful in defining what basic needs are and this is why the last part of this subsection is
dedicated to presenting what evolutionary theory and biology have to offer to the study
of happiness. Relativistic theories on the other hand have received less support, but it is
not entirely clear to what extent this is due to the invalidity of the theory or to empirical
difficulties such as the definition of the group of reference for the individual. This review
is by no means exhaustive. I only aim at providing a very brief introduction to the
explanations often found in the happiness literature, and in particular to those most
relevant for the following chapters. Besides, as each of the chapters contains a section
reviewing the relevant theories there is no need to make this introduction too long. Need
theories claim that SWB is related to need satisfaction. Need theorists usually refer to
basic needs that derive from our biology. They predict that people will experience feelings
of SWB to the extent that these basic needs are met. ‘Livability theories’ (Veenhoven and
Ehrhardt, 1995) are an example of such theories. In this context, objective conditions of
the country determine SWB and explain world differences in SWB. Note that although
the satisfaction of needs is partly an individual matter, society establishes the context
in which the individual lives and, by doing so, facilitates or impedes the satisfaction of
needs. Societies can be more or less effective in that respect, which could explain SWB
differences around the world.
The evidence available has given support to the idea that there are some basic needs
that when met raise SWB (e.g. Diener et al., 1995; Tay and Diener, 2011; Veenhoven,
1991, among others). Since wealthy countries are more likely to meet the basic needs of
their citizens, many studies have looked at the relationship between economic resources
and SWB in order to assess the validity of need theories (e.g. Diener et al., 1995, 1993).
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The former studies have found a strong correlation at low levels of income that loses
strength at higher levels, becoming flat after a certain point. This has been interpreted
as giving support to the basic needs approach because, it has been argued, when income
is devoted to basic needs fulfilment SWB rises but it ceases to do so after basic needs
have been met. However one problem with those studies is that they do not specify much
what basic needs are and simply assume per capita GDP to be a good proxy of need
satisfaction. This is not necessarily the case.
Some studies have attempted at a more rigorous measurement of need satisfaction
by selecting some non-controversial needs. For example, Diener et al. (1995) looked at
safe drinking water, infant mortality, life expectancy, calories available per capita, and
sanitary toilet facilities. These five variables were thought to capture whether the people
in each nation could meet their basic health, safety, and survival needs. In fact there was
a correlation between those and SWB, however they also found that after those needs
were being met, mean income of the nation still had an effect. Is this evidence against
need theories? Or is it simply that some important needs were left out? Or, are human
needs unlimited as some authors seem to suggest (e.g. Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008)
Other studies have used other indicators in an attempt to measure basic needs but
similar problems emerge. Veenhoven and Ehrhardt (1995) reviewed supportive evidence
for the ‘livability theories’, and they concluded that societies differ in SWB, and that a
substantial amount of the variance can be accounted for by objective conditions. Factors
such as income, nutrition, equality, freedom, and education can account for 77 per cent
of the variance in national happiness (Veenhoven, 1993). One might wonder whether
equality is a basic need, which highlights again the importance of defining basic needs
more precisely. Not doing so makes it impossible to test its validity.
Diener et al. (1995) found that after what they considered basic needs were met, the
mean income of the nation still had an effect on SWB, but that after a certain point the
curve flattened out. While this evidence has been interpreted by some as giving support
to the basic needs story – note that basic needs in that case are defined as those that
are being fulfilled until income stops having an effect, relative theories have interpreted
it as lending support to relativistic theories. Relativistic theories (Michalos, 1985), or
comparison theories, claim that SWB is the result of the evaluation of your situation
with respect to some standard. In other words, this theory assumes that the evaluation
of life, SWB is based on a mental calculation, in which perceptions of life-as-it-is are
weighed against standards of how-life-should-be. In this context, the relativistic model
suggest that SWB depends not on one’s absolute level of resources but on how one’s
resources compare to the relevant comparison standards such as one’s past levels or the
level of others or our expectations for the future. Unlike need theories, similar objective
conditions lead to very different SWB and the other way round. In a way, what this
theory is saying is that needs may be relative.
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For example, Richard Easterlin claimed that the flat relationship or no relationship
between income and happiness after a certain income level was the result of social com-
parisons (Easterlin, 1974), or to raising expectations Easterlin (2001). Something similar
has happened with the debate applied to within countries. In almost every country, in-
dividuals in the upper part of the income distribution do report higher SWB levels than
less well-off individuals. While needs theorists would explain this as being the result of
different needs satisfaction – richer individuals can fulfil more needs than poorer indi-
viduals and therefore be happier – relative theories have resorted to social comparisons
to explain this same outcome. In essence, the idea is that those who have more feel
better than those who have less – who feel deprived. Put differently, needs are relative.
According to relative theories, needs increase in line with rises in mean income (needs
are relative), and therefore, those with more resources will always be more capable of
satisfying more needs than those with less. Need theories would claim that wealthy in-
dividuals are simply more capable of satisfying their needs – which are absolute – than
less wealthy individuals, and that is how they explain the SWB gap within each country.
This is credible in some countries but may be less so in already very rich countries where
we believe everyone’s needs are being met.
Although the laboratory evidence is positive about the effects of social comparisons on
SWB when individuals are asked to focus on a certain target (Strack et al., 1993), it is not
clear whether those generalise in a natural setting. The evidence about social comparison
is mixed and inconsistent, and this may be due to the fact that in a natural setting social
comparisons do not work as simply as they do in the lab, where the researcher somehow
directs and influences the way in which the comparison is to be made. In reality this
process is much more flexible, to the extent that it makes no sense to assume that that
relative position automatically leads to a certain SWB level (this will be discussed in
greater detail in Chapter 2), and therefore that happiness may not be a zero-sum game.
On the contrary, evidence on networks effects seems to point in the opposite direction:
to happiness being contagious due to reasons other than social comparisons (Fowler and
Christakis, 2008).10
So far, the main difference that we have seen between need and relative theories is
that in the first case, the needs whose satisfaction leads to SWB are limited – even if we
do not know what they are – whereas in the latter case, those would be unlimited, we
can desire anything that we know exists. There is yet another important difference, need
satisfaction produces SWB regardless of whether the individual is aware of it. Relative
theories require the attention of the individual and the exercise of a comparison in order
to produce an effect on SWB. Thus, relative theories are about the satisfaction of wants
or desires. Although we are not sure what the basic need or needs are, it seems clear
than needs and desires are different things. We can all agree on that. From a biological
10A more general discussion of networks effects is found in Christakis and Fowler (2009).
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viewpoint, a need would be something that is necessary for organisms to live a healthy
life, whereas a want or desire is something that we are ready to strive for but that is not
essential to our survival. Thus, needs are distinguished from wants because a deficiency
would cause a clear negative outcome, such as dysfunction or death. It is less clear
whether the satisfaction (or not) of desires would cause harm.
Figure 1.5: Needs, wants, and SWB
As Figure 1.5 shows, there may be some overlap between needs and wants, but they
are not the same. The satisfaction of wants may or may not lead to SWB. On the other
hand there may be things leading to SWB that we may not desire or pursue consciously
(part of the grey circle that does not intersect with the empty circle). The remaining part
may be things that lead to SWB without us being aware of them (Brunstein et al., 1998).
And this is precisely where goal theories step in, since goal theories claim that people
have goals and that SWB is linked to the degree of achievement of those (Emmons, 1986).
In other words, they are concerned with the connection between the empty circle and
SWB because they form the link between wants or desires and SWB. Generally, progress
towards goals was correlated with pleasant affect and failing to reach one’s goals was
correlated with negative affect (Emmons, 1986); but certain types of goals were more or
less beneficial for SWB. For example, Kasser and Ryan (1993), argued that goals that
are not compatible with intrinsic human needs could be detrimental to SWB (e.g. they
found that those who rated financial success as an important goal reported lower SWB
than those who endorsed self-acceptance, community feeling, and affiliation goals, even
when participants were making progress towards materialistic goals). In a similar vein
Brunstein et al. (1998), argued that progress toward motive-congruent goals (motives
related to basic needs) were related to SWB, but goals that conflict should not. He
further claimed that ‘individuals have motives that they may or may not consciously
recognise. Note that he was referring to the part of the grey circle that is not intersected
with the white one.
Thus, goal theories seem to support the idea that not all desires, or their satisfaction,
lead to SWB. Only some do, and those that do seem to be strongly related to our human
nature, meaning that biology probably has a lot to say in this. So goal theories seem to
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be more in line with need theories than with relative theories. In this context, the study
of happiness should benefit from an understanding of the character of the relevant genetic
influence, where evolutionary theory can explain a lot. This is what we will review next,
to close this section.
1.3.2 The biology of happiness
There are two main links between the natural sciences and the study of happiness: the
evolutionary perspective and the neurological approach. What follows concentrates on
the evolutionary perspective and is mostly based on Grinde’s work Grinde (2002a,b,
2005). This approach suggests that happiness is simply a tool of evolution to direct our
behaviour rather than an end in itself. We are not ‘designed’ to be happy but to survive
and reproduce (Camerer, 2007; Camerer et al., 2004; Rayo and Becker, 2007) – all cited in
(Frey, 2008, p. 5), and the brain plays an important role in this by creating emotions that
direct or influence our behaviour. Therefore, a better understanding of our evolutionary
history may be useful to individuals and societies in their pursuit of happiness, as well
as helping us to improve society.
Applying an evolutionary perspective to the social sciences is somewhat controversial.
One relevant concern is that this perspective suggests an overly deterministic model. It
is important to keep in mind that biology concerns the average person, and therefore the
principles suggested by behavioural human biology may be more appropriate for a society
than for any given individual members of that society because a particular individual is
not only shaped by universal human inborn tendencies, and his particular set of genes,
but also by general culture and proximate individual environment (Grinde, 2005) This
also means that the evolutionary approach may be of limited value in providing specific
advice on how to study happiness (for the time being at least); nevertheless, it can offer
a useful conceptual framework (Buss, 1998; Palmer and Palmer, 2001).
Two aspects of our evolutionary legacy seem particularly relevant when thinking about
SWB. One of them is the existence of discrepancies between the environment in which
modern humans live, and the environment of evolutionary adaptation – the conditions
to which the genes are adapted, the way of life of Palaeolithic tribes can be a good
approximation. The second is the existence of feelings that influence our behaviour
(Grinde, 1996; Barkow, 1997; Buss, 2000).
The disparities between how we live and what our genes are adapted to have been
referred to as ‘mismatches’. The term ‘discord’ is used for the cases where mismatches
have detrimental effects (note that mismatches can also be beneficial – e.g., sleeping on
a mattress versus on the floor). SWB is expected to correlate inversely with the presence
of discords. In many ways, people live in much greater comfort than their ancestors.
Sleeping on a mattress rather than on the floor is one simple difference between how
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we live and how our ancestors did. This difference is clearly not problematic. In fact,
it is beneficial. However not all differences between the modern environment and the
environment of evolutionary adaptation are beneficial, for instance, experts seem to agree
on the fact that the main source of discords are related to social issues. Humans evolved in
the context of small groups, of between 50 and 200 individuals (Dunbar, 1993), whereas
nowadays many individual live in large cities. This affects all our interactions, from
the number of strangers we meet in the street to mating behaviour, who we help and
who we are helped by, among others. These are very different social environments and
it seems likely that it is the source of many psychological problems that seem to have
emerged with modern living, e.g. the relative anonymity and isolated nuclear families
make it more difficult to get the social support that would have characterised ancestral
social conditions (Nesse & Williams, 1994, p. 221). Buss (2000) suggests increasing the
closeness of extended kin, as well as the development of deep friendships to close the gap
between the environment of evolutionary adaptation and current environments; Tooby
and Cosmides (1996) make similar claims.11
Another example of an often-damaging mismatch that has recently been brought to
our attention is exposure to light. The exposure to light that most people experience
today, differs enormously from that of our ancestors and the conditions in which we
evolved. While being able to read late at night with the help of a lamp may be seen as
an improvement, this also has drawbacks because in essence we are exposed to too little
light during the day and too much during the night. Light is one of the factors telling
the organism when to be awake and when to sleep and this strange pattern of exposure
to light confuses our bodies. This is very nicely explained by the chronobiologist Till
Roenneberg in a recent book, “Internal Time: Chronotypes, Social Jet Lag, and Why
You’re So Tired” (Roenneberg, 2012).
Human beings have very varied and complex feelings that drive us to do what is best
for our genes (and their reproduction). Most likely humans have more complex set of
feelings than other vertebrates because we are also the animals with most intelligence and
free will. High intelligence and free will made it more likely for our ancestors to survive
and solve challenges, but it also made possible that we took actions that went against our
genes. Strong feelings acted like a counterweight. Reward circuits – positive emotions –
are presumably designed as incitement, while penalising feelings – negative emotions –
function as discouragement (Fredrickson, 2001; Grinde, 2002a). For example, the positive
sensation induced by sugar ensured that we ate things with sugar when we had a chance.
Looking at rewards does again point at our social life for explaining differences in SWB.
The most important dispensers of rewards and punishment are presumably associated
11Another example of discord or mismatch would be the long hours in the office coupled with feelings
of disconnection from the fruits of labour, which have a negative impact on SWB (Maslach, Schaufeli,
& Leiter, 2001, cited in Hill and Buss: 2008: 68).
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with the requirements for procreation and sustaining life: sex, food, shelter, and health.
If these basic needs are satisfied, the most significant external factor appears to be our
social life, i.e., how we socialise, bearing in mind that we need other human beings for our
survival, from the obvious fact of reproducing to getting food through hunting in groups
(Grinde, 2002a).
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1.4 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS: INTRODUCTION TO THE CHAPTERS
The remaining parts of the thesis are organised in three main chapters followed by a
concluding chapter. What the three main chapters have in common is subjective well-
being, that is, SWB is always the dependent variable, and each of the chapters addresses
it in one way or another. But, for the rest, they are quite different. This thesis tries
to provide some sociological insight in this field since it deals with three key concepts in
sociology such as reference groups (Merton and Lazersfeld, 1950; Veblen, 1899), social
class (Marx and Engels, 1848, Weber, E.O. Wright), and time (Gershuny, 1983, 2000;
Szalai et al., 1972). Each chapter is, however, essentially a stand-alone paper and can
therefore be read in any order. I hope that clarifying this will makes the thesis easier to
read. In the following paragraphs I will briefly explain what to expect from each chapter.
The next chapter, Chapter 2, tries to challenge relative theories, in particular it tries
to question the widespread idea that relative standing affects our SWB. To do so it uses
the British Household panel survey and looks at the effects of changes in relative position
on life satisfaction and negative emotions. The results of this chapter do not support the
idea that relative income affects our SWB. Happiness, or SWB more generally, does not
seem to be a zero-sum game. Although this chapter may seem somewhat disappointing, in
that it does not actually tell us what makes people happy, given the incredibly widespread
and deeply rooted beliefs of this idea that happiness is, partly, a zero-sum game, and given
the huge policy implications that this fact would have, I felt it was worth trying to prove
them wrong, or that testing the hypothesis in a better way is not a fruitless endeavour.
Chapter 3 aims at understanding differences in positive and negative emotions across
social classes. It does so using by data from several European countries that took part in
the third and sixth round of the European Social Survey, where a special module on SWB
was included. This module consisted of a battery of questions that permit the production
of measures of positive and negative affect that are comparable across countries. This
allowed the interesting comparison of levels and gaps of SWB across countries, as well as
the very interesting comparison of emotions before and after – or during – the economic
crisis that has affected so many countries. The latter is not only very interesting in itself
but also allows the making of stronger causal claims. This chapter seems to suggest
that differences across countries and across classes in negative emotions mostly, are due
to differences in economic hardship, unemployment and health. Once individual level
variables are taken into account, income inequality (nor per capita GDP or any of the
other macro variables) plays no role in explaining emotions, therefore challenging relative
theories and giving support to livability theories.
The last substantive chapter of the thesis, Chapter 4, is very different to the other
two, which use more or less conventional surveys with one or more measures of SWB per
respondent. This final chapter uses time use data linked to enjoyment rates, as well as
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many other SWB outcomes – from the last French time use survey, to investigate the
issue of work-life balance. Not only is this type of SWB data very special and somewhat
unique, but time diary data also allow an in-depth investigation of people’s lives that
is unparalleled by conventional surveys (therefore making the possibility of making a
contribution easier). In particular, I used several SWB measures as the benchmark against
which to assess the consequences that different working hours had on SWB. In particular I
explore the effects of working hours on enjoyment, time crunch and satisfaction measures,
to identify the optimal number of hours of work to maximise well-being. I was very
interested in seeing eventual trade-offs and in particular in seeing whether these optimal
points occurred at larger number of hours for individuals that really enjoy their jobs.
The final chapter closes the thesis by drawing some conclusions and highlighting some
limitations and ideas for future research. It should be warned that Chapter 4 is more
explorative and unconventional than the earlier chapters. Hence, in the conclusion I will





Who cares about the Joneses!
Relative income and subjective well-being using the BHPS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
There are two major theories of subjective well-being (SWB): livability and comparison
theories. Livability theories (Veenhoven and Ehrhardt, 1995) hold that SWB depends
on the satisfaction of universal needs. By contrast, comparison theories, or theories of
relative utility (Lance et al., 1995), hold that people assess the adequacy of their situation
in relation to variable standards such as other people. Although these theories are not
mutually incompatible, their policy implications can be quite distinct. If, as need theories
– or absolute utility theories – claim, SWB is about what the individual has, regardless of
others’ situation, then everyone can be made happier at the same time. Yet if comparison
theories are correct, raising everyone’s SWB becomes, to some extent, impossible.
When poor and rich countries are compared, it becomes clear that the relation be-
tween the wealth of a nation and average SWB is positive (Diener et al., 1995; Veenhoven,
1991), which supports absolute formulations of utility. However this relationship loses
strength as countries grow richer. In the last decades, many countries have experienced
unprecedented economic growth without any rise in SWB (Diener and Oishi, 2000; Diener
and Suh, 1997; Easterlin, 1974; Oswald, 1997). Richard Easterlin (1974) used social com-
parisons to reconcile the time-series results with the cross-sectional evidence that showed
that within every country the rich are happier than the poor. In such a context, raising
the incomes of all in tandem would leave happiness unaffected, which is why Richard
Layard (2005), among others, has been pushing for a reduction in income inequality as a
way to increase happiness in wealthy countries.
Solnick and Hemenway (1998) carried out a survey in which they asked respondents
to choose between a world in which they have more of a good than others, and one in
which everyone’s endowment of the good is higher, but the respondent has less than
others. Half of the respondents preferred to have 50% less real income but high relative
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income. This shows that people care about relative position and, therefore, it is likely
that relative concerns drive behaviour – as Veblen (1899), and many others after him
have suggested.1 However, the fact that people do care and do try to keep up with the
Joneses does not mean that doing so will make them happier. Preferences and utility
may not be the same thing. Caring about relative standing and being affected by it may
be rather different. This chapter is concerned with the latter.
The first section reviews the existing empirical evidence on the effects of relative
income on SWB, and it also reviews the literature on social comparison processes, high-
lighting the simplistic approach taken by most of the existing literature, which has simply
assumed that a contrast in incomes has consequences for SWB. Social comparisons are
complex processes where the individual plays an important role; he needs to choose the
object of the comparison, and who to compare with, among others. Besides, most people
do not compare their income with that of others when judging their lives. In light of this,
it becomes less surprising that researchers have found such weak evidence in support of
the relative income hypothesis. The remaining sections of the chapter are devoted to car-
rying out an empirical analysis using the British Household Panel Survey and exploring
the effects of changes in relative income on two different SWB outcomes: life satisfaction
and mental distress. Section 2.3 presents the dataset and describes the analysis carried
out. The results of these regressions question the idea that relative income matters for
SWB because changes in relative income are not followed by changes in life satisfaction,
nor for mental distress.
These results are quite robust because not only are two different SWB outcomes
considered, but in order to build the reference groups two different income variables are
looked at: personal earnings and per capita household income, and several reference
groups are used (see section 2.4.1). In addition the remaining sections conduct a series
of robustness checks that reinforce the credibility of the main results. Sections 2.4.2
and 2.4.3 for instance, try to address the possible endogeneity of changes in relative
income. Section 2.4.2 compares the distribution of personality across individuals that
change their relative position to different degrees. Section 2.4.3 explores separately the
effects of changes in relative income driven by own income to those driven by the income
of the reference group – since the latter should be more exogenous than the first. In the
remaining sections some more robustness checks are carried out to make sure that the ‘no
effects’ found are not the result of group differences that cancel each other out. Section
2.4.4 explores whether the effects of changes in relative position vary with the sign of the
change (positive or negative), and Section 2.4.5, takes personality into account. Finally,
Section 2.4.6 explores the effects of relative income on possible mediators between relative
income and SWB. In particular, the effects of relative income are explored on financial
1Other experiments that show that people care about relative position are: Alpizar et al. (2005);
Carlsson et al. (2007); Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002); Zizzo and Oswald (2001).
25
satisfaction, since this is one of the candidates to be channeling the effects between relative
income and SWB. The final section discusses the findings.
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2.2 THE RELATIVE INCOME HYPOTHESIS
2.2.1 The empirical evidence
According to the relative income hypothesis, having an income below that of your ref-
erence group reduces SWB, while having an income above that of the reference group
raises SWB. In this context, an individual’s SWB depends not only on what he or she
has, but also on what those with whom he or she compares have. Many researchers have
long defended the use of relative utility functions to account for this fact. Luttmer (2005)
and Clark and Oswald (1996) provide good reviews of this literature.
Defining the income of reference is difficult because we need to specify who individuals
compare themselves with. However, the fact that many reference groups have been used
in the literature and that they have all yielded similar results has given support to the
relative income idea. Ferrer-i Carbonell (2005) for instance, calculates comparison income
using a combination of sex, age and education. McBride (2001) uses the individual’s
cohort as a reference point. Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), Luttmer (2005), and Knight
et al. (2009) take a geographic approach.2
Table 2.1 shows some of the evidence in favour of the relative income hypothesis. It
includes some of the most cited papers that came out of a search with the terms: ‘rela-
tive income’, ‘relative income hypothesis’, ‘comparison income’, and ‘Easterlin paradox’.
Assuming that the coefficients of these papers could be given a causal interpretation, it
should be noted that its size is small, so much so that it should make us question to what
extent it can be concluded that relative income matters for SWB. In my view, most of
the literature in this area suffers from an excessive ‘cult of statistical significance’ (Ziliak
and McCloskey, 2008). Other authors have claimed that these ‘effects’ are not that small
if one takes into account that life satisfaction and happiness do not change much. Life
satisfaction is certainly more stable than other variables, but it does change. For in-
stance, for individuals in the British Household Panel Survey life satisfaction changes by
approximately 12% from one year to the next. This is much more than all the coefficients
in Table 2.1.
Most of the evidence relies on cross-sectional data, and therefore, making a causal
interpretation of the coefficients is doubtful. Unobserved characteristics may make some
individuals more likely to be well positioned in relative terms, as well as to enjoy higher
SWB. If this were so, the coefficient of relative income would be biased upwards. For
instance, Easterlin (1974), using data for the 1960s, found that in the US, individuals of
higher socioeconomic status had 1.1 points higher in self-reported happiness than indi-
viduals from lower socio-economic status (on a scale from 0 to 10). The coefficient would
also be biased upwards in the presence of reverse causality. There is evidence showing
2Clark et al. (2008) provides a very comprehensive review of this literature.
27
Table 2.1: Some of the evidence on the relative income hypothesis






SWB: happiness; Y*: posi-
tion in the income distribution;
DATA: cross-sectional for sev-
eral countries
In the US, individuals of higher socioe-
conomic status had 1.1 points higher in
self-reported happiness than individuals
from lower socio-economic status (on a





SWB: job satisfaction, Y*: pre-
dicted earnings, DATA: cross-
sectional for 5,000 British work-
ers
A reduction of 2 standard deviations in
earnings was associated with a 5% re-






SWB: happiness, Y*: average
earnings of people in the same
region and cohort, DATA: cross-
sectional US data
The probability of answering being
‘very happy’ decreases by 7.9% when




analysis of the com-
parison income effect.
[725]
SWB: life satisfaction, Y*: av-
erage earnings of those with the
same age, education and region,
DATA: panel data for Germany
The respondent’s SWB depends on how
his income compares with the income of
persons in his reference group. Marginal
effects are not provided.
Luttmer (2005), Neigh-
bours as negatives: rel-
ative earnings and well-
being. [1,071]
SWB: happiness and mental dis-
tress, Y*: earnings of the in-
dividuals living in the same re-
gion, DATA: panel data for the
US
an increase in log(neighbours earnings)
of 1 unit would reduce happiness by
4.13% for married individuals. No ef-
fects on mental distress were found.
The number in brackets, after the paper title captures the number of citations received by November,
the 10th, 2013. ‘SWB’ refers to the subjective well being measure used, and ‘Y*’ specifies the income
of reference.
that happiness significantly affects many life outcomes because of the many benefits of
positive emotions (Fredrickson, 2001). Lyubomirsky et al. (2005), for instance, showed
that happier individuals were more successful in many life realms, including income. In
this context, the coefficients from the regression with cross-sectional data would also be
biased upwards. Therefore panel data is preferred.
The little evidence on the effects of relative income using panel data is mixed. Luttmer
(2005) finds that an increase in neighbours’ income is associated with a decrease in SWB,
although the effect is rather small, and it only applies to married individuals. He finds
no effects on mental distress.3 Senik (2004), however, finds that the reference group’s
income exerts a positive influence on individual satisfaction, which contrasts with other
studies on the subject. She interprets this as a ‘tunnel effect’ following Hirschman and
3In addition, he does not find an effect of neighbours’ earnings on financial satisfaction, which should
be the mechanism linking neighbours’ earnings and happiness
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Rothschild (1973).4 A similar interpretation is made by Knies (2010) for East Germany.5
2.2.2 Social comparison processes and subjective well-being
The literature just discussed has generally assumed that relative income affects SWB
through the mechanism of social comparisons in a more or less automatic manner (i.e.
having more than others makes you happy and having less reduces your happiness).
However, psychologists have shown that social comparisons do not take place in such a
simplistic way, social comparison processes are more complex, allowing for variation in the
type of information that is used in comparison as well as the way that the information is
used (Diener et al., 1999). For instance, the choice of a comparison target and a reference
group is a flexible process and is not determined solely by proximity. Besides, even when
individuals make a similar comparison the consequences may be different depending on
how they decide to use this information (Buunk and Van Yperen, 1991; Dunning et al.,
1989). For example, others’ success might be seen with envy, or as a source of inspiration.6
In sum, all the relevant parameters of a social comparison: the choice of comparison
target, a reference group and the directionality of effects on SWB, are flexible processes
that are very much up to the individual. In fact, it has been shown that people often
do use social comparisons in a self-serving way (Brown and Dutton, 1995; Diener and
Fujita, 1997). In this context, a mere contrast in income does not necessarily affect SWB.
Individuals could simply choose wisely the reference groups so that they benefit from a
comparison or simply avoid income comparisons altogether if their financial situation is
bad. In fact, unlike need theories, which predict that need fulfilment automatically causes
SWB, relative theories require that the individual actively engages in social comparisons
– of income in this case. But does that happen?
The European Social Survey, in its third round (2006), asked individuals from 22
different countries about this. In one of the questions, individuals were asked whether
comparing one’s income with that of other individuals was or was not important. The
answers were measured on a 7-point scale that ranged from 0 ‘not at all important’ to 6
‘very important’. The most popular category in all countries was ‘not at all important’,
even though after aggregating some of the categories to build Figure 2.1, the ‘not impor-
tant’ category appears as the most popular. The answers vary slightly across countries
but the main story remains: more than half of the people think that comparing one’s
4The Tunnel Effect refers to the relief experienced when even though you are stuck in a tunnel, the
lane next to you starts to move. Initially you feel better, even though you are still stuck, because this
signals to you that the jam has ended and your own lane will soon start moving too. In terms of relative
income, this would mean that when you see a neighbour with more income, you could interpret it as a
prediction of what will happen to you soon.
5It seems as if researchers’ desire to find an effect of relative income made them too hasty in accepting
the evidence they found, even when it meant readjusting the hypothesis substantially.
6Some recent studies have taken some of this into account (Budŕıa and Ferrer-i Carbonell, 2012; Falk
and Knell, 2004)
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income with the income of others is not important, and this amount is, in most cases,
twice that of those that claim that comparing one’s own income is important. There was
another question that aimed at finding out who respondents compared themselves with,
the possible answers were: ‘work colleagues’, ‘family’, ‘friends’ and, ‘no one’. Consistently
with the previous question, most people report not making comparisons at all (36.3%).
The next most popular response is comparing with work colleagues (35.9%), followed –
by quite far – by ‘friends’, ‘family’ and finally, ‘other’. There is some variation across
countries but, in all of them, the two most popular groups by far are ‘no one’ and ‘work
colleagues’.
Figure 2.1: Social comparisons in Europe in 2006
(a) How important is to compare your income
with others’?
(b) Whose income would you compare your own
with?
Source: The European Social Survey, third round of data. Countries included: Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland,
France, UK, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Sweden,
Slovenia, Slovakia, and Ukraine.
If these reports were true, they would undermine the relative income hypothesis as it
is laid out in most of the papers mentioned so far. A mere contrast in income cannot affect
SWB via social comparisons if people do not engage in social comparisons (leaving aside
the fact that social comparisons may not actually occur in the simplistic way proposed).
Social desirability could be, for sure, influencing these reports. For instance, if they think
that comparing with others is not acceptable – as seems to be the case – then people could
be under-reporting the use of social comparisons. However, precisely because most people
think that comparing their income with others’ is not important, this could influence them
in not making social comparison when judging their lives. In fact, according to Schimmack
et al. (2002) less than 10% of individuals use social comparison when reporting their life
satisfaction. Schimmack et al. (2002) asked 150 individuals to report their life-satisfaction
and immediately after they were asked to report their thoughts during the life-satisfaction
judgments. Respondents quite often thought about family, romantic life or relationships
with friends, whereas financial situation was mentioned less frequently (9% of the cases)
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and social comparisons just 6% of the time. In the light of these findings, the authors
conclude that it is unlikely that individual differences in income influence life-satisfaction
judgments. In the light of these studies, assuming that people make income comparisons
when judging their lives seems to be a very strong assumption.
Yet, social comparisons probably do take place, at some point everyone engages in a
social comparison, and doing so will likely provoke an emotional response. However, that
social comparisons elicit some feelings at the time they occur does not imply that those
will leave a permanent or significant trace in us. Social comparisons could have an effect
on transient emotions, but not affect measures of SWB that involve judgment and eval-
uation, such as life satisfaction or happiness.7 The former evidence casts serious doubts
on the idea that a mere contrast in incomes automatically leads to social comparisons,
and that those in turn affect SWB. This could explain the weak evidence presented in
Table 2.1.
7As discussed in the first chapter, SWB has three distinct components: life satisfaction, positive
affect, and negative affect. Self reported happiness or life-satisfaction results from the evaluative beliefs
about one’s life. In contrast, positive and negative affect reflect the amount of pleasant and unpleasant
feelings that people experience in their lives (Schimmack, 2008). Making a social comparison can produce
unpleasant – or pleasant – feelings at the moment in which the comparison is made, but it may not have
any effect on life satisfaction or general happiness.
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2.3 DATA & EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
2.3.1 Data
The dataset used in this chapter is the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), where the
same representative sample of individuals is followed over a period of years. The BHPS
was carried out by the Institute for Social and Economic Research at the University of
Essex from 1991-2009 (Waves 1-18). The main objective of the survey was to further
understanding of social and economic change at the individual and household level in
Britain (and in the UK from Wave 11 onwards).8 Thus, the BHPS includes a wide range of
information about individuals and households, SWB questions are also part of the survey.
In particular, individuals are asked about their life satisfaction and mental distress. Since
the aim of this chapter is to measure the effects of relative income on SWB, understood
as broadly as possible, both measures will be used. Life Satisfaction is measured with the
following question: “All things considered, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your
life as a whole?”, from 1 “not satisfied at all”, to 7 “completely satisfied”. The second
dependent variable is a measure of mental distress that is obtained from the answers
to the General Health Questionnaire (Goldberg and Williams, 1988). This is a form of
valuation that has been used in psychiatry for some time and was incorporated into the
BHPS from the very beginning. The mental distress measure ranges from 0-36, where
a higher number means more distress. For comparability purposes, both measures have
been rescaled so as to take values from 0-10. Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of the
two SWB variables. It can be seen that most people are satisfied with their lives and
experience low levels of mental distress because the distribution of life-satisfaction is
negatively skewed and the distribution of distress is positively skewed.
The BHPS started in 1991 and concluded in 2008, it has 18 waves in total. All waves
available will be used for the current analysis but it should be noted that while mental
distress is available in all waves, life satisfaction is not, and therefore sample size will be
somewhat smaller when life satisfaction is the dependent variable. The life satisfaction
question is present in waves 6 to 10 and 12 to 18. However it should be noted that sample
size is large enough in all cases to get precise estimates.
Relative income (ri) is defined in equation (2.1), where ri stands for relative income,
(y) is the income of the individual, and (y∗) the income of the reference group. By taking
logs we give more weight to changes in ri that occur closer to y∗. This makes sense
since changes around the reference point should be more salient to the individual, and
therefore have a greater effect on SWB. Two measures of income will be used: usual net
payment per month and a measure of per capita household income.9 The purpose of using
8From Wave 19, the BHPS became part of a new longitudinal study called Understanding Society,
but this analysis is restricted to the BHPS.
9The latter will be obtained by dividing annual household income by the equivalent household size
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Figure 2.2: The distribution of subjective well being in the UK in 2002.
(a) Life satisfaction (b) Mental distress
Source: The British Household Panel Survey, 12th round (2002). For building this graph, the
original life-satisfaction variable was used (ranging from 1-7).
two measures of income is twofold. On the one hand using two measures will make the
results more robust, and on the other hand – and more importantly – these two measures
do capture slightly different things. While the measure of per capita household income
captures access to resources, the personal income measure does measure what you earn,
which may or may not coincide with what you have access to, but it could be argued that
individuals make comparisons based on what they make rather than on what remains for
them after dividing with the other household members.10
ri = log(y/y∗) (2.1)
Defining the income of reference (y∗) is very difficult and is probably the most contro-
versial part of this and all other research that tries to assess the effects of relative income
on SWB. In consequence a variety of reference groups have been used in the literature.
Since the former is precisely the literature that this paper wants to challenge, a variety
of reference groups will be used here as well. I consider the following groups: individuals
in the same region, individuals with the same education level, in the same occupation, in
the same ethnic group and, a combination of the former. Table 2.2 shows all the relative
income variables as well as the variables used to build them together with its categories.
The income of reference (y∗) for a given individual is simply the average income in that
according to McClements scale (McClements, 1977), which simply corrects household size to take into
account that different types of household members do have different needs. This allows making income
comparisons across different types of households. This variable is provided by the BHPS.
10The population under study will vary depending on the income variable used, with personal income
allowing us to study the effects of relative income on employed people only; whereas per capita household
income extends the analysis to a much larger part of the population. The sample under study will also
depend on the SWB measure used because although the General Health Questionnaire appears from the
very first wave (1991), the life satisfaction question appears only in 1996 and from then is available for
all years with the exception of 2001.
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Table 2.2: The variables used to create the reference income
ri variable Variable defining the reference groups
ri region19 region19 (19): Inner London, Outer London, R. of South East, South West,
East Anglia, East Midlands, West Midlands Conurb, R. of West Midlands,
Greater Manchester, Merseyside, R. of North West, South Yorkshire, West
Yorkshire, R. of Yorks & Humber, Tyne & Wear, R. of North, Wales, Scotland,
Northern Ireland.
ri region133 region133 (133); divides respondents into 133 areas corresponding to NUTS3,
Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics suggested by the Eurostat with
the aim of having comparable territorial units across Europe.
ri ethnicity ethnicity (3): white, black and Indian origin
ri educ education (3); higher, medium and lower education level.
ri occup occupation (9); managers and senior official; professionals; associate profes-
sionals and technicians; administrative and secretarial; skilled trades; personal
service; sales and customer service; process, plant and machinery operatives;
elementary occupations.
ri predicted y∗ is the predicted wage for an individual living in the same region, of the same
age and gender, and, with the same education level.
ri = log(y/y∗), where y is own income, and y∗ is the average of the income of individuals in the
same reference group.
group, obtained from the sample using cross-sectional weights. There are two exceptions
to the former, ri region133 and ri predicted. In the first, the y∗ for each region is the
estimated Gross Disposable Household Income (GDHI) that the UK Office for National
Statistics calculates every year since 1995. In this particular case, getting y∗ from the
sample would be problematic since most of the NUTS3 regions are represented by a
few panel members only. With regards to ri predicted, y∗ is the predicted wage for an
individual of the same gender, age, region, and education.
Geographically based reference groups are very popular in the literature (e.g. Luttmer,
2005), and closer reference groups are in principle more interesting, since people are more
likely to make comparisons with those closer to them, and this is much more likely to be
captured by smaller regional areas and this is why region 133 is in principle more inter-
esting than region 19. ri occup and ri wage are particularly relevant because according
to the European Social Survey, work colleagues were the group with whom individuals
would compare.
2.3.2 Empirical strategy
This paper uses longitudinal data in order to exploit the within individual variation in
relative position, and by doing so time-constant unobserved heterogeneity is eliminated.
Besides, by looking at yearly changes, reverse causality becomes less likely. If happier
individuals can earn more income, changes in SWB could drive changes in relative income,
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however, in a year period such effects become unlikely because the benefits of positive
emotions take longer to occur. Therefore, if we see that yearly changes in relative income
are associated with yearly changes in SWB, causation will most likely be running from
relative income to SWB.
Since relative income is defined as a function of own income and income of the reference
group – ri = log(y/y∗) –, changes in relative position go hand in hand with changes in own
income. With more income, one’s relative position can improve – provided that others’
positions remain the same – but so does one’s absolute income level. Since absolute
income could have an effect of its own on SWB (Diener et al., 1995; Stevenson and
Wolfers, 2008; Veenhoven, 1991), we should control for it. To do so individuals are
divided into five groups according to the income quintile to which they belong at the
time they experience the change in relative income, and separate fixed effects regressions
are estimated for each. If relative income does have an effect on SWB, one would expect
the relative income coefficient to be statistically as well as economically significant at
all income levels. However, if the ‘effect’ of changes in relative income became smaller
as higher income levels are considered, it would suggest that relative income does not
have an effect on SWB and, instead, that absolute income was driving the effect. Some
summary statistics of the income quintiles can be found in the appendix, see Table A1.11
The effects of relative income on SWB will be estimated using fixed effects for each
income quintile separately. The dependent variables will be life-satisfaction and mental
distress, and relative income will be the only variable on the right-hand side. This will be
repeated several times given that we have six reference groups and two income variables.
The results of these regressions question the idea that relative income matters for SWB
because changes in relative income are not followed by changes in life satisfaction or
mental distress. These results are shown in section 2.4.1. Several robustness checks are
carried out and will be described next. It should be noted, nevertheless, that the baseline
results constitute a robust result given that they use six different reference group variables,
two income variables and two different SWB outcomes.12
Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 try to assess the possible endogeneity of changes in relative
income. In particular, section 2.4.2 explores the possible self-selection into change in
relative income by comparing the distribution of personality traits among individuals that
experience changes in relative income to different degrees. Section 2.4.3 looks separately
at the effects of changes in relative income driven by own income (y), and to those driven
by the income of the reference group (y∗), since the latter should be more exogenous than
the first. Section 2.4.5 explores the effects of changes in relative position for different types
11Note that by doing OLS one is implicitly assuming that the answers to the life satisfaction question
are cardinal and thus comparable across respondents. Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters (2004) show that
it makes virtually no difference whether one assumes ordinality or cardinality of SWB answers.
12Several controls were tried out but the coefficients for relative income did not change and therefore
we opted for the most parsimonious model.
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of individual – different personality types – to make sure that the no effects of the baseline
results are not hiding important group differences. Section 2.4.4 sees whether positive and
negative changes may have different effects on SWB. Finally, section 2.4.6 explores the
effects of relative income on variables that could be channelling the connection between




Figures 2.3 to 2.6 show the baseline results of the effects of changes in relative position
on SWB. In particular, Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show the effects of relative income on life
satisfaction using earnings and per capita household income respectively, while Figures
2.5 and 2.6 show the effects of relative income on mental distress. Within each figure
there are several graphs, one for each relative income variable; and within each graph
there are five estimates together with the confidence intervals. As usual, the estimates
capture the effect of a unit change in relative income on SWB – life-satisfaction or mental
distress – for the income quintile in question.
Figure 2.3: Marginal effect of relative income –using earnings– on life satisfaction
(a) Region19 (b) Region133 (c) Education
(d) Occupation (e) Ethnicity (f) Predicted wage
On the horizontal axis we find the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th income quintile. On the vertical
axis we find the βri resulting from the fixed effects regressions, that is, the expected change in
life satisfaction when relative income changes by one unit. Life satisfaction ranges from 0 to
10 but in these graphs the Y-axis range from -0.25 to 0.5 so that we can appreciate the small
variation. The regression table can be found on Table 2.3 on page 41.
The main message provided by figures 2.3 to 2.6 is that changes in relative position
are not associated with changes in SWB. Changes in relative income do not seem to affect
either life satisfaction or mental distress, and the results are very similar when we use the
relative income variables constructed with earnings and with household income. Although
there are some coefficients that are statistically different from zero, in most cases they have
no practical significance. Besides, in order to assess the effects of relative income we should
focus on the coefficients obtained for the top quintiles. The largest of those are found
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when we look at the effects on life satisfaction using per capita household income (Figure
2.4), and they are always below 0.1. This is a small change if one takes into account
that life satisfaction ranges from 0 to 10 and, that for that change to occur on SWB, and
assuming that at t0 his income was equal to that of his reference group, his income would
have to multiply by 2.7 between t0 and t1 (assuming that y∗ remains unchanged). For
instance if one considers an individual belonging to a household in the 3rd quintile with an
income equal to the average level in that quintile (1,001 pounds), and his income increases
by 20% (up to 1,200 pounds), and assuming that the income of reference (individuals in
the same region) remains unchanged at 1,000 pounds, the individual should experience
an increase in life satisfaction of 0.018 (recall that life satisfaction goes from 0 to 10). See
estimate for the third quintile in Figure 2.4a. Bear in mind that an increase of almost
20% is the average positive change in relative income that individuals experience (see
Table 2.7).
Figure 2.4: Marginal effect of relative income – using household income – on life satisfac-
tion.
(a) Region19 (b) Region133 (c) Education
(d) Occupation (e) Ethnicity (f) Predicted wage
On the horizontal axis we find the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th income quintile. On the vertical
axis we find the βri resulting from the fixed effects regressions, that is, the expected change in
life satisfaction when relative income changes by one unit. Life satisfaction ranges from 0 to
10 but in these graphs the Y-axis range from -0.25 to 0.5 so that we can appreciate the small
variation. The regression table can be found on Table 2.4 on page 42.
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show the coefficients of relative income in the life satisfaction
regressions. One would expect to find a decreasing effect of relative income as higher
income levels were considered, driven by absolute income effects. However, what we find
instead is that only changes in the 3rd quintile are associated with a change in life satis-
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faction, while there is no effect (or the effect is smaller) for lower and top quintiles. The
former is definitely surprising but does not contradict the main hypothesis put forward
in this chapter, that is, that relative income does not affect SWB.
Figure 2.5: Marginal effect of relative income – using earnings – on mental distress.
(a) Region19 (b) Region133 (c) Education
(d) Occupation (e) Ethnicity (f) Predicted wage
On the horizontal axis we find the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th income quintile. On the vertical
axis we find the βri resulting from the fixed effects regressions, that is, the expected change
in mental distress when relative income changes by one unit. Mental distress ranges from 0 to
10 but in these graphs the Y-axis range from -0.25 to 0.5 so that we can appreciate the small
variation. The regression table can be found on Table 2.5 on page 42.
Figure 2.4 shows the effects of changes in relative income on life satisfaction using per
capita household income rather than earnings. The sample size is much larger in this
case because we include all individuals, not only those in employment, which is probably
why the confidence intervals narrow. The pattern here is similar, the coefficients are
always quite close to zero but are slightly higher for middle-income groups than for the
lowest and top quintiles. It should be noted, however, that while there is statistical
significance for quintiles 4 and 5, the size of the coefficients is rather small – around 0.1.
It is interesting to note that there are not important variations across reference groups.
This is also interesting because the reference groups selected differ in their degree of
endogeneity. Reference groups defined by occupation are in principle more endogenous
than those defined geographically, and in any case they are simply different reference
groups.
When we look at the effects of changes in relative income on mental distress we ar-
rive at the same conclusion because changes in relative position are not associated with
changes in mental distress regardless of whether relative income is calculated using earn-
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ings (Figure 2.5) or per capita household income (Figure 2.6). In all cases the confidence
intervals cross the zero line and in all cases the point estimates are very close to zero.
This is very clear when per capita household income is used, whereas when personal in-
come is used we see the expected trend of diminishing effect as income rises that could be
produced by the diminishing effects of absolute income and a no effect of relative income.
The positive slope in Figure 2.5 is what we would expect because mental distress is a
negative measure of well-being – a greater number means less well-being.
Figure 2.6: Marginal effect of relative income –using household income– on mental distress
(a) Region19 (b) Region133 (c) Education
(d) Occupation (e) Ethnia (f) Predicted wage
On the horizontal axis we find the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th income quintile. On the vertical
axis we find the βri resulting from the fixed effects regressions, that is, the expected change
in mental distress when relative income changes by one unit. Mental distress ranges from 0 to
10 but in these graphs the Y-axis range from -0.25 to 0.5 so that we can appreciate the small
variation. The regression table can be found on Table 2.6 on page 43.
This trend is more obvious for some reference groups than for others, but it is present
in all cases: in the lowest income quintiles, changes in relative income reduce mental
distress, while this is no longer the case for the top quintiles. Changes in relative position
using household income do not seem to be associated with mental distress for any income
quintile. It is worth noting that these results for mental distress are similar to those
obtained by Luttmer (2005). While he could find some effect of neighbours’ income on
happiness self-reports, he found no effect on mental distress. The fact that neighbours’
earnings do not affect mental distress is quite problematic because it is usually distress,
or negative consequences on SWB in general, that supporters of the relative income
hypothesis refer to when they argue that relative position affects well-being. In other
words, the negative consequences of not keeping up with the Joneses are more often
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discussed than the happiness derived from surpassing them.
2.4.1.1 The regression tables of the main results
Table 2.3: Marginal effect of relative income – using earnings – on life satisfaction
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Coef./(s.e.) Coef./(s.e.) Coef./(s.e.) Coef./(s.e.) Coef./(s.e.)
Region19 -0.021 0.016 0.187** 0.048 0.086
(0.037) (0.062) (0.071) (0.079) (0.067)
Region133 -0.021 0.019 0.185* 0.059 0.105
(0.037) (0.062) (0.072) (0.078) (0.068)
Education -0.014 0.037 0.144* 0.060 0.050
(0.038) (0.060) (0.069) (0.072) (0.065)
Occupation 0.000 0.003 0.113 -0.006 0.021
(0.047) (0.060) (0.058) (0.056) (0.057)
Ethnicity -0.028 0.016 0.184* 0.115 0.110
(0.039) (0.064) (0.072) (0.079) (0.070)
Pr. wage -0.028 -0.023 0.085 -0.002 -0.010
(0.038) (0.060) (0.066) (0.070) (0.063)
N 11,608 12,759 12,989 12,595 11,796
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Q1 to
Q5 refer to Income quintiles 1 to 5 respectively.
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Table 2.4: Marginal effect of relative income – using household income – on life satisfac-
tion.
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Coef./(s.e.) Coef./(s.e.) Coef./(s.e.) Coef./(s.e.) Coef./(s.e.)
Region19 -0.010 -0.002 0.081* 0.111** 0.079**
(0.023) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.027)
Region133 -0.007 0.004 0.081* 0.117** 0.085**
(0.023) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.026)
Education -0.019 -0.016 0.052 0.087* 0.083**
(0.023) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.027)
Ethnicity -0.015 -0.006 0.073* 0.116** 0.085**
(0.023) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.028)
Pr. wage -0.044 -0.079* 0.026 0.061 0.062*
(0.024) (0.039) (0.035) (0.035) (0.027)
N 27,022 26,608 25,557 25,330 24,811
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Q1 to
Q5 refer to Income quintiles 1 to 5 respectively.
Table 2.5: Marginal effect of relative income – using earnings – on mental distress.
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Coef./(s.e.) Coef./(s.e.) Coef./(s.e.) Coef./(s.e.) Coef./(s.e.)
Region19 -0.056* -0.090* -0.042 -0.068 0.064
(0.025) (0.045) (0.051) (0.053) (0.051)
Region133 -0.065* -0.089 -0.033 -0.009 0.070
(0.027) (0.047) (0.054) (0.056) (0.056)
Education -0.057* -0.105* -0.017 -0.026 0.080
(0.025) (0.045) (0.049) (0.049) (0.048)
Occupation -0.028 -0.017 -0.042 -0.015 0.044
(0.030) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.039)
Ethnicity -0.055* -0.097* -0.047 -0.068 0.076
(0.026) (0.046) (0.051) (0.054) (0.052)
Pr. wage -0.044 -0.073 0.018 0.006 0.088*
(0.025) (0.042) (0.046) (0.047) (0.044)
N 15,520 17,163 17,351 17,214 16,102
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Q1 to
Q5 refer to Income quintiles 1 to 5 respectively.
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Table 2.6: Marginal effect of relative income – using household income – on mental
distress.
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Coef./(s.e.) Coef./(s.e.) Coef./(s.e.) Coef./(s.e.) Coef./(s.e.)
Region19 -0.014 -0.040 -0.057* -0.058* 0.003
(0.014) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.018)
Region133 -0.016 -0.033 -0.021 -0.064* 0.003
(0.015) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) (0.020)
Education -0.016 -0.034 -0.038 -0.039 0.007
(0.014) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.019)
Ethnicity -0.023 -0.036 -0.041 -0.049 0.009
(0.014) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.019)
Pr. Wage 0.005 0.020 -0.004 -0.019 0.024
(0.015) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.019)
N 35,376 35,480 34,653 34,595 34,146
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Q1 to
Q5 refer to Income quintiles 1 to 5 respectively.
2.4.2 Assessing self-selection into change in relative income
Because relative position is not randomly assigned, panel data is preferred to cross-
sectional data. However, changes in relative income are not random either. Individuals
experiencing greater changes in relative position may not necessarily be similar to those
experiencing no changes, or to those experiencing negative changes. This could be a
problem for the estimation of the parameter, and it should be a greater concern the
less widespread the changes in relative income are across the population. Table 2.7,
shows some summary statistics of change in relative income. It can be seen that most
individuals experience a change in relative position during their time in the panel, note
that average life-change is almost 1. Approximately 57% experience an improvement and
43% experience a worsening. As expected, yearly change is much lower than life change;
nevertheless, there is change in relative income from one year to the next too.
Although both life and yearly change in relative income are experienced by a large
part of the sample, the distribution of change in relative income is not homogeneous.
Some individuals do experience greater changes in relative income than others and, if
the reason for this bears some relation to SWB, the estimates could be biased. One
such factor could be the individual’s personality. Psychologists studying personality
distinguish five main personality traits: extraversion, conscientiousness, agreeableness,
openness and neuroticism, and the BHPS includes them in one of its waves. The left-hand
side graph in Figure 2.7 compares the distribution of neuroticism (emotional stability) –
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Table 2.7: The distribution of change in relative income
Mean Std. Dev. N
Positive life change 0.981 0.558 2,416
Negative life change -0.991 0.612 1,784
Positive yearly change 0.181 0.112 4,200
Negative yearly change -0.668 0.458 1,841
This figure is obtained using earnings as the income variable, and ‘oc-
cupation’ as the reference group, but that using any other would not
change the results much. Remember that ri = log(y/y∗). Assuming
that at t0 y = y∗, a change of 0.98 comes about if for instance the in-
come of reference remains constant while own income almost doubles.
Such change could also come about if the income of the individual goes
up by 50% and that of the reference group decreases by 25%. Life
change is the difference between the maximum and the minimum value
of relative income for a given individual during their time in the panel.
Yearly change is simply the average change in relative income from one
year to the next. To avoid distortion in the life-change summary, in-
dividuals that appear in less than 10 waves have been excluded. Total
N=4,200.
the personality trait that has, by far, the strongest correlation with both life satisfaction
and mental distress – for the following three groups: (1) the 10% of the sample that
experiences the largest positive changes in life-change in relative income, (2) the 10%
that experiences the largest negative changes, and, (3) the 10% that experience the least
change in relative income.
Figure 2.7: Distribution of neuroticism across life-change in relative income
(a) Type of life-change in relative income (b) Life satisfaction
These figures are calculated using only individuals that appear in at least 10 waves,
and for whom we have personality information, this amounts to 3,788. This division of
individuals into groups by amount of life-change have been done using ri occup, but using
other relative income would not affect the results much.
The results are encouraging because they show a very similar distribution of neuroti-
cism across life-change in relative income. In other words, individuals experiencing the
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largest positive change in relative income seem to be very similar in terms of personality
to individuals with little change in relative income, and to those with the largest negative
change. To make clear how similar the curves for the different groups are, the second
graph in Figure 2.7 shows the distribution of neuroticism for individuals that are very
satisfied with their lives, versus the individuals that are least satisfied with their lives.
Although there can of course be some confounding factors: other than neuroticism, I
would say that personality is an important one. Hence, these results give credibility to
the baseline results provided in section 2.4.1.13
2.4.3 Changes in relative income driven by own income versus
reference income
Changes in relative position can come from either changes in own income (y) or changes
in the others’ income (y∗), or both. When changes in relative income are driven by
changes in own income, the individual may be playing a very active role in this change,
making them endogenous. However, correlation between relative income and the error
term is less clear when changes in relative income come from changes in the income of
reference. In other words, changes driven by the income of reference are more exogenous,
and therefore, looking at them separately is interesting. However, there may also be
advantages in looking at the effects of changes in relative position driven by own income.
On the one hand, most of the change in relative income is of this type, therefore ignoring
it would be a shame. On the other hand, a considerable change in own income should
improve one’s relative position regardless of the reference group. Note that even after
having constructed a wide variety of reference groups, we cannot be sure that these are
the actual groups with whom the individual compares, but, if he does compare himself
with someone, it is likely that a large change in his own income improves his relative
standing – regardless of his reference group.14
Tables 2.8 and 2.9 show, respectively, the relative income coefficients of fixed effects
regressions like those of the previous section but separately for changes driven by own
income, and changes in the income of the reference group, for life satisfaction and mental
distress.
In each table, the first three columns refer to relative income using earnings and the
last three use per capita household income. The first column of each block is included
for reference and runs the regression with all observations. Since no big differences were
13We have replicated this with the other four personality traits and the results were exactly the same,
each of personality traits was very similarly distributed across change in relative position.
14There is one additional interesting reason for looking at the effects of these two different types of
changes in relative income, they are in nature different events and just for that reason they could have
different effects. It could be argued that improving one’s relative standing is more gratifying when it is
due to one’s actions – a change in own income – than to others’ actions – a change in the income of the
reference group.
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Table 2.8: The effects of relative income on life satisfaction by type of change in relative
income.
Earnings Per capita HH. Income
All ch(y)>ch(y*) ch(y*)>ch(y) All ch(y)>ch(y*) ch(y*)>ch(y)
ri region19 0.008 0.016 -0.001 0.064∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.073
(0.017) (0.018) (0.051) (0.010) (0.011) (0.044)
ri region133 0.011 0.022 0.040 0.069∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.180∗
(0.017) (0.018) (0.053) (0.010) (0.011) (0.072)
ri educ 0.022 0.028 0.012 0.059∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.050
(0.017) (0.018) (0.055) (0.010) (0.011) (0.042)
ri occup 0.023 0.038 0.006 0.065∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.019
(0.019) (0.023) (0.038) (0.015) (0.016) (0.040)
ri ethnicity 0.015 0.025 -0.012 0.065∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.047
(0.017) (0.019) (0.049) (0.011) (0.012) (0.045)
ri predicted -0.010 -0.005 0.018 0.034∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.032
(0.017) (0.018) (0.069) (0.011) (0.011) (0.192)
N 84,013 63,941 20,072 156,323 126,000 30,323
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Since no big differences were
observed across quintiles in the baseline regressions, for this part we pool together the observations
from all quintiles.
observed across quintiles in the baseline regressions, for this part, the regression for
changes coming from a change in own income is done by pooling together the observations
from all quintiles. Regarding changes driven by changes in others’ income, it should be
highlighted that changes in own income are kept more or less constant because in those
cases own income hardly changes at all.
In a nutshell, Tables 2.8 and 2.9 show again that relative income does not seem to have
any effect on SWB because changes in relative income variables are not associated with
changes in SWB regardless of the origin of the change. As with the baseline regressions,
some of the coefficients are statistically significant but those are mostly insignificant in
practical terms. For example, none of the coefficients in the table with the life satisfaction
regressions (Table 2.8) has any practical significance. For instance, take the largest
coefficient in Table 2.8, this is the coefficient of ri ethnicity when per capita household
income is used and when change in relative income is driven by a change in own income.
In this case β = 0.072. Assuming that at t0 y = y∗, and if the income of reference
remains constant while own income increases by almost 20% (average yearly change), life
satisfaction would only change by 0.01. It should be highlighted the effects of changes
in relative position driven by the reference income are always statistically, as well as
practically, insignificant – with just one exception, the coefficient of ri region133 that is
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Table 2.9: The effects of relative income on mental distress by type of change in relative
income.
Earnings Per capita HH. Income
All ch(y)>ch(y*) ch(y*)>ch(y) All ch(y)>ch(y*) ch(y*)>ch(y)
ri region19 0.020 0.023∗ 0.014 -0.026∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗ -0.047
(0.010) (0.011) (0.032) (0.007) (0.007) (0.024)
ri region133 0.011 0.007 0.004 -0.018∗ -0.017∗ -0.032
(0.012) (0.013) (0.042) (0.007) (0.008) (0.044)
ri educ 0.018 0.022 0.022 -0.023∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.011) (0.011) (0.036) (0.007) (0.007) (0.026)
ri occup 0.015 0.010 0.023 -0.009 -0.009 0.009
(0.013) (0.015) (0.027) (0.010) (0.011) (0.024)
ri ethnicity 0.021 0.020 0.041 -0.027∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.054∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.032) (0.007) (0.007) (0.026)
ri predicted 0.039∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.016 0.008 0.008 0.049
(0.010) (0.011) (0.041) (0.007) (0.007) (0.095)
N 116,581 89,766 26,815 217,987 176,202 41,785
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Since no big differences were
observed across quintiles in the baseline regressions, for this part we pool together the observations
from all quintiles.
almost 0.18 but with very little statistical significance. The mental distress table tells
us the same thing: changes in the reference income affecting our relative position do not
have any influence on mental distress.
It may be worth mentioning that most of the change in relative income is driven by
changes in own income, that is why there are many more observations in the columns
referring to that type of change. This is also why the coefficients in the all column are very
similar to those in the ch(y) > ch(y∗) column. Note also that in those two columns we
do not control in any way for changes in absolute position and therefore any significant
coefficient in any of those columns should not be interpreted as evidence against the
relative income hypothesis. The most interesting columns of these two tables are the
ch(y∗) > ch(y) columns, which have a much lower number of cases but still enough to
get ‘effects’ if there were any. The fact that there is no association between a change in
relative income when the change in relative income is driven by a change in the income
of the reference group is problematic because there is in principle no reason why this
should be the case if the relative income hypothesis is true. There is yet one more reason
why this estimate is interesting. This type of change in relative position is less subject
to measurement error – than a change in own income – and therefore less vulnerable
to attenuation bias. There is likely to be measurement error in personal income, and
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this could produce attenuation bias in the estimates obtained for changes driven by own
income. The income of reference, however, should have much less measurement error
because it is the average of many individuals. Thus, this attenuation bias should not be
less present when the effects in changes in relative income come mostly from changes in
others’ income, since the latter are much less subject to be measured with error.15
2.4.4 Positive versus negative changes in relative income
The aim of this subsection is to see if the ‘no effects’ found so far could be hiding important
asymmetries in the effects of relative income depending on the sign of the change. That
could be the case if, for instance, only negative changes in relative income had an effect
but improvements in relative position did not, which would be consistent with the loss
aversion hypothesis put forward by prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). To
see if that is the case, a separate fixed effect regression was run for positive and negative
changes. The results are shown in Tables 2.10 and 2.11. These two tables have a very
similar structure to those of the previous section and thus there is no need to describe
this structure again. Both tables suggest that there are no clear differences on the effects
of relative income depending on the sign of the change, especially not in the direction
that one would have expected. This can be easily appreciated by comparing the columns
with the positive and negative changes, which are very similar.
15I thank John Ermisch for making me aware of this.
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Table 2.10: The effects of relative income on life-satisfaction by sign of change.
Earnings Per capita HH. Income
all ch(ri) > 0 ch(ri) < 0 all ch(ri) > 0 ch(ri) < 0
ri region19 0.008 -0.003 0.001 0.064∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.020) (0.031) (0.010) (0.017) (0.016)
ri region133 0.011 -0.005 0.015 0.069∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.021) (0.031) (0.010) (0.017) (0.016)
ri educ 0.022 0.006 0.024 0.059∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.021) (0.032) (0.010) (0.017) (0.016)
ri occup 0.023 0.016 -0.001 0.065∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗ 0.054∗
(0.019) (0.026) (0.034) (0.015) (0.020) (0.024)
ri ethnicity 0.015 0.016 0.008 0.065∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.022) (0.031) (0.011) (0.017) (0.016)
ri predicted -0.010 -0.012 -0.013 0.034∗∗ 0.009 0.041∗
(0.017) (0.020) (0.034) (0.011) (0.016) (0.017)
N 84013 51588 32425 156323 87848 68475
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Columns ‘all’ contain all
individuals, and the other columns, ‘ch(ri) > 0’ and ‘ch(ri) < 0’ contains regression with positive
and negative changes in relative income respectively.
Table 2.11: The effects of relative income on mental distress by sign of change.
Earnings Per capita HH. Income
all ch(ri) > 0 ch(ri) < 0 all ch(ri) > 0 ch(ri) < 0
ri region19 0.020 0.031∗ 0.046∗ -0.026∗∗∗ 0.007 -0.028∗∗
(0.010) (0.012) (0.021) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011)
ri region133 0.011 0.015 0.051∗ -0.018∗ 0.008 -0.021
(0.012) (0.015) (0.024) (0.007) (0.010) (0.012)
ri educ 0.018 0.033∗∗ 0.047∗ -0.023∗∗∗ 0.003 -0.023∗
(0.011) (0.013) (0.021) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011)
ri occup 0.015 0.028 0.069∗∗ -0.009 0.025 -0.037∗
(0.013) (0.016) (0.023) (0.010) (0.013) (0.016)
ri ethnicity 0.021 0.029∗ 0.044∗ -0.027∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.029∗∗
(0.011) (0.013) (0.021) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011)
ri predicted 0.039∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.054∗ 0.008 0.047∗∗∗ -0.014
(0.010) (0.012) (0.022) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011)
N 116581 74062 42519 217987 126644 91343
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001, Columns ‘all’ contain all
individuals, and the other columns, ‘ch(ri) > 0’ and ‘ch(ri) < 0’ contains regression with positive
and negative changes in relative income respectively.
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2.4.5 The effects of relative income on different types of indi-
viduals
When studying the relationship between income and SWB many researchers have under-
stood that the former may be mediated by the personality of the individual (in addition
to personality having an effect of its own on SWB) (Proto & Rustichini (2015), Boyce &
Wood (2011). For instance, Proto & Rustichini (2015), argue that neuroticism increases
the concavity of the relationship between income and life satisfaction. In other words,
it reduces the elasticity between income and life satisfaction at higher income levels but
increases it at low income levels. Given the former one would expect the relationship
between relative income – a function of income in relation to others’ income – also to
be subject to the personality of the individuals. In addition, the effect between relative
income and SWB may depend on the individual’s personality for one more direct reason,
social comparisons are not just the result of a contrast in income, but the individual’s
personality also plays an important role.
Psychologists have shown the importance that individual personality plays in social
comparison processes (see section 2.2.2). In essence, all the relevant parameters in a social
comparison are strongly influenced by the personality of the individual. Consequently,
some researchers have argued that the effects of relative position on SWB could be highly
dependent on the individual’s personality. For instance, Budŕıa and Ferrer-i Carbonell
(2012) claim that individuals that are more neurotic and extroverted are more sensitive
to their position on the economic ladder, whereas other individuals are insensitive to it. If
this is true then it could be the case that the no effects that we observe when we consider
all individuals together are hiding important differences across personality types. This
section tries to establish if that is the case.
Tables 2.12 and 2.13 show the relative income coefficients for fixed effects regressions
on life satisfaction and mental distress respectively. In order to see whether personality
matters, individuals are divided into two groups: individuals below the average in terms
of neuroticism, and individuals above the average.16 Note that the number of observations
is significantly lower than in the previous sections, this is because personality information
was included in just one wave of the BHPS (because, presumably, personality remains
quite stable throughout life). Nonetheless, the number of observations is high enough to
obtain precise estimates.
Within each table there are two groups of estimates, ones using earnings to build the
relative income variable and another using per capita household income. On the whole
there are no clear differences between more and less neurotic individuals. For instance,
when personal earnings are used to build relative income, no differences exist between in-
16Neuroticism is the personality trait that is more strongly linked with SWB, this is why I have decided
to pick this personality trait.
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Table 2.12: The effects of relative income on life satisfaction by neuroticism level.
Earnings Per capita HH. Income
all N < mean N > mean all N < mean N > mean
ri region19 0.015 -0.010 0.034 0.070∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.025) (0.026) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016)
ri region133 0.019 -0.009 0.040 0.074∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.025) (0.025) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016)
ri educ 0.027 0.002 0.047 0.063∗∗∗ 0.033∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.026) (0.026) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016)
ri occup 0.016 0.002 0.027 0.061∗∗∗ 0.008 0.111∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.028) (0.031) (0.016) (0.022) (0.022)
ri ethnicity 0.021 -0.001 0.039 0.071∗∗∗ 0.038∗ 0.099∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.026) (0.027) (0.012) (0.017) (0.017)
ri predicted -0.005 -0.029 0.014 0.041∗∗∗ 0.020 0.059∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.025) (0.026) (0.012) (0.016) (0.017)
N 67,228 30,778 36,450 120,829 56,044 64,785
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Columns ‘all’ contain all
individuals, and the other columns ‘N < mean’ and ‘N > mean’ contain individuals below and
above average in terms of neuroticism respectively.
dividuals above and below the median in terms of neuroticism in the relationship between
relative income and life satisfaction, nor mental distress. In both cases, the coefficients are
of no practical or statistical significance for both individuals above and below the mean in
terms of neuroticism. When per capita household income is used, some of the coefficients
appear to be statistically significant in the life satisfaction regressions, (although of little
practical significance) and some difference, albeit small, can be found between individuals
above and below the median in terms of neuroticism (see Table 2.12). The differences
found suggest that more neurotic individuals would be more sensitive to changes in rel-
ative position, however it should be recalled that the practical significance is small. In
the mental distress regressions, there is also a difference between types of individuals but
this time the coefficients are so small that not even for individuals with above average
neuroticism is the coefficient worth reporting (below 0.04 in all cases!). To sum up, some
effect has been found, albeit very small for individuals with above average neuroticism
when relative income is built using household income, not with earnings and only for life
satisfaction.
Thus only in one of the four sets of regressions is there any difference worth high-
lighting, and still the practical significance is doubtful. Note that in the life satisfaction
regressions, the coefficients for neurotic individuals are around 0.1., remember that life
satisfaction ranges from 0 to 10 and that for a change of 0.1 to occur, the income of the
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Table 2.13: The effects of relative income on mental distress by neuroticism levels.
Earnings Per capita HH. Income
all N < mean N > mean all N < mean N > mean
ri region19 0.027∗ 0.020 0.032 -0.024∗∗ -0.008 -0.038∗∗
(0.012) (0.016) (0.017) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012)
ri region133 0.020 0.014 0.025 -0.021∗ -0.003 -0.036∗∗
(0.013) (0.017) (0.019) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012)
ri educ 0.028∗ 0.029 0.028 -0.021∗∗ -0.004 -0.036∗∗
(0.012) (0.016) (0.017) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012)
ri occup 0.022 0.023 0.022 -0.005 0.011 -0.021
(0.014) (0.019) (0.021) (0.011) (0.013) (0.017)
ri ethnicity 0.029∗ 0.023 0.034 -0.022∗∗ -0.006 -0.036∗∗
(0.012) (0.016) (0.018) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012)
ri predicted 0.049∗∗∗ 0.033∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.008 0.004 0.011
(0.012) (0.016) (0.017) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012)
N 88,382 40,695 47,687 156,830 73,116 83,714
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Columns ‘all’ contain all
individuals, and the other columns ‘N < mean’ and ‘N > mean’ contain individuals below and
above average in terms of neuroticism respectively.
individual would have to almost triple while that of the reference remains stable. This
reminds us that absolute income effects could be behind such change in life satisfaction
as well and would be consistent with differences in marginal income effects across person-
ality discussed by Proto & Rustichini (2015). Hence, the main conclusions of the paper
so far remain: changes in relative position do not bring changes in SWB, mental distress,
or life satisfaction.
2.4.6 The effects of changes in relative income on financial sat-
isfaction, house satisfaction and spending
Luttmer (2005) argues – and I agree – that “if neighbours’ consumption patterns shape
one’s aspirations, one might have expected that higher neighbours’ earnings would signif-
icantly reduce one’s satisfaction with material outcomes such as one’s financial situation
or one’s home (Luttmer, 2005, p. 985).” If there is a connection between relative income
and SWB through social comparisons, financial satisfaction – or material satisfaction
more generally – should be channelling this connection. In other words, it would be hard
to believe that if neighbours’ income rises, and such rise affects happiness via social com-
parisons, that it does so leaving financial satisfaction unaffected. Put differently, changes
in financial satisfaction are a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a relationship
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Table 2.14: The effects of relative income on financial satisfaction, house satisfaction and
spending.
Earnings Per capita HH. Income
Financial
stf.
House stf. log(spending) Financial
stf.
House stf. log(spending)
ri region19 0.263∗∗∗ -0.043 0.293∗∗∗ 0.708∗∗∗ 0.031 0.166∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.068) (0.027) (0.068) (0.049) (0.022)
ri region133 0.311∗∗∗ -0.076 0.276∗∗∗ 0.575∗∗∗ 0.153 0.086∗∗
(0.077) (0.074) (0.028) (0.128) (0.080) (0.030)
ri educ 0.225∗∗ -0.042 0.282∗∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗ 0.095 0.133∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.070) (0.028) (0.069) (0.052) (0.022)
ri occup 0.296∗∗∗ 0.028 0.109∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗ 0.048∗∗
(0.049) (0.047) (0.018) (0.060) (0.051) (0.019)
ri ethnicity 0.307∗∗∗ -0.088 0.289∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗ 0.070 0.175∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.065) (0.026) (0.074) (0.050) (0.025)
ri wage 0.248∗∗ 0.124 0.224∗∗∗ 0.306∗ -0.266 0.001
(0.090) (0.087) (0.033) (0.155) (0.156) (0.068)
N 20119 20115 20600 30441 30437 28443
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
between relative income and SWB to exist. It is not, I believe, a sufficient condition be-
cause there could be a relationship between changes in others’ income and one’s financial
satisfaction and still that such situation might not affect general life satisfaction.
Luttmer (2005) tested this but failed to find evidence of a connection between neigh-
bours’ earnings and financial satisfaction, or satisfaction with one’s home. He explains
the lack of a relationship as the result of people giving up leisure time to work more and
in that way be able to mimic the living standards of their neighbours. However, I think
this makes it hard to believe that the relationship he finds between neighbours earnings
and SWB is capturing relative deprivation. Following Luttmer (2005), in this section we
look at whether changes in the relative income affect financial satisfaction, satisfaction
with one’s home, or spending. We also explore the effects of such changes on personal
spending to see if there is some process of emulation or ‘keeping up with the Joneses’
going on. Since changes in own income could clearly have an effect on the former on its
own, here we will only consider changes in relative income coming from changes in the
income of reference so that absolute income level is kept more or less constant. The aim
of this section is then to see if there is a relationship between relative income on possible
mediators between relative income and SWB such as financial satisfaction, hoping to rule
out the relationship between RI and SWB in case no relationship was found.
Financial satisfaction and house satisfaction were captured with the following ques-
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tions: “How dissatisfied or satisfied are you with the income of your household?”, and
“How dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your house or flat?” (answers ranged from 1-7
but as with the life-satisfaction question, the answers were rescaled to range from 0-10).
The variable measuring spending is the log of the sum of two variables that measure dif-
ferent spending concepts: the amount of money spent eating out and the amount spent
on leisure, per month.17
Table 2.14 shows the relative income coefficients of fixed effects regressions where
the independent variable is change in relative income coming from the reference group,
and the dependent variables are financial satisfaction, satisfaction with one’s home, and
spending. There are two columns for each of the dependent variables because, as usual,
the results for the two relative income variables are given, i.e., using earnings and per
capita household income. Unlike Luttmer (2005) I do find an association between changes
in others’ earnings and financial satisfaction, and it has the expected sign, positive,
meaning that improving relative position makes us more satisfied with the income of
the household. Or, to be more precise, as the income of neighbours goes up, our relative
position goes down and we feel less satisfied with our income (most change in the income of
reference is positive). The size of the coefficients varies somewhat depending on whether
earnings or household income is used to build relative income, but the same patterns
emerge. For instance, if in t0 y = y∗, and in t1 the income of those living in the same region
(region19) goes up by 50% (and own income remains unchanged), financial satisfaction
goes down by 0.28, in a scale from 0 to 10. It makes sense that the individual’s satisfaction
with own income goes down when he or she sees the income of the neighbours go up,
however, that does not guarantee that SWB is affected.
With regards to spending, it does not seem that emulation is taking place because
the coefficients of spending are positive. Since the analysis is restricted to changes driven
by the reference income, which are mostly positive, the coefficients obtained tell us that
when the income of the reference group goes up (and relative income goes down), we cut
down our spending. In sum, what we seem to find is that if the income of those around
us goes up – keeping our income constant– we feel less satisfied with our own financial
situation and we spend less. But this lower consumption, neither the lower financial
satisfaction resulting from improvement in the situation of other’s seems to pass to SWB,
as the previous sections have shown.
17The question wording was as follows: “How much do you personally spend in an average month on
eating out, or buying take-away food from a restaurant, pub or cafe, including school meals or meals at
work?”, “how much you personally spend in an average month on leisure activities, and entertainment
and hobbies, other than eating out?” The answers are limited to 12 possible spending brackets. I have
created a continuous variable taking the middle point of each spending bracket.
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2.5 CONCLUSION
The idea that relative position affects happiness, or SWB more generally, is very widespread
and this chapter has tried to challenge this view in several ways. It began by showing how
weak the existing evidence is, and, bringing in the literature on social comparisons has
helped us understand why this may be so. Social comparisons are complex and flexible
processes in which the individual plays an important role, and therefore, assuming that
a contrast in incomes will produce a given effect seems unreasonable. In addition, most
people do not compare their income with that of others when judging their lives, which
make us further question why relative income should have an effect on SWB.
At the empirical level, the chapter takes the BHPS, a longitudinal household survey
to explore the effects of changes in relative position on two different SWB outcomes: life
satisfaction and mental distress. The results of these regressions question the idea that
relative income matters for SWB because changes in relative income are not followed
by changes in life satisfaction, or on mental distress. These results are quite robust
because they do not vary depending on whether earnings or per capita household income
is used, or with the reference group. In order to tackle the issue of potential endogeneity
of changes in relative income, the paper compares the distribution of personality across
individuals that change their relative position to different degrees, showing that there
are virtually no differences. We have also looked separately at the effects of changes in
relative income driven by the income of the reference group, since those should be more
exogenous than changes in relative income driven by changes in own income, finding no
relevant differences.
Other robustness checks were carried out that supported the main results. Section
2.4.4 explores separately the effects of positive versus negative changes to make sure
that the ‘no effects’ found in the main regressions are not the result of different effects
that cancel each other out. Section 2.4.5, compares the effects of relative income for
individuals above and below the mean in terms of neuroticism. Both give support to
the main results. The last Section explores the effects of relative income on possible
mediators between relative income and SWB such as financial satisfaction, with the aim
of ruling out the relationship between RI and SWB in case no relationship was found.
However this is not done because the data show that relative position does indeed affect
financial satisfaction and personal spending, yet, it should be made clear that while this
does not support our hypothesis of RI not having an effect on SWB, it does not conform
evidence against it either, since I believe the existence of a relationship between RI and
financial satisfaction to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for the relationship
between relative income and SWB to exist.
The evidence provided here cast doubts on the relative income hypothesis. If the find-
ings presented in this chapter were further replicated and confirmed by future research,
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the policy implications would be quite clear: everyone can be made happier at the same
time. Happiness is not a zero-sum game – at least not regarding income. This is, I be-
lieve, very positive because it means that everyone can enjoy higher SWB without doing
so at the expense of others. Given that there is income inequality, and probably always
will be, knowing that this need not prevent anyone from being happier is good news. The
findings of this chapter might also make us question whether the use of relative poverty
lines really makes sense.
Although it is not the first research to question the idea that relative income matters
for SWB, it is, to my knowledge, the first one that explicitly attempts to make that point
empirically. Many researchers have, in fact, found no effects, but they have not been
very open to interpreting their findings as contradicting the relative income hypothesis.
Publication bias towards ‘effects’ rather than ‘no effects’ may have had something to do
with this, but I also think that the reason the relatively weak evidence was so quickly
accepted as giving support to the idea that relative income matters for SWB is that
the coefficients obtained in most studies – even if not of practical importance in most
cases – were very much in line with deeply rooted ideas about the importance of relative
standing.
The idea that people care about relative position is nothing new and many authors
have dealt with this issue throughout history (e.g. Smith, 1759; Veblen, 1899). Recently
several experiments have made it clear that individuals care a lot about relative position
(Solnick and Hemenway, 1998), and many researchers have cited them as evidence in
support of the relative income idea, when what this evidence really does is show that we
care about relative position (it may even affect satisfaction with our financial situation),
but not that we are affected by it. I think that researchers have confused preferences and
utility. That we care about the Joneses is clear, but that surpassing them will make us
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disaster (across Europe?)
A comparative analysis of class and emotions
(with Fabrizio Bernardi)
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Sociologists have worked extensively at understanding objective differences in well-being
between the most and the least privileged members of society. They have studied how
the lives of lower-class individuals differ from the upper class in terms of health and
labour market outcomes, among others (Rose and Harrison, 2012). However, very little
is known about how their feelings differ. This chapter hopes to fill this void by exploring
and trying to explain the differences in positive and negative emotions between the most
and the least privileged members of society in several European countries.
SWB is a very broad concept; it refers to how people experience the quality of their
lives and includes both emotional reactions and cognitive judgements. In other words,
it is a combination of satisfaction with life and the relative frequency of positive and
negative affect (Diener, 1984). The European Social Survey (ESS) has been collecting
information on life satisfaction and happiness since its first round in 2002. But in the
third round (2006) a special module was included that aimed at measuring SWB more
comprehensively. A battery of questions was included that permitted building good
measures of positive and negative affect, and which could be compared across countries
(unlike life satisfaction self reports whose comparability is very controversial, as was
explained in the first chapter). An initial look at the data reveals that in almost every
country, individuals in the upper class systematically enjoy higher subjective well-being
than individuals in the lower class, regardless of the measure used. That is, upper-class
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people report higher life satisfaction and happiness than lower-class people, but they
also experience positive emotions more often, and negative ones less often. For instance,
in Germany, average life satisfaction is 7.3 for the upper class and 6.2 for lower-class
individuals, also in Germany, 15% of the upper class experience depression versus 26 in
lower class (ESS my computation). Although there is a lot of cross-country variation, the
differences between upper, middle and lower class are often of non-negligible size.
In order to understand why this is the case we will focus on five groups of factors
that previous research has proven to be relevant to SWB. These are: health, feelings of
safety, social life, financial difficulties, and employment. To the extent that the former
are dependent on class position, they can also be interpreted as mediating variables for
the observed class gap in positive and negative emotions. We estimate a multilevel model
with individuals nested in countries, which will explain positive and negative affect as a
function of social class and the former potential mediators. Moreover, a decomposition
is performed in order to establish which part of the observed country differences in the
emotional class gap are due to composition effects (i.e. difference incidence of the medi-
ating variables) or to slopes effect (i.e. differential effects of the mediating variables) in
the various countries.
Fortunately for us, the SWB module that was introduced in the ESS in 2006 was repli-
cated in 2012, right at a time when many countries were suffering the worst consequences
of the financial crisis. Not only does this allow a very interesting description in itself of
what has happened to individuals’ emotions with the crisis, but it also allows making
stronger causal claims. The analysis seems to suggest that differences across countries
and across classes in negative emotions are due to differences in economic hardship and
unemployment, as well as to health differences. Social life and feelings of safety, while im-
portant for negative affect are much more equally distributed across classes. Differences
in positive affect are poorly explained, and neither income inequality, GDP per capita,
nor GDP growth seem to have any effect once individual level variables are controlled
for.
SWB is an important life outcome that is unequally distributed over the population.
To the extent that inequality in the distribution of SWB is class based, public policy may
be able to do something about it. However, before it can do that, an understanding of how
those differences are produced is required. This is, to our knowledge, the first attempt
to do so. Since the study of emotions is still quite novel within sociology, the chapter
will start by presenting the dependent variables and some facts about the distribution of
positive and negative affect. The second section will briefly review the existing literature
on the relationship between the mediating variables and SWB. The third section presents
the dataset and empirical strategy, and finally, the last two sections present the results
and draw some conclusions.
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3.2 EMOTIONS AND THE CLASS-BASED EMOTIONAL GAP
In the 3rd and 6th round of the ESS, individuals were asked about the frequency with
which they experience positive and negative states such as loneliness, anxiety, or happi-
ness. The measures of positive and negative emotions displayed here and used throughout
this chapter are simply an average of those items. This is the standard procedure for their
analysis, as will be explained in detail in the data section (Section 3.4). As one may ex-
pect, individuals experience positive emotions with far more frequency than negative ones,
and Figure 3.1 shows this clearly. Figure 3.1 has been produced by pooling individuals
from all countries, but we would observe something similar if we looked at any particular
country, similar in the sense of positive emotions (PA) being more frequently experienced
than negative emotions (NA),1 but as we will see there is actually some variation in the
shape of the distributions across countries, which is, in fact, the object of study of this
chapter.
Figure 3.1: The distribution of positive and negative emotions in Europe
Source: The European Social Survey, 3rd round. All
countries that participated in that round have been in-
cluded. Includes individuals aged 30 to 60. Weights are
used at the country level only. Hence, this is not repre-
sentative of the European population.
Next, some figures on positive and negative emotions across countries, as well as the
differences in emotions across classes, will be presented, to which we may refer as the
‘emotional gap’ or simply the ‘class gap’. Class has been defined using the EGP schema
(Erickson et al., 1979), grouping several categories in a very uncontroversial way: upper
class, middle class, and lower class. The upper class will contain classes I + II (higher
and lower service class). The lower class = V + VI + VIIa + VIIb (manual supervisors,
1We may refer to both positive emotions or positive affect (from which PA comes from), the same
applies to negative emotions, also referred to as NA).
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skilled and unskilled workers and farm labourers). The rest are middle class. This is a
good way of capturing differences in SWB between the most and least privileged people
in each country.2
Figure 3.2: Experience of positive emotions across Europe and across classes
Source: The European Social Survey, third round of data. Only the 19 coun-
tries appearing in rounds 3 and 6 have been included. The length of the bars
shows the average level of the positive emotions score for each social class. The
longest bars show the level of the lower class and the shorter ones indicate how
much more do the middle and the upper class and the lower class experience
positive emotions compared to the lower class.
Figure 3.2 shows the average level of positive emotions (PA) for the lower class as well
as the gap between lower and middle class, and between middle class and upper class.
The total length of the bars is, then, the level of positive emotions for the upper class.
Note also that the sum of the two gaps summarises the differences in emotions between
the upper and the lower class. Countries are ordered according to the lower class level
of PA. It is easy to see that there are substantive differences in the levels of PA across
countries as well as across classes. For example, the average level of positive emotions
for the lower class varies notably across countries, from 1.4 in Bulgaria to almost 2 in
Switzerland, with the mean being 1.71 and the standard deviation 0.14. Variation within
the upper class is also large but smaller, from 1.6 in Slovenia to 2 in Bulgaria (with a
mean and standard deviation of 1.8 and 0.1 respectively). Average levels of negative
2The former may not seem entirely true since people that have never had a job are excluded from
this study. However, as will be shown later, they are in almost every county very few. A more important
limitation is the fact that we exclude the most disadvantaged members of society: individuals who have
no homes and therefore do not take part in surveys.
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emotions also vary significantly across countries, and across classes, and they seem to
vary even more than positive emotions, as Figure 3.3 shows.
Figure 3.3: Experience of negative emotions across Europe and across classes
Source: The European Social Survey, third round of data. Only the 19 coun-
tries appearing in rounds 3 and 6 have been included. The length of the bars
shows the average level of the negative emotions score for the upper class, and
the shorter bars indicate how much more do the middle class and the lower
class experience negative emotions compared to the upper class.
Figure 3.2 also shows the differences across classes in the experience of PA. In almost
every country individuals in the upper class experience positive emotions more often than
the lower class, and negative emotions less often. For example, in Scandinavian countries,
class is a much less relevant predictor of SWB than in Eastern European countries, such
as Hungary or Bulgaria. This result is hardly surprising since the former have long
been recognised as the worldwide equality champions, where class-based inequality for
outcomes such as income and educational attainment is at the lowest level. However,
the ranking of other countries is more mixed and less easily interpretable. For instance,
Germany, with a high GDP and relatively low level of income inequality when compared
to the majority of EU countries, ranks quite badly in terms of PA gap.
From Figure 3.3 – which shows NA levels and gaps – it is very easy to appreciate that
the class gap in negative emotions is much larger than the class gap in positive emotions.
There is also more variation in NA across countries that there was in PA. The ranking of
countries in terms of levels and gaps varies. This is another confirmation of the relative
independence of positive and negative emotions that was discussed in the introductory
chapter (Huppert et al., 2009; Huppert and Whittington, 2003).
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Figure 3.4: Differences in emotions across countries matter!
(a) Negative Affect too frequently (b) Positive Affect too rarely
Source: The European Social Survey, third round of data. The vertical line at ‘sometimes’
marks the threshold that divides normal levels of positive and negative affect from undesirable
ones. Specialists on the subject have agreed that if the NA score is above 1 (‘sometimes’),
the individual experiences negative states more than would be desirable. Similarly PA below
1 means that you experience positive emotions too rarely.
However, looking at these graphs one might ask whether these emotional gaps, or
whether the differences in emotions across countries, are really large. They are. Note
that the average class gap in positive emotions is approximately 0.3, which is 1 standard
deviation of the variation across countries in PA. One way to see this even more clearly is
to translate these scores in terms of depression rates, that is, to focus on the proportion of
individuals within a country or within a social class that experiences negative states ‘too
often’ or positive ones ‘too seldom’. Specialists on the subject have agreed that negative
emotions reach worrying levels – the point at which one may want to seek help from a
professional – when they cross the threshold of 1 (on a scale of 0-3), that corresponds with
‘sometimes’. Thus, if the NA score is above 1, this means that you experience negative
states more than would be desirable. With regards to PA the same criteria is followed, a
PA below 1 means that you experience positive emotions too rarely.3
When we explore the distributions of negative and positive emotions, we see that
in fact the gaps observed in Figures 3.2 and 3.3 do actually correspond to substantive
differences in depression rates. For instance, Figure 3.4 shows that two countries that
‘apparently’ did not differ that much in terms of PA and NA scores, such as Germany
and Portugal, do actually differ substantially in terms of the proportion of the population
with depressive symptoms and too low PA. In Germany, for example, 19% of the sample
has depressive symptoms while this percentage goes up to 32% in Portugal. Even larger
3Note that while being depressed according to your NA, that is, having a NA above 1 means that
you show depressive symptomatology, this does not necessarily mean that you will experience clinical
depression, however the proportion that do after scoring positive in this test is quite high, around 85%
according to the Centre for Epidemiologic studies of depression.
63
Figure 3.5: Differences in emotions within countries matter!
(a) NA distribution in Portugal (b) NA distribution in Germany
Source: The European Social Survey, third round of data. The vertical line at ‘sometimes’
marks the threshold that divides normal levels of negative affect from undesirable ones. Spe-
cialists on the subject have agreed that if the NA score is above 1 (‘sometimes’), the individual
experiences negative states more than would be desirable.
differences are found in these two countries in terms of ‘too low’ PA.
The aim of Figure 3.5 is to show the same, but this time applied to differences among
classes within each country. Figure 3.5 shows the differences in depression among the
upper, middle, and lower classes for both Germany and Portugal. While the differences
seem somewhat larger in Portugal than in Germany, they are relevant in both cases. In
Germany, for example, depression is almost twice as prevalent among the lower class than
among upper-class individuals (26% versus 14%), while middle-class individuals lie in the
middle. In Portugal similar patterns are observed but at higher levels. In the appendix
we provide the calculations of depression for all countries and for all classes, see Table
A8 on page 185.4
4For those interested in the scores, they are also available for all countries and social classes in Tables
A35 and A7, on pages 218 and 184.
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3.3 LITERATURE REVIEW
Argyle (1999) reviewed the literature on the relationship between social class and SWB
and concluded that there is a statistical association of a non-negligible size between the
two. He argued that the “upper classes have better jobs, better housing and access to
these services, better relationships, and leisure”. This is how he explained that the upper
class had higher SWB than the lower class. This chapter tries to shed light on the exact
same question, and in order to do so it will focus on five groups of variables, which
are actually related to those pointed out by Argyle (1999). In this section, the existing
evidence between those factors and subjective well-being is reviewed. Those factors are
physical health, safety, social life, unemployment and financial strain. To the extent that
the former are dependent on the class position, they can also be interpreted as mediating
variables for the observed class gap in emotions.
3.3.1 Physical health, mental health, and subjective well-being
The importance of physical health for mental health is quite intuitive and, as expected,
has found wide empirical support – although the amount of evidence showing that the
lack of physical health leads to mental illness is even greater. Okun et al. (1984) carried
out a meta-analysis of the relationship between health and SWB that confirms the link
between the two. Gerdtham and Johannesson (2001), using Swedish microdata show that
happiness increases with health, and Oswald and Powdthavee (2008) show that happiness
decreases with the lack of health, such as disability. The evidence of the effects of a lack
of physical health on mental health is very wide, although, as we will see next, the
relationship between physical health and mental health is quite complex, with causality
running in both directions.
There are several reasons why subjective well-being may affect physical health, for
a review on the mechanisms see Veenhoven (2008a). For example, stress can, in the
long run, cause hypertension and lead to heart disease, and constant or even irregular
exposure to stress hormones can eventually induce illnesses by weakening the body’s
immune system (McEwen, 2000; McEwen and Stellar, 1993). Untreated depression is a
cause of much unnecessary suffering, and effective treatment has been shown to decrease
disability, prolong survival, and increase quality of life (Goldberg, 2010). It is worth
noting that not only does the lack of mental health cause physical problems, but there
is also evidence of high mental well-being helping to cure diseases (e.g. see Cohen et al.,
2003; Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 2002).
While there is evidence showing that mental health (or the lack of it) can affect
physical health, the evidence showing the reverse causal link is even more abundant, and
the effects found were very substantive (see Goldberg, 2010, for a review). For instance,
it is well known that the incidence of depression is much higher in those with physical
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illness, e.g. in patients with a chronic disease depression is almost three times higher
than normal (Egede, 2007; Moussavi et al., 2007). In fact some studies have observed
depression following diseases that are quite exogenous, giving credibility to the causal
connection between physical illness and mental illness (Egede, 2007; Moussavi et al.,
2007). Moussavi et al. (2007) for instance found that patients with two or more chronic
physical disorders experienced a prevalence of depression of 23%, whereas healthy controls
only reported depression in 3.2% of cases (see also Scott et al., 2007).
Two population-based studies found that physical illness was a risk factor for the later
development of depression (Patten, 2001; Smit et al., 2004). Both studies took large sam-
ples of individuals who had been free of depression at baseline. After 1 or 2 years, around
3% of them did experience depression, and this development was well predicted by a wide
range of physical illnesses, such as hypertension, asthma, arthritis and rheumatism, back
pain, diabetes, heart disease and chronic bronchitis, migraine, respiratory or abdominal
problems. Similar results have been found in clinical populations the year after the di-
agnosis of cancer (Burgess et al., 2005) and after first hospitalisation with a heart attack
(Dickens et al., 2004). Both are associated with a particularly high rate of new onset of
depression or anxiety of approximately 20%. There is also consistent evidence for depres-
sion being a consequence of coronary heart disease, stroke, and HIV/AIDS (Prince et al.,
2007).
Some of the reasons why chronic physical disease causes depression is due to the effects
of pain and the risk – and probably fear – of disability. For instance, Dworkin et al. (1990)
and Korff and Simon (1996) show that the amount of pain is directly proportional to the
prevalence of depression. Prince et al. (1998) and Ormel et al. (1997) show that chronic
physical illness carries the risk of disability, which can be very depressing for healthy
adults. In other cases, the link between physical health and depression is more direct and
unnoticeable for the individual, like left-sided cerebral ischaemia resulting from stroke
(Rittner et al., 2003).
3.3.2 Feeling safe and happy
The importance of feeling safe, i.e., not at risk, for feeling well, also seems quite obvious
however, and probably because not feeling safe is rare in many countries, there is less
empirical evidence of this connection than there is about the connection between health
and SWB. The link between safety and happiness becomes very obvious when one thinks
about the EEA – Environment of Evolutionary of Adaptation – where being alert and
preventing risks, feeling safe in other words, determined survival. For this reason we have
been ‘designed’ to experience negative emotions if we feel at risk (Fredrickson, 2001). This
is why we expect to find a strong relationship between feeling safe and SWB, perhaps
with more connection to negative affect than with positive affect.
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Welsch (2008), for instance, explores the consequences of civil conflict on happiness
using cross-national data. The paper finds that the number of conflict victims and their
change over time significantly affect subjective well-being directly through health but also
through psychic effects. At the micro level we also find evidence of safety and SWB being
connected. Gilbert et al. (2008) used a sample of 203 students in order to shed light on
the ‘types’ of positive affect and they found that one of these types was related to safety
feelings, and it was precisely this one that that had the highest negative correlations
with depression, anxiety and stress, self-criticism, and insecure attachment. Helliwell
and Wang (2010) present new evidence linking trust and subjective well-being, based
primarily on data from the Gallup World Poll and cycle 17 of the Canadian General
Social Survey. Their results reveal strong linkages between trust and well-being. While
‘trust’ is not exactly the same as feeling safe, there is no doubt that the two are strongly
related.
3.3.3 Unemployment, financial strain and subjective well-being
Another group of variables that we will consider are variables that measure the labour
market situation and financial situation of the individual. It is reasonable to expect that
jobs foster SWB because they provide wages and an opportunity for feeling useful. Not
surprisingly, the effects of unemployment – and its duration – on SWB have been well
established in the literature (Burchell, 1990; Clark, 2006; Clark et al., 2001; Clark and
Oswald, 1994; Eggers et al., 2006; Fryer and Payne, 1986; Gerlach and Stephan, 1996;
Korpi, 1997; Murphy and Athanasou, 1999, are just some examples). Not only does
unemployment lower well-being but it may do so to the point of causing depression. There
is both cross-sectional and longitudinal evidence pointing at causality from unemployment
to depression. Unemployed workers are twice as likely as their employed counterparts to
experience psychological problems such as depression, anxiety, psychosomatic symptoms,
low subjective well-being, and poor self-esteem (Paul and Moser, 2009). Bromberger
and Matthews (1996) explored depressive symptoms in a sample of 541 middle-aged
women. At baseline, non-employed women reported higher levels of depressive symptoms
than employed women, but those decreased among non-employed women if they were
employed at the later test.
Another set of studies that have given credibility to the effects of unemployment on
SWB is provided by studies where self-selection plays a much smaller role because in those
studies the cause of job loss was a great recession. An example of this for the US is found
in Zukin et al. (2011), and Deaton (2012), that found the economic crises has had only a
small and relatively short-lived effect on life satisfaction. In Europe, there are two studies
that do something similar, one is Russell et al. (2013), which explores the effects of the
recent economic crisis on life satisfaction using the ESS data. The other is Walsh (2011),
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using Eurobarometer data, which found that mean life-satisfaction declined across the 29
countries. Perhaps the severity of the crisis in Europe – especially in some countries –
compared to that experienced in the US could explain why the effects on life satisfaction
for the US were milder.
Thus, to sum up, the link between unemployment and reduced SWB has been demon-
strated repeatedly in both longitudinal and cross-sectional frameworks (see McKee-Ryan
et al., 2005; Paul and Moser, 2009, for recent reviews). Some of this literature suggests
that the primary role in the distress experienced by the unemployed is financial strain
(Gallie et al., 1994; Russell et al., 2013; Whelan, 1994), although there seem to be other
factors. Many studies have consistently found the incidence and persistence of depression
to be higher among persons with low incomes (e.g. Bartley, 1994; Dooley et al., 1996;
Janlert, 1997), but causal mechanisms for this relationship are not well understood. Zim-
merman and Katon (2005), using longitudinal data, show that that employment status
and financial strain are causally related to depression, but income is not. In other words,
income matters for negative emotions to the extent that it means that individuals expe-
rience economic strain but having more income than necessary does not. Whelan and
McGinnity (2000) also found that measures of material deprivation and financial strain
are more strongly associated with well-being than income, and Kahneman and Deaton
(2010) found, for the US, that high incomes do not affect emotional well-being (although
it does seem to affect life satisfaction.
3.3.4 Social life and subjective well-being
The importance of social needs may be, in principle, less intuitive than that of health or
safety; but, we are social animals and we do need social interaction with other human
beings. Evolutionary psychology makes clear why this is so. In a nutshell, human be-
ings need to cooperate with other human beings in order to survive and reproduce and
probably for this reason we have been ‘designed’ to enjoy social contacts (Grinde, 2002a).
Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that researchers have found that social relations
or social contacts of different kinds are related to SWB (see Helliwell et al., 2004, for a
review), and the lack of them or the lack of successful social contacts brings problems
(Tooby and Cosmides, 1996; Williams and Nesse, 1994, both cited in Hill and Buss 2008).
It has been well known since the 1970s that one of the specific mechanisms by which
social contacts or social support prevent mental problems is because they act as mod-
erators of negative life events. This is known as the ‘stress-buffering hypothesis’ and
was proposed simultaneously by Cassel (1976) and Cobb (1976) in the late 1970s. Many
studies have given support to this theory since then (Cohen and Wills, 1985; Leavy, 1983;
Schwarzer and Leppin, 1991, among others). See also Umberson et al. (1996), Kessler
et al. (1988) and more recently McKee-Ryan et al. (2005). Although most of the litera-
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ture, such as that on the stress-buffering hypothesis, has focused on the effects of social
support moderating the negative consequences of negative life events, social life seems to
have an even greater relationship with positive affect than with negative affect – at least
in more or less healthy individuals (Schimmack, 2008). Some examples of this are studies
that have looked at the beneficial effects of having a partner (Coombs, 1991; Gerdtham
and Johannesson, 2001; Kalmijn, 2010; Kohler et al., 2005; Stack and Eshleman, 1998;
Zimmermann and Easterlin, 2006).
69
3.4 DATA
3.4.1 The subjective well-being measures
SWB is a combination of life satisfaction and the relative frequency of positive and
negative affect (Diener, 1984). It is very controversial whether the responses to the life
satisfaction questions can be compared across countries because they are very vulnerable
to cultural influences.5 This is why this chapter will focus on positive and negative
emotions. The data used in this analysis comes from the European Social Survey (ESS),
a repeated cross-sectional survey conducted in more than 30 countries between 2002 and
2012. The ESS conducts face-to-face interviews that aim at being representative of the
residential population aged 15 years and above. For the current analysis we will only
consider people between 30 and 60 years old that have a job or had one in the past
since social class is the key independent variable and it settles at age 30 (Erikson and
Goldthorpe, 1992). This means that people that never entered the labour market will be
excluded from the analysis. This could be a limitation since people that never entered the
labour market are probably among the most disadvantaged members of society. However,
as we will see shortly, they are much less prevalent than one might expect.
The ESS has been collecting information on life satisfaction and happiness since its
first round in 2002. But in the third round – in 2006 – a special module was introduced
to measure SWB comprehensively and with greater reliability. The module was repeated
in 2012, retaining many of the key features of the module’s design, hence, allowing for a
very interesting comparison between the two time periods. The questions of the module
that most interest us here are described in detail below.6
The items of the questionnaire measuring positive and negative emotions are in essence
the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D), in particular the 8-
item depression measure developed by Radloff in the late 1970s (Radloff, 1977), plus
some additional items. The CES-D scale is a short self-report scale designed to measure
depressive symptomatology in the general population, and, hence, it focuses on negative
states. The extra items added tried to capture other aspects – mostly positive – that were
absent in Radloff’s scale, such as the degree of arousal experienced – and not just direction
of affect– as well as extent of vitality, and thus they provide a broader picture of emotional
experiences (see European Social Survey, 2013). The CES-D questionnaire has been used
widely (e.g. Huppert et al., 2009) and its validity and reliability extensively assessed. The
most recent study in this regard is Van de Velde et al. (2010), which assessed the factorial
invariance of these items cross nationally using the 2006 SWB module of the ESS, and
5For a more extended discussion on this see the introductory chapter.
6For more details see the module proposal of the repeated module European Social Survey (2013),
available at: http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/methodology/questionnaire/ESS6 rotating mod-
ules.html
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Figure 3.6: Positive and negative emotions questions in the 3rd and 6th round of the ESS
concluded that CES-D scores can be compared across countries. Although the different
items have a different weight in the score in different countries, meaning that separate
items cannot be used to compare negative emotions across countries, the summary score
can be compared.7
Figure 3.6 shows the questions that individuals were asked in both the 3rd and 6th
round of the ESS. The first 8 items are the short version of the CES-D questionnaire and
the other items (9 to 11) were added by the research team that developed this module.
Using these questions, this chapter will build two measures of emotions, one positive
and one negative. The measure of negative emotions is just the CES-D score, and the
measure of positive emotions is obtained by averaging the answers to the items that
capture positive states. While the validity, reliability and comparability of the measure of
negative emotions – the CES-D score – is well established, it is yet to be seen whether the
average of the positive emotions items can be compared across countries – although some
have already used it without major concerns (for example Huppert et al., 2009). However,
we believe it is an interesting measure and worth looking at as well.8 The main analysis
7We are extremely grateful to Piet Bracke for his clarifications on the comparability of CES-D scores.
8Note that while the PA score only contains questions that ask about the frequency of positive
emotions, the CES-D score includes 2 items that ask about positive states. In principle we would just
use the items that ask about negative states to capture NA but we will stick to the CES-D score for two
reasons. First, the results do not change when we build the NA measure using only the 7 negative items,
and second, and more importantly, because the validity of the CES-D score is very well established,
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will treat these two scores of positive and negative emotions as continuous variables.
However, we are also interested in capturing changes around the relevant thresholds that
depict depression. An individual is considered to have depressive symptomatology if he
or she, has a CES-D score > 1, or a PA score < 1 (Huppert et al., 2009; Van de Velde
et al., 2010).
Table 3.1: Summary statistics of positive and negative affect
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Positive Affect (PA) 1.79 0.64 0 3 42,987
Negative Affect (CES-D) 0.71 0.50 0 3 43,071
CES-D> 1 (%) 20.8 40.6 0 100 43,071
PA< 1 (%) 17.0 37.5 0 100 42,987
Source: The European Social Survey, 3rd round of data. Country weights have been
used.
Only individuals with a valid answer in most of the items were considered in the
analysis. This meant individuals with a maximum of 1 missing value, out of 4, in the
positive affect questions, and a maximum of 2, out of 8, for the negative affect questions.
This way of dealing with missing values is standard in the literature (Van de Velde et al.,
2010). Table 3.1 shows some summary statistics of the two dependent variables of this
paper, PA and CES-D score, as well as for depression using the former two scores. If the
reader is interested in seeing those for each country and social class, see Table A35 in the
appendix, on page 218.9
This paper considers only individuals that have a social class, that is, people that
either work at the time of the interview or that have worked at some time in the past.
Given the purpose of this study we may be concerned about the individuals that we
exclude by doing so. This is a concern for two reasons. One the one hand, because those
excluded may be the most disadvantaged and therefore interesting for us. On the other
hand, because if they are many and the proportion varies a lot across countries, the cross-
country comparison becomes less interesting. However, the proportion of individuals in
that age range (30-60) that did not have a social class is below 5% in all countries with
the exception of Cyprus (7%), Spain (5.4%), Israel (5.2%), Portugal (5.5), and Kosovo
(almost 40%). Excluded individuals are in most cases women with a low level of education,
whereas that of the average of the negative items is not. Again, we thank Piet Bracke for his advice on
this.
9If only individuals with no missing values at all were considered in countries like Russia, Bulgaria,
Estonia, Ukraine, Czech Republic, Kosovo or Hungary, the proportion of missing values would reach
10%. In this way we reduce the proportion of missing values, which goes down in the former countries
to below 5% in all cases with the exception of Russia for PA in 2006, where the proportion of missing
cases is 6.2%. In Hungary, one of the PA items was not asked, and therefore requiring that all questions
are answered would automatically exclude Hungary from the PA analysis.
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although this is more the case in some countries than others. In any case I think there
is no reason for concern since, with the exception of Kosovo (which is excluded from the
analysis), the proportion of individuals without social class is very low.
3.4.2 The explanatory variables
The key independent variable is social class, which is measured with three dummies:
upper, middle and lower. Table 3.2 shows how the EGP categories have been aggregated.
In the regression, the dummies upper and middle are included, and the lower class is the
reference category. Therefore the coefficient of upper captures the difference in emotions
– positive or negative – between the upper and the lower class, and the coefficient of
middle captures the differences between the middle and the lower class. Table A4 in the
appendix (page 181), shows the size of each class for all countries included in the analysis.
Table 3.2: EGP Social Class Scheme (1979)
Upper class Higher controllers
Lower controllers
Middle class Routine non-manual
Self-employed with employees
Self-employed with no employees
Self-employed farmer




The other independent variables try to capture the following five domains: health,
safety, social life, employment, and financial hardship. The variables that have been
used to measure each are described next briefly. Health is measured using two variables:
self-reported health and how hampered the individual is. Self-reported health takes on 5
possible values: ‘very good’, ‘good’, ‘fair’, ‘bad’ and ‘very bad’ (the dummy fair will be
the reference category). Hampered tells us whether the individual is hampered ‘to some
extent’ or ‘a lot’, or ‘not at all’ in their daily activities. Safety will be measured with two
variables. The first one measures how safe the individual feels walking alone in their local
area after dark. There are 4 possible answers ‘very safe’, ‘safe’ (the reference category),
‘unsafe’, and ‘very unsafe’. The other variable is Assault, a dummy variable equal to 1 if
the individual was assaulted during the last 5 years, and 0 otherwise.
In order to measure the quantity and quality of social life, the following variables
are used. Partner is a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual lives with a partner.
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Intimate is a dummy variable equally to 1 if the individual reports having someone to
discuss intimate and personal matters with. There is another variable that measures the
frequency of social meetings. There are four possible answers: ‘less than once a month’,
‘once a week’, ‘several times a week’ (the reference category), and ‘almost every day’.
The labour force situation of the individual is measured with two dummies, unemployed
and out of the labour force (the reference category are employed individuals). There is
a variable that measures the duration of past unemployment spells. It will be used to
proxy security of employment. Two dummies have been created: unem short, equal to 1
if the individual spent between 3 and 12 months in unemployment at some point in the
past, and unem long if the individual spent more than 12 months. The reference category
is individuals that have experienced unemployment for less than 3 months (individuals
that have not experienced unemployment are included here). Finally, financial hardship
is measured with a variable that captures feelings about household income. The possible
answers are: ‘comfortably’, ‘coping’ (the reference category), ‘with difficulty’, and ‘with
great difficulty’. The distribution of all these variables can be found in the appendix in
Tables A10 to A15, on pages 187 to 192.
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3.5 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Guided by livability theories (Grinde, 2002a; Veenhoven and Ehrhardt, 1995), several
groups of variables whose relationship to SWB is supported by existing research (as it
shown the literature review section) have been selected. Those factors are physical health,
safety, social life and unemployment and financial struggle. To the extent that the former
are dependent on class position, they can also be interpreted as mediating variables for
the observed class gap in emotions. In order to understand where the class-based SWB
comes from, a multilevel model is run so that positive and negative emotions at the
individual level are explained by the former individual level variables.
In particular, in the model individuals will be nested in countries where the dependent
variable will be the PA score and the CES-D score, and the independent variables social
class, and the ones just described. We will estimate the model with random slopes for
social class since we want to allow the difference between upper and lower class to vary
across countries. Then the other variables that may be mediating the ‘effect’ of social
class on SWB will be added, and we will observe what happens to the coefficient of class
when we do so. Moreover, we perform a decomposition in order to establish which part
of the observed country differences in the SWB class gap are due to composition effects
(i.e. difference incidence of the mediating variables) or to slopes effect (i.e. differential
effects of the mediating variables) in the various countries.
Many things changed for many individuals in that period, and to the extent that the
rise in unemployment and in financial hardship can be considered exogenous, we are be
able to draw more credible conclusions about the effects of those variables on emotions.
We will also describe how the crisis has affected different countries, how depression rates
have gone up in some countries but not in others. We will also explore how the emotional
costs of the crisis have distributed across social classes.10
10Initially, regressors at the country level were also included, such as GDP per capita or the Gini index
of rates of economic growth. Since none of them had any effect once individual level variables were
included, they were eventually abandoned.
75
3.6 RESULTS
The results section will start by first showing that there is indeed a difference in health,
safety, social life, employment, and economic situation by class; and second, the existence
of an strong correlation between the former and positive and negative emotions. After
showing this, we will proceed to the regression results and see what has happens to the
‘effect’ of class when the selected regressors are included in the model. Afterwards, a
decomposition analysis is carried out in order to understand clearly the contribution to
the gap that each group of variables make. The results section concludes the discussion
of the likelihood of making a causal interpretation of the estimates by describing the
changes in emotions between 2006 and 2012.
3.6.1 Exploratory analysis
Table 3.3 shows two things. One the one hand (the left-hand side), that class correlates
with health, safety, social life, employment and income, and on the other hand (right-
hand side), that the former variables also correlate with SWB since there is a higher
prevalence of depression among individuals that do not have, or have less of the former
things. The first 3 columns show that the distribution of Xi depends, in a non-negligible
way, on social class. In other words, there is an important correlation between social
class and social life, employment, health and so on. The last two columns show that
health, social life, etc. are strongly correlated with the experience of negative emotions.
For instance, the first row for haves captures the proportion of depressed individuals
among individuals that have a partner, and the have nots column gives the proportion
of depressed individuals among individuals that do not have a partner. This is why the
total of haves and have nots is not 100.
It is clear from looking at Table 3.3 that in all five domains, lower-class individuals are
less successful than the upper class, and middle-class individuals lie somewhere in between
the other two. For instance, 83.7% of upper-class people have a partner versus 79.4%
and 75.6% of middle and lower class respectively. With regards to safety feelings, 83.1%
of upper-class people felt safe versus 78.0% of lower class. Similar patterns are observed
for health, employment, and feelings about household income. It is worth highlighting,
however, that although there are differences across classes in all five domains, those are
larger, or rather take place at higher levels, for some needs than for others. For instance,
although there is a gap in terms of friendship between upper- and lower-class individuals,
lower-class individuals (as well as middle-class people) enjoy a relatively high level of
social life (note that 91.8% of lower-class individuals have social meetings at least once
a week). Whereas regarding income difficulties, almost 40% of lower class people report
experiencing difficulties to live on their present income.
The right part of the table shows that all these variables that are unequally distributed
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Table 3.3: Class→ Xi → SWB
Proportion(%) Depression(%)
Xi Upper Middle Lower Haves Have nots
Partner 83.7 79.4 75.6 16.5 30.9
Intimate 74.2 73.7 70.5 19.0 42.1
Friends 96.3 94.7 91.8 17.5 31.6
Safety 83.1 77.0 78.0 16.9 33.8
Trust 68.7 53.4 44.7 13.4 29.6
Health 95.5 92.0 87.7 12.5 61.7
Hampered 17.5 20.3 25.2 38.3 15.6
Employed 86.9 78.1 70.8 16.5 34.8
Long term unem. 10.3 18.1 25.0 33.5 17.7
Financial strain 15.4 27.6 39.5 39.3 13.5
The first three columns show that the distribution of Xi across classes. The last two columns aim at
showing that the Xi – health, social life, etc.– affect subjective well-being by showing the prevalence
of depression for haves and have nots of each Xi – health, social life, etc.
across social class seem to have an important impact on well-being. In this case, we
consider depression rates for ‘haves’ versus ‘have nots’. For instance, with regards to
long-term unemployment, the ‘haves’ column shows the proportion of individuals with
depressive symptoms among those that have experienced long-term unemployment, and
the ‘have nots’ column gives the percentage among those that have not experienced long-
term unemployment. As expected, depression is much more present among those that
have experienced long term unemployment, 33% versus 17%. Similar patterns are found
for the other variables. It is worth noting that the largest depression rates are found
among individuals that report having bad health (above 60%!), among those that report
being hampered to some extent in daily activities (38.3%), among those who do not
have someone to discuss intimate matters with (42%), and among those that experience
income difficulties. Looking at Table 3.3 it seems quite plausible that the differences in
emotions among classes are explained by the differences in the former 5 domains.11
3.6.2 Regression analysis
The results of the regression analysis are presented next. Remember that the empirical
strategy was to compare two models, one where social class is the only variable, on
the right-hand side, and another one, where in addition to social class all the variables
discussed so far are added, which we believe mediate the effect between class and SWB.
11There are also differences in the expected direction in terms of PA but for brevity they are not
included here.
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In both models we would allow the effects of social class – βupper and βmiddle – to vary
across countries, and our expectation is that the class coefficients will converge towards
zero in the full model. Table A27 in the appendix (page 193) shows the regression output,
and Figures 3.7 and 3.8 displayed here show the – βupper and βmiddle – before and after
controls for each country. Remember that the reference category is the lower class.12
Figure 3.7: The effect of class on negative emotions
(a) βupper (b) βmiddle
These graphs show the βupper and βmiddle from the regression model, where the reference
category is the lower class. The gaps shown have been reversed to avoid negative values. In
other words, the gaps shown in this Figure tell us how much more negative emotions do lower
class people compared to upper class individuals (Figure 3.7a) and to middle class individuals
3.7b respectively.
The light grey bars capture the size of the differences in emotions between classes
before controls, and the black bars show the class differences remaining after controls.
For instance, in Spain the average gap in the CES-D score between the upper and lower
class is approximately 0.16 (with the lower class having the larger score), and this gap
goes down to practically zero after controls. Countries are ordered according to the size
of the class effect before controls. In Figure 3.7 it can clearly be seen that once we
control for health, safety, social, labour market and income variables, upper- and middle-
class individuals do not seem to experience negative emotions any more frequently than
lower-class individuals. Note that the black bars are practically zero in all countries,
especially for the differences between the middle and lower class (Figure 3.7b). Differences
between upper- and lower-class individuals in CES-D are also quite successfully explained,
although not as well as βmiddle, see Figure 3.7a. There are some countries where some
effect remains, for example in the Czech Republic, Estonia and Spain some effect remains
even after controls, although the size of the coefficient in those cases is too small (and
statistically insignificant). In the regression table (Table A16, on page 193) we see that
all the coefficients have the expected signs.
12Running separate models for each round was also attempted but since there were no differences
between the two all the observations were pooled.
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Figure 3.8: The effect of class on positive emotions
(a) βupper (b) βmiddle
These graphs show the βupper and βmiddle from the regression model, where the reference
category is the lower class.
It is worth mentioning that in some countries the ‘effect’ of being upper class – the
βupper – has a negative sign, suggesting that in those countries, after controls, lower-
class individuals would experience less negative emotions than upper-class individuals.
Although these differences do not happen to be statistically significant, and perhaps they
would disappear if we added more regressors, I think it is also important to allow for the
possibility of lower-class individuals being advantaged in some respects. For example, the
jobs performed by the upper class are, in general, more stressful than those performed
by the lower class. This could explain why lower-class individuals, after controls do
experience less negative emotions than upper-class people. However the main message
seems to be that, in most aspects, being lower class is a disadvantage (much more in
some counties than in others). These results support the idea that the reason why lower-
and middle-class individuals experience negative emotions more often than upper-class
people is because they have worse health, less jobs, more financial hardship and so on.
The model is however much less successful in explaining differences in positive emo-
tions across social classes (see Figure 3.8). The model explains some but not all variations.
On some level this makes sense if we recall all the literature on the relative independence
of positive and negative affect. If PA and NA are indeed independent we could never
explain them both very successfully with the same variables, although the coefficients
for the different explanatory variables are allowed to vary (and they do in fact vary, see
Table A16), it makes sense to think that if these variables can explain NA very well, they
will probably not explain PA that well. And this is in fact what seems to be happening.
This means that we will need to work harder in the future to discover what makes up for
those differences. However, I want to highlight once more the possibility that there may
be aspects, in which the lower class is advantaged over the upper class. In fact, this is
79
what the large negative gaps found in Figure 3.8 seem to suggest.
3.6.3 How much does each group of variables explain?
So far we have seen that the five groups of variables explain the differences in negative
emotions found across classes. One may wonder, however, how much each of these groups
of variables is explaining. Table 3.4 tries to answer that by showing how the different
domains contribute to the class-based gap in negative emotions. In particular the decom-
position is carried out for negative emotions only since the gap in those is the one that
this chapter seeks to explain. Note also that the decomposition has been made for the
gap between the upper and the lower class.
Income and health explain most of the gap. Note that those two alone explain 76% in
all countries on average. The next most important domain – although by some distance
– is employment – which explains 14.3%. This is consistent with the literature that has
argued that the primary role in the distress experienced by the unemployed is financial
strain (Gallie et al., 1994; Russell et al., 2013; Whelan, 1994). The next most important
factor in terms of average contribution to the gap is social life and then safety, which
explain 7.0% and 2.6% respectively. There is some variation across countries but not
much, note that the standard deviations that are quite low for the domains explaining
most of the variation. This also means that in terms of health, income, and employment,
the upper class is always doing better than the lower class whereas in other aspects such
as safety, in some countries like Estonia, lower-class individuals do better than upper-class
individuals.
Thus, to conclude we can say that differences in negative emotions across classes are
mainly due to differences in health and financial strain (and employment, since this is
probably the cause of financial strain). This is clear from looking at Table 3.4. However,
what is less evident in that table is why social variables, for instance, play a smaller role.
We can see that they are more equally distributed across classes, but what this table
does not show is that those aspects are as important as the former for NA. To make that
clear, we just need to look again at the second part of Table 3.3, at the beginning of this
section, which showed clearly how all variables were strongly correlated with depression.
Figure 3.9 tries to make that clear by summarising the level of ‘need satisfaction’ for each
domain across classes.
Figure 3.9 shows that there is almost a 20 percentage points gap between upper
and lower class in terms of health, financial situation, and employment. Whereas social
life and safety feelings are much more equally distributed across classes and quite well
satisfied for all. Note that the proportion of people with a good enough social life is
above 90% for all classes. Safety needs, are somewhat less well satisfied – around 80% –
but quite equally distributed across classes. These figures vary a bit across countries, for
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Table 3.4: Contribution of each group of variables to the class gap in negative emotions
Contributions(%) Total
Country Social Safety Health Labour Income
Belgium 6.3 1.8 31.8 14.7 45.4 100.0
Bulgaria 1.0 5.6 27.7 11.7 54.0 100.0
Cyprus 4.0 0.5 29.9 12.7 52.9 100.0
Denmark 7.0 10.6 37.2 10.0 35.2 100.0
Estonia 6.4 -8.0 36.1 15.1 50.5 100.0
Finland 6.2 4.1 37.0 14.4 38.2 100.0
Germany 8.4 17.4 27.6 10.7 36.0 100.0
Ireland 6.6 3.8 26.9 14.7 47.9 100.0
Netherlands 7.1 13.4 25.7 11.1 42.6 100.0
Norway 6.8 3.6 39.6 12.6 37.5 100.0
Poland 8.0 -2.4 31.0 16.9 46.5 100.0
Portugal 4.9 -5.1 30.2 13.5 56.5 100.0
Russia 7.6 -3.9 25.9 16.0 54.4 100.0
Slovakia 3.6 4.0 35.6 12.5 44.3 100.0
Slovenia 6.1 -0.3 36.3 12.1 45.8 100.0
Spain 4.9 -7.4 32.4 12.9 57.1 100.0
Sweden 6.3 20.2 25.8 10.1 37.7 100.0
Switzerland 6.6 3.4 29.1 12.3 48.6 100.0
UK 7.6 -2.0 29.7 14.8 49.9 100.0
Total 6.1 3.1 31.3 13.1 46.4 100.0
Mean 7.0 2.6 27.8 14.3 48.3 100.0
SD 10.8 7.3 12.6 3.7 12.6 0.0
Note: To approximate the contribution of each group of variables, we simply compare the
upper class coefficient of two models: (1) the full model, and (2) the full model without
the variables whose contribution we want to assess (call this A). We would do this 5
times, one for each group of variables. Then we add up the former differences (call this
B). The contribution of each group of variables would then be equal to (A/B)*100.
instance, in the UK, there is a difference of 13.6 percentage points gap in health and a 10
points gap in financial strain between upper and lower class people, whereas the social
and safety gap is below 5 percentage points. In Sweden however, the gap between upper
and lower class individuals is around 5 points or below in all domains. In consequence,
while in the UK there is a 12 point difference in depression between upper and lower class
individuals, in Sweden is of just 4 points.
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Figure 3.9: Class-inequality in health, safety, social life, income, employment.
(a) Good social life* (b) Feel ‘safe’ of ‘very safe’
(c) Health is ‘good’ or ‘very good’ (d) Can live on present income (e) In Employment
Each bar within each Figure shows the proportion of individuals within each social class that have
the need in question, sufficiently satisfied. For instance, health is considered to be satisfied when
the individual reports a level of health that has a low level of expected depression associated to
it. For instance, in the case of social life, ‘Good social life’ means that the individual has at least
two of the following three items: a partner, someone to discuss intimate matters with, meets with
his/her friends once a week or more. It turns out that having at least two of the former three items
predicts a low level of negative emotions.
3.6.4 Financial crisis and the emotional gap
Negative emotions seem to be the result of social life, safety, health, employment and
income. Hence, differences across nations, or individuals within a nation, in levels of NA
are explained by how well the former domains are satisfied. For instance, the reason why
in Norway or Finland the frequency of negative emotions is lower than that of Spain or
Portugal is simply that, in the former, individuals score better in terms of health, social
life, employment and so on.13 The same explanation applies to explain class differences in
the experience of negative emotions that are observed within countries. Can we conclude
from the former that if governments want to reduce class-based inequality in negative
emotions, they should focus on reducing health and income differences across classes?
The cross-sectional nature of our data obliges us to be cautious about causal state-
ments. The credibility of our story relies on being able to make a causal interpretation
of the coefficients. In other words, we need to assume that the effect obtained for un-
employment or income difficulties on NA are capturing a causal relationship. In other
words, being unemployed and or experiencing difficulties to live on present income do
13These can be seen in Tables A10 to A15 in the appendix.
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indeed cause an increase in the frequency of negative emotions. While this may seem
quite obvious to most people, it could also be argued that causality runs in the opposite
direction or that there is some unobserved factor that makes some people both more
likely to be unemployed and to have a high CES-D score.
Figure 3.10: Need satisfaction and depression
(a) Experiencing income difficulties (%) (b) Individuals with bad health (%)
While this is possible, there are good reasons for giving some credibility to the story
proposed in this chapter. These are essentially the following: (1) the existence of abun-
dant research supporting the causal links between health and financial strain on SWB; (2)
cross-country variation can be considered exogenous to individuals living in each country;
and (3) the change in financial strain and unemployment produced by the economic crisis
is also exogenous to individuals and produced the expected changes in emotion.
If we only had data for a single country, it would be hard to argue that unemployment
or financial strain are causing higher CES-D scores. For instance, how can we ensure that
Spanish people experiencing great income difficulties are not in that situation because
they are somewhat problematic individuals and that makes them less likely to find good
jobs and at the same time to have high levels of negative affect? We cannot be sure
really. However, having several countries where the proportion of the population under
financial pressure varies a great deal, would give greater credibility to the causal story
between income difficulties and mental stress, since reverse causation is much less likely
at the cross-country level. It does not make sense to argue, for instance, that the 30%
unemployment level in Spain is due to the Spaniards being depressed.
This is in fact one of the strengths of this research. Using a multi-country dataset, in
all countries we find the same: that individuals experiencing income difficulties experience
negative emotions with greater frequency than individuals without such problems. In
consequence, as Figure 3.10 shows, in countries with a higher proportion of individuals
experiencing economic difficulties, depression rates are higher. See Figure 3.10a.
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Figure 3.11: Changes in need satisfaction and changes in depression between 2006 and
2012.
(a) Change in the % with income difficulties (b) Change in the % of with bad health
Source: The European Social Survey, 3rd and 6th round of data. The countries included
are the 19 countries that appear in both rounds.
Looking at Figure 3.10, it seems quite plausible that income difficulties really do have
an effect on the experience of negative emotions. However, there is yet one more reason
why this seems to be so, and that is that not only do we observe this effect when comparing
countries with very different economic situations and backgrounds, but also those same
countries at two points in times, specifically: right before and right after – or rather
during – the financial crisis. Between 2006 and 2012 huge economic turmoil meant that
in some countries, like Spain and Ireland, many jobs were lost and in consequence many
more individuals and families than in 2006 experienced very serious financial difficulties.
While this is very unfortunate, the period of economic downturn worked as a natural
experiment that forced many people into economic pressures that they did not choose
but that they experienced nonetheless. This offers an excellent opportunity for showing
that the causal interpretation that we made seems to be correct.
While Figure 3.10 shows the positive relationship between economic difficulties and
depression, Figure 3.11, explores the relationship between changes in the former. There-
fore we see that in those countries where income difficulties increased the most, so did
depression rates (e.g. Spain, Cyprus and Ireland). For instance, in Spain, between 2006
and 2012 the proportion of people that experience difficulties went up by almost 20%, and
depression went also up by 8% approximately (see Figure 3.11a). Similar stories occurred
in Ireland and Cyprus (the same probably happened in Greece but unfortunately Greece
did not take part in round 6 of the ESS). At the same time in places where the proportion
of individuals facing financial strain went down, so did depression rates. This was the
case of Poland and Bulgaria. Another point in favour of the causal story is that when
separate models were run for 2006 and 2012, the data was pooled and just one model was
run because there were no important changes in the coefficients. In particular, income
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and unemployment seem to be equally strongly correlated with CES-D in 2006 – when
there were many less individuals in unemployment, than in 2012 – when unemployment
levels were much higher in some countries.
3.6.5 How has the crisis been distributed across classes?
In the previous section, a convincing case has hopefully been made for the causal inter-
pretation of our results, that is, that class differences in negative emotions are mainly
due to differences in health and financial strain. Now we will turn to how the changes in
depression rates, and negative emotions more generally, that occurred between 2006 and
2012 have been distributed across classes. This brings us back to the initial question of
this chapter, which was to study emotional gaps. We want to know whether those gaps
have become wider or smaller as a result of the crisis and, as we will see, the answer
is: it depends on the country we look at. To describe this, we focus on the 8 countries
that have experienced the greatest emotional changes: the 4 that experience the greatest
increase in depression – the ‘emotionally-unlucky’ countries, and the 4 that have experi-
enced the largest decrease – the ‘emotionally-lucky’ countries. This exploration can be
found in Figures 3.12 and 3.13. The remaining countries do not experience great changes
overall, but for the interested reader, Table A17 in the appendix, on page 194 shows the
distribution of changes in depression for all countries in the sample.
Figure 3.12: The consequences of the crisis among the ‘unlucky’ countries
(a) Changes in depression rates (b) Evolution of CES-D score
The countries included in this figure are the ones that experienced the greatest increase
in overall depression rates. In particular the increases were of 9.5 per cent in Cyprus, 5.8
in Spain, 4 in Ireland and 2.3 in the UK. For these countries we show in Figure 3.12b
the increase in depression in each social class, and in Figure 3.12a the evolution of the
CES-D score between 2006 and 2012.
If we order countries in terms of how much has depression increased among the pop-
ulation we find the following countries at the top: Cyprus (with a 10% increase approx-
imately), Spain very close (around 6%), Ireland (4%), and the UK at some distance.
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Figure 3.12a shows how the increase in depression has distributed across classes. Out of
these four unlucky countries, Spain is the one where the increase in depression has been
more unequally distributed across classes, with the middle class absorbing almost the
whole increase (15% increase), followed by the upper class that experiences a 5% increase
and the lower class, with a 4% increase. A similar pattern in observed in Cyprus, with
the middle class absorbing the greatest part of the increase but this time, not so much
more than the upper and lower class. In Ireland, however, the lower class is the one
that has got worse, followed by the middle class, with the upper class experiencing the
smallest increase. The UK is the strangest case because is the only country of these four
where one of the social classes – the lower class – has reduced depression rates in spite
of the overall increase in the country. The middle class however bears most of the cost
of the increase in depression, and the upper class experiences a much smaller increase.
Figure 3.12b shows the same phenomena but looking at the evolution of levels in the
CES-D score rather than depression rates. Note that the distance between the levels of
each class are the emotional gaps. In an earlier version of this paper the analysis focused
on the gap between the upper and lower class only. Ignoring the middle class was very
unfortunate because, as we see, this is where most of the story takes place in countries
like Spain or Cyprus.
Note that in Spain, for example, the levels of CES-D for the upper and lower class have
both increased almost by the same amount and therefore the gap between those two would
be almost the same as that in 2006. However, adding the middle class to the analysis
explains why depression rates have gone up so much in Spain, because the middle class
has increased NA so much that it has converged with the lower class. Something similar,
although on a smaller scale, has occurred in Cyprus where the middle class has got close
in levels of CES-D score to the lower class but not as close as in Spain. In Ireland the
distance between the lower class and the middle and upper class has increased, whereas
in the UK, the distances between classes have become smaller, although the middle class
has got a bit worse and separated from the upper class, the improvement of the lower
class has been substantive, almost reaching the levels of the middle class.
Among the countries that have become less depressed with the crisis, there is none
where the upper class has experienced the greatest reduction (see Figure 3.13a). In
fact, in Bulgaria for example, the lower class has experienced the greatest reduction in
depression, followed by the upper class; and the middle class is the one that has improved
the least. Poland is an even clearer case of reduction in distances between classes because
the lower class has been the one benefiting the most from the reduction in depression,
followed by the middle class, and the upper class has been the group that has improved
the least. The exact same situation has occurred in Slovenia (although on a smaller scale)
where the lower and middle class have improved more than the upper class. In Slovakia
the upper class is the one benefiting less from the reduction in depression.
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Figure 3.13: The consequences of the crisis among the ‘lucky’ countries
(a) Changes in depression rates (b) Evolution of CES-D score
The countries included in this figure are the ones that experienced the greatest decrease
in overall depression rates. In particular the reductions in depression were of 10.8 in
Bulgaria, 10.4 in Poland, 7.8 in Slovakia and 4.28 in Slovenia.
To conclude we can say that in countries where things have got better, this improve-
ment has come together with a reduction in emotional inequalities. In countries where
things have got worse, the results are mixed, because it is mostly the middle-class people
that are experiencing the greatest increase in depression, and only in one of these four
countries has the lower class suffered the most.
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3.6.6 Conclusion
Sociologists have worked extensively to understand differences in objective well-being be-
tween the most and the least privileged members of society. However, very little is known
about how their feelings differ. This chapter aimed to shed light on this issue. First by
showing that there are indeed important differences in emotions across countries and also
within countries that are worth looking at and understanding. A first exploration of the
data shows that in almost every country, individuals in the upper class systematically
enjoy higher subjective well-being than individuals in the middle class – regardless of
the measure we look at. That is, upper-class people experience positive emotions more
often and negative ones less often that the middle class, and middle-class individuals
are also better off than the lower class in terms of emotions. Although there is a lot of
cross-country variation, the differences across classes are often of non-negligible size. Un-
derstanding why this is the case is important because SWB is an important life outcome
that is unequally distributed over the population. To the extent that inequality in the
distribution of SWB is class based, public policy can do something about it.
Using a special module of the ESS and pooling the data from 2006 and 2012, a mul-
tilevel model was estimated with individuals nested in countries that explained positive
and negative emotions as a function of social class and the mediating variables between
class and SWB: health, safety, social life and labour market status. The findings suggest
that the differences in SWB between the upper and the lower class are mostly driven by
differences in health and employment, and that the differences in the gaps across coun-
tries are due to differences in the differentials in those variables across countries. Feeling
safe and having successful social relationships is no less important for negative emotions,
but, since they are more equally distributed across classes, they do not contribute to
the differences in negative emotions existing across classes and countries. This chapter
is much more successful explaining differences in positive and negative emotions than
explaining the satisfaction gaps.
Had there only been one round of the ESS, these conclusions would have to be taken
with great caution, however the fact that we have data from 2006 and 2012, and the
fact that the economic shock that the crisis brought with it has produced the expected
effects on negative emotions that our model would predict, means that we may actually
give them a causal interpretation. For example, between 2006 and 2012 the proportion
of individuals that experienced economic difficulties increased dramatically in countries
like Spain, due to a rise in unemployment levels, as did depression rates. At the same
time, in countries like Bulgaria or Slovakia where employment rates grew and financial
hardship decreased between 2006 and 2012, so did the experience of negative emotions
and the prevalence of depression.
These changes in depression rates produced a reduction in the emotional gap in coun-
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tries where things improved, because in those countries the lower and middle classes were
the ones that benefited the most from the reduction in depression. However, in countries
where things got worse and depression increased, the situation in terms of gaps in mixed
since it was mostly the middle class that absorbed the increase in depression, getting in
some cases very close to the levels of NA of the lower class. So, in such cases, although
the emotional distances between the middle and lower classes got smaller, it means that




How much should I work?
Using subjective well-being to shed light on work-life balance
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The work-life balance refers to how well individuals integrate work and life – other than
work. Most of us would agree that even though working may indeed be very enjoyable,
we need leisure time too. However, what is less clear is how much exactly one should
work, or how much free time one needs to feel best.
Work life balance has for some time concerned policy makers, but lately the issue has
gained much attention – probably because working time arrangements have diversified
and in general become more flexible (Boulin et al., 2006; Messenger, 2004), and also
because of the increased participation of women into the labour market, which may have
contributed to making it more difficult to balance work with the rest of our lives. This is
consistent with time pressure reports that suggest that people find it increasingly difficult
to do all the things they want. Examples of this concern are the OECD work-life balance
measures, or the French initiative to limit off-the-clock work emails to ensure that the 11
hours of daily ‘rest’ time to which all workers are legally entitled be spent uninterrupted.
A similar initiative occurred one year earlier in Germany where the employment ministry
banned its managers from calling or emailing staff out of hours except in emergencies to
prevent employees from ‘burning out’.
Despite all this concern about the work-life balance, we know very little about what
it is exactly, or how to achieve it. Usually, when people refer to work life balance, they
mean something like ‘not working too much’ to avoid ‘burning out’. But, is that it? How
much should we work if we want to feel at our best? We do not know the answer to this,
but we could know, or at least try to find out, because we have at our disposal many
measures of SWB that could be used as a benchmark to assess the adequacy of different
working amounts. In fact, there are some authors that have already acknowledged this,
and used this type of data together with time diaries to assess quality of life, and in
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particular of work and leisure experiences like Dow and Juster (1985), Csikszentmihalyi
and LeFevre (1989), or Gershuny (2013). It is the aim of this chapter to do precisely this,
to employ time use data and subjective well-being variables to try to find out how much
we should work to maximise SWB.
This chapter will explore the relationship between working hours and different well-
being outcomes, essentially the enjoyment of activities, satisfaction, and feelings of time
pressure. Work amounts that maximise well-being will be considered conducive to bal-
ance. There may be many different combinations of work and leisure that produce bal-
ance, or there may be just one point, a unique combination that produces equilibrium
between work and life other than work. It is unlikely that we will identify a magic point
at which balance is achieved but rather of a bracket of hours of work in which this can
happen. Finding this bracket of possibilities is the first aim. The second is to take into
account that not all workers like their jobs to the same extent and to see if that affects
the optimal points. In other words, do individuals that like their jobs more, need less
leisure? Can they afford to spend more time at work, and still achieve balance? Finally,
special attention will be paid to the potential trade-offs among different SWB outcomes.
Although the results of this chapter are still very preliminary and caution is required,
the analysis carried out suggests that there is indeed an optimal number of hours of
work to maximise SWB. But the optimal point does indeed vary depending on the SWB
outcome we look at, and most importantly on whether one likes one’s job. For instance,
for individuals that like their jobs more than the median, daily enjoyment and life satis-
faction are maximised at approximately 6 and 9.5 hours respectively, and the frequency
of unpleasant moments is minimised at approximately 7 hours. Besides, the curves are
so flat around the optimal points that levels of SWB very close to the optimal ones are
also achieved for a relatively wide range of hours around the optimal one. However, in-
dividuals who do not like their jobs that much should work as little as possible if they
want to maximise enjoyment, but should work on something if they want to maximise
life satisfaction (6.7 hours).
This chapter is organised as follows. In the next section a brief review of the existing
literature on this subject will be provided, starting with the earliest attempts to address
work-life balance and ending with the most sophisticated studies that have addressed
this issue to date. Then, the latest French time use survey will be presented and the
empirical strategy discussed. Then the results are presented for each SWB outcome
separately, starting with enjoyment, followed by feelings of time pressure and finally for
satisfaction. The chapter ends with a short discussion of the results.
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4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
When we speak of work-life balance (WLB), we refer to how well individuals integrate
work and life outside of work. For some time the work-life balance issue has received a
lot of attention among both policy makers and academics alike, and many terms have
been used to refer to it: the interface between work and family, integration, work-family
reconciliation or, work-family conflict. In this paper I will use the terms work-life balance,
as suggested by the ILO (see Fagan et al., 2012).
There is a lot of literature that has, in a more direct or indirect way, tried to help us
understand how to achieve balance. It is the aim of this section to briefly review it. The
section is divided into two subsections, in the first one I will review the ‘indirect’ evidence
and in the second one the ‘direct’ evidence. By ‘direct’ evidence I mean studies where
the impact of, for instance, working hours is explored on some well-being outcome. For
example, studies of the effects of working more than 48 hours a week on physical health,
or exploring the effects of leisure characteristics on feelings of time pressure. ‘Indirect’
evidence on the contrary, would be studies that keep track of time aggregates with the
intention of capturing quality of life but without actually exploring the effects of those
on well-being (e.g. looking at the prevalence of overwork or shift work).
However, before that we will define ‘paid work’ and the ‘rest of our lives’, the two
main time aggregates whose combination and effects on SWB this chapter investigates.
The starting point for grouping activities is As (1978) who proposes four types accord-
ing to how much freedom of choice there is about doing the activity. He distinguishes
between: necessary time, contracted time, committed time, and free time. Necessary
time is time needed to satisfy the basic physiological needs (sleep, meals and personal
health and hygiene). There is not much freedom of choice about doing these or not.
Contracted time refers to regular paid work and time devoted to travel to work, time in
schools and waiting for work to begin. Committed time covers all household chores and
caring activities, and Free time: is the time that is left after the former is taken out (As,
1978). Note that these groups correspond exactly to what we usually refer to as: sleep
and personal care, paid work, unpaid work and leisure.
Although the definition provided by As (1978) is quite intuitive, some controversy
may arise regarding the distinction between unpaid work and leisure, because there are
some activities, such as gardening, that could be considered both: unpaid work but also
a leisure activity, since it may be done for pleasure. Since a consistent rule is needed,
Reid’s third-person criterion is followed – according to which ‘unpaid work’ is considered
to be any activity which could be delegated to some third party without loss of the final
utility that derives from it (Reid, 1934). Thus, while gardening may very pleasant and
considered leisure for many people, one could hire someone to care for the garden (and
still enjoy seeing the garden well taken care of), whereas we would not hire someone to
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go to the cinema on our behalf. This is why gardening is considered ‘unpaid work’ and
watching a movie is considered ‘leisure’. Another way to look at it would be to say that it
while activities considered leisure have only process benefits (Juster and Stafford, 1985)
– like the enjoyment of watching the movie – unpaid work has a final utility in addition
to the process benefits.
The third person criterion is then a useful one that has been widely used in time
use studies. Yet, when researching SWB it is important to keep in mind that this is a
somewhat strange criterion because this means/ends, or work/leisure distinction can lead
us to think that individuals would be better off if they could have the ‘ends’ – i.e. the
leisure activities – and avoid the ‘means’ – i.e. the work. However, evidence suggests that
this is not the case. There are process benefits in all activities (Gershuny and Halpin,
1996; Juster and Stafford, 1985), i.e., utility derived from performing the activities that
we should not ignore. When those process benefits are considered we see that paid work
and unpaid work are both pleasurable activities from which utility is derived (Gershuny,
2011; Juster and Stafford, 1985; Krueger, 2007), even if less than leisure activities. In
some respects, work does produce higher well being than leisure, and stress levels seem
to be lower at work than at home (Csikszentmihalyi and LeFevre, 1989; Damaske et al.,
2014; Young et al., 1973). Besides, when we compare individuals in employment with
those out of it, like homemakers or unemployed individuals, we find that the first are
healthier, and more satisfied with their lives than non-employed individuals (Bromberger
and Matthews, 1996; Gerlach and Stephan, 1996).
All this suggests that work makes people better off and that individuals would not
be better off if they were at leisure all the time. This chapter wants to investigate ‘how
much work’, paid work in particular, individuals should do in order to optimise SWB.
Hence, this Chapter will explore the well being produced by different combinations of
paid word and the rest of activities. At this point one may wonder why unpaid work is
included in ‘the rest of our lives’ rather than in work since it is also a kind of committed
time. This would seem especially reasonable for homemakers, however, in our sample of
employees, there are no homemakers, and therefore the amount of time devoted to unpaid
work is really small when compared to the time devoted to paid work, and since it is less
committed than contracted time, and, of a very different nature to paid work, I prefer
to separate unpaid work from paid work. Although I understand this issue is debatable,
and in any case, the amount of unpaid work that the individual does will be taken into
account.
4.2.1 Indirect measures of work-life balance
Policy makers and academics have for a long time collected statistics on hours of work,
driven by a general concern that long hours of work can have damaging social conse-
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quences (Lourie, 1996). Hours of work have a relation to the quality of life to the extent
that the greater proportion of the day is devoted to work, the less time remains for doing
anything else. But not all time that is not devoted to work is devoted to leisure. Hence,
some researchers have looked directly at leisure time, and have documented a dramatic
increase in leisure time in the last decades in the US – especially among the less educated
(Aguiar and Hurst, 2006), and also in Europe (Gimenez-Nadal and Sevilla-Sanz, 2011).
A more comprehensive picture of work-life balance is provided by Gershuny (2011)
with a ‘triangle of daily activities’ that shows the exact combination of paid, unpaid and
leisure time. By exploring changes in the shape and position of the triangle, one can
easily get a sense of the existing balance between paid work, unpaid work, and leisure
time. A similar but less graphic approach is proposed by Fisher and Layte (2004), who
measure the proportion of ‘discretionary time’, which is time that is not spent in paid,
unpaid or in personal care. The idea that leisure is not just time that is not spent at
work is widespread and an example of this is the OECD Better Life Index, which maps
‘work-life balance’ by country by providing statistics of time devoted to paid, unpaid,
personal care and leisure time.1
Leisure serves as an adequate buffer against stress (Iwasaki and Schneider, 2003;
Roberts, 2011), and this is why the former research has taken care to quantify it as well
as possible. However, some researchers claim that not all leisure is of the same quality
and, therefore, that not all leisure serves its function equally well. In particular, some
researchers have argued that leisure is of higher quality the less fragmented and the less
contaminated it is by other activities, and also, if it is spent with other adults and with-
out children that require the adults’ attention (Bianchi and Mattingly, 2003; Bittman
and Wajcman, 2000; Gimenez-Nadal and Ortega-Lapiedra, 2010; Henderson et al., 1991;
Sullivan, 1996). Based on the former assumptions, Sevilla et al. (2012) build quality mea-
sures using the American time use data to show that the relative growth in leisure time
enjoyed by low-educated individuals documented in previous studies has been accompa-
nied by a relative decrease in the quality of that leisure time. Fisher and Layte (2004)
also explore the prevalence of multitasking and leisure fragmentation in several countries
in an attempt to measure work-life balance. However, most of these assumptions have not
been properly tested – an exception is Sullivan (1996), and therefore, making inferences
about the quality of leisure based on those assumptions does not seem appropriate.
4.2.2 Direct measures of work-life balance
4.2.2.1 Measuring unbalance: hours of work and ill-being
Golden and Altman (2008) define overwork as “the point at which working hours begin
1Available at: http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/topics/work-life-balance/
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to entail escalating risks or harms beyond those associated with normal, standard, agreed
upon hours” (Golden and Altman, 2008, p.65, cited in Fagan et al. 2012). I think that
this definition illustrates very well what this literature does for the most part: identifying
the point at which work starts to threaten our physical and/or mental health. In other
words the literature has mainly focused on understanding the consequences of a lack
of balance, or working an excessive number of hours. Working long hours impedes a
sufficient recovery time, and it is usually associated with unhealthy lifestyles such as
smoking, high caffeine intake, alcohol consumption, lack of exercise and poor diet (Burke
and Cooper, 2008; Van der Hulst, 2003). This is a reason for concern because a sizeable
proportion of the workforce works long hours (Messenger, 2004; Messenger et al., 2007;
Parent-Thirion et al., 2007). This literature is vast and only a brief overview will be
offered here. The interested reader may want to look at Dembe et al. (2008) or Fagan
et al. (2012) on which this section relies heavily.
Working long hours and is associated with general bad health, such as backache,
headaches, muscular pain, injury, stress, high blood pressure, diabetes, overall fatigue
and insomnia (Åkerstedt, 2003; Boisard et al., 2003; Burchell et al., 2008; Costa, 1996;
Kawachi et al., 1995; Kawakami et al., 1999). Long working hours are also a significant
source of work-family conflict, as they reduce the amount of time available to be spent
with children and other family members (Berg et al., 2003; Burchell et al., 2008; Fagan and
Burchell, 2002; Fagan and Walthery, 2011; Gallie and Russell, 2009; White et al., 2003),
and work-family conflict can in turn lead to poor mood, anxiety, substance dependence
disorders, prolonged fatigue and a greater need for recovery time, as well as lower job
and life satisfaction (Frone, 2000; Gornick and Meyers, 2003; Hochschild, 1997; Hughes
and Galinsky, 1994; Jansen et al., 2003; Lewis and Cooper, 1987, 1988; O’Driscoll et al.,
1992).
The scheduling of paid working hours is also important because it affects the easiness
of coordination with domestic routines and social life. Shift work, for example, interferes
directly with the rhythm of the family (Kristensen et al., 2005). This is probably why
many studies have found that it affects health and work family conflict. Employees
working at weekends report significantly higher emotional exhaustion, job stress and
psychosomatic health problems than other employees (Boisard et al., 2003; Burchell et al.,
2008; Jamal and Baba, 1997). Kawachi et al. (1995) and Knutsson et al. (1986) showed
that shift workers were 40% more likely to have had incidents of coronary heart disease
than other workers. There is also causal evidence of the effects of shift work on divorce
and the quality of marital relations (Perry-Jenkins et al., 2007; Presser, 2000; White and
Keith, 1990). Non-day working schedules are also associated with stress and work-family
conflict (Kingston and Nock, 1987; La Valle et al., 2002; Mellor, 1986; Rubin, 1994; Simon,
1990; Staines and Pleck, 1983). And this is in spite of a reduction in number of hours
worked (Fagnani and Letablier, 2004). As with long working hours, there are reasons for
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concern because a significant proportion of men and women work at non-standard times,
and this phenomenon has been rising (Parent-Thirion et al., 2007; Pocock et al., 2007;
Presser, 2005).
The negative effects of unusual schedules seem to be attenuated if workers have some
autonomy and control over their work schedules (Barton and Folkard, 1991; Fenwick and
Tausig, 2001; Hughes and Parkes, 2007). However, flexible working time arrangements
may offer less autonomy in practice than on paper because while they may help with the
coordination of work and family responsibilities, they may also isolate the worker and
create difficult boundary maintenance between ‘work’ and ‘home’ space (Felstead et al.,
2002; Pérez Sánchez and Gálvez Mozo, 2009), which may increase work-family conflict
(Hecht and Allen, 2009).
An important part of this literature has been devoted to studying feelings of time
pressure, the increasingly widespread reports of feeling rushed, that may affect individuals
in paid work. Paradoxically, as leisure time went up, so did stress and feelings of time
pressure, and abundant literature has emerged to capture ‘time poverty’ and ‘time crunch’
and related issues (Conley, 2009; Hamermesh and Lee, 2007; Hochschild, 1997; Robinson
and Godbey, 1997; Schor, 2008, are just some examples). Hamermesh and Lee (2007)
“Stressed Out on Four Continents: Time Crunch or Yuppie Kvetch?” is a very interesting
example of this literature because it seems to question the importance we should give
to time crunch reports. They find that in Australia, Canada, Germany, Korea and the
United States, wealthier people are much more likely to complain – or ‘kvetch’ – about
being busy than the poor. This is a fact that may be partly explained by longer hours
of work. After controlling for time spent doing paid and unpaid work, individuals with
higher incomes continue to feel more stressed, and the importance of higher incomes
in generating time stress is not small, particularly in North America. This leads the
authors to question the extent to which one should be concerned about these complaints.
Whether these complaints coming from the rich come from a greater opportunity cost or
are just a habit of the rich –a yuppie kvetch–, we do not know. But, do they hurt any less
than the rushed feelings coming from actually working too many hours? This is without
doubt an interesting phenomenon that deserves further investigation.
There is a bit of a generalised complaint (not solely from the yuppies) that seems,
however, hard to reconcile with the evidence that suggests that individuals in employment
have better health (physical as well as mental) than others (see previous chapter). For
instance, a very recent study by Damaske et al. (2014) questions the idea that work
can only be a source of stress and a threat to workers’ health. The authors measured
people’s cortisol levels – a major biological marker of stress – and found that people have
significantly lower levels of stress at work than at home. This is at odds with the reports
of increasing difficulties to reconcile a work and life balance but it is actually consistent
with the well-established fact that employed people who work have better mental and
97
physical health than their non-working peers (see Chapter 3).
I think that the findings of Damaske et al. (2014), together with all the evidence that
workers have better health than non workers, suggests that balance may be somewhere
in the middle between not working at all and working too much. How much work is
too much seems to be clearer, but it remains to be seen how much we should work to
maximise well-being and achieve balance. In the next section we review the studies that
have used time use data and well-being information to shed light on that question.
4.2.2.2 Hours of work and subjective well-being
As we have seen, most of the research concerning the relationship between work and well-
being has focused on the negative aspects of working too much or at the wrong hours. We
seem to know a lot about what working too much is, and what negative consequences it
can bring. However, we know much less about the benefits of work and we know almost
nothing about how much should we work to maximise well-being instead of just avoiding
the miseries of excessive working hours. Shedding light on this is the aim of this chapter.
Although I know of no study that addresses precisely this question, there are some studies
that have touched upon these issues and I will discuss those next.
Several authors have acknowledged the value of time use data to gain an understanding
of quality of life (that could improve the current GDP approach), and have used enjoyment
or affect measures combined with time use data to produce national accounts of well-
being. This was first proposed by Juster and Stafford (1985) who spoke about “process
benefits” – the utility we derive from the things we do – and how those should also be
taken into account when building national accounts. Other authors that have worked
in this direction are Gershuny and Halpin (1996), Krueger (2007) or Kahneman et al.
(2004a). All these proposals varied in the details but had in common the aim of producing
a measure of utility that came from taking into account time spent in different activities,
and the utility that those produce, to build utility accounts for the individual and society.
These authors vary in the sophistication with which ‘utility’ is measured. For exam-
ple, Dow and Juster (1985) simply multiplied time spent on the activities by a score in
a ranking of preferred activities. Whereas Krueger (2007) obtained actual utility by ran-
domly sampling episodes during the day (based on the experience sampling methodology
developed by Larson and Csikszentmihalyi, 1983) and collecting a score from 0-6 that
captured the intensity of six affect measures, three positive and three negative.2 He then
grouped activities based on affective experiences (feeling interested, stressed, happy, sad,
pain, and tired) during various activities. And secondly, he also built the “U-index” that
is simply a measure of the proportion of time spent in an unpleasant state.3 He concludes
2The Princeton Affect and Time Survey (PATS). Available at:
http://krueger.princeton.edu/files/PATS.pdf
3An episode is deemed unpleasant if the strongest emotion is a negative one.
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that between 1965 and 2005 in the US, time spent in the most enjoyable and engaging
forms of leisure activities has decreased for both men and women, which is at odds with
the conclusions reached by Aguiar and Hurst (2006): “we have documented that the
amount of leisure enjoyed by the average American has increased substantially over the
last forty years” (cited in Krueger, 2007, p. 206). This discrepancy highlights the im-
portance of using SWB information to value the quality of experiences. (Krueger, 2007,
p. 206) remarks that categorisations of time are based on subjects’ reported experiences
rather than on researchers’ judgements.
Many before Krueger (2007) have also acknowledged the arbitrariness of the distinc-
tion between work and leisure. For reasons of brevity I will not get into the details
here but some examples include: Csikszentmihalyi and LeFevre (1989); Gershuny (2013);
Sorokin and Berger (1939); Young et al. (1973) or Fisher and Layte (2004). Young et al.
(1973) for instance collected a time diary sample in which they asked respondents to
classify the activities as one of work, leisure, neither or both. As compared to the third
person criterion assignment of current activities in this dataset, 35% of all “work” time
was not so classified by the respondents themselves, while 28% of all “leisure” was classi-
fied as not pure leisure.Csikszentmihalyi and LeFevre (1989) followed 78 adult workers for
1 week and at randomly chosen moments individuals were asked to report how they felt.
The aim was that of exploring if the quality of experience was more influenced by whether
a person was at work or at leisure or more influenced by whether a person was in flow
(i.e., in a condition of high challenges and skills (Csikszentmihalyi, 1991). The results
showed that all the variables measuring the quality of experience, except for relaxation
and motivation, are more affected by flow than by whether the respondent is working or
at leisure. Moreover, most flow experiences are reported when working. Note that this
is consistent with the very recent findings by Damaske et al. (2014) that people are less
stressed – presenting lower cortisol levels – at their place of work than at home.
Other interesting studies that have used time use data linked to SWB information,
although with a slightly different focus – that is, not with the aim of making overall
assessments – are Gershuny (2009), Kahneman et al. (2004b), or Stone et al. (2006), but
Gershuny (2009) is the one closest to this study and has in fact influenced it greatly.
Gershuny (2009) makes an empirical exploration of diminishing marginal utility of activ-
ities with respect to time using diaries with enjoyment ratings from the UK and US from
the mid 1980s. He finds striking similarities between the US and UK average ratings
of activities, with out-of-home leisure being the most enjoyable activity, and shopping
and unpaid work the least enjoyed activities. Paid work is somewhere in the middle.
He also calculates the diminishing marginal utilities with respect to time and finds that
all activities except watching TV have inverted-U utility functions. After obtaining the
turnover points for each activity and discovering that the marginal utility for ‘leisure
out of home’ does not become negative until 10 to 14 hours per day – a level so much
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beyond the normal levels – which leads him to conclude that “on the basis of the evidence
presented here, a little more time devoted, across a society, to out-of-home leisure, will
produce more aggregate utility than would a similar margin of time devoted to at-home
leisure, and more at-home leisure would similarly dominate more paid or unpaid work.
These sorts of regularities could be used by public authorities as a justification for taxes,
subsidies and regulations leading, for example, to less paid work time, and more time
devoted to out-of-home leisure consumption.” (Gershuny, 2009, p. 20-21).
I agree with the former statement, however, given that doing more of one thing means
doing less of something else, I think it is a good idea to also see what happens to overall
enjoyment, in addition to exploring diminishing marginal utilities of activities. This is
the purpose of this chapter, to explore the effects on overall enjoyment of doing more or
less hours of work. In addition, I think that exploring the consequences of changes in the
distribution of time across activities, on other outcomes in addition to enjoyment would
be a good idea, just in case there were important trade-offs (as there probably are).
4.2.3 Objective and subjective happiness
In 1999, Kahneman (1999) introduces the concept of ‘objective happiness’, as opposed
to ‘subjective happiness’, which is how he referred to happiness and life satisfaction self-
reports. Objective happiness is derived from a record of instant utility over the relevant
period. He acknowledged that these accounts of subjective experience provided by people
could differ substantially from actual experience due to a series of biases that occur when
the individual retrospectively evaluates his own experience. This led him to conclude
that subjective happiness is some kind of imperfect version of SWB and that what he
called ‘objective happiness’ is preferred.
The reason why the two differ is that happiness and life satisfaction self-reports are
answered applying heuristics that are subject to certain biases that make the two differ.
The duration neglect or the peak/end rule are good examples of this (Kahneman, 2000).
Redelmeier and Kahneman (1996) discovered these two rules in an experiment involving
a colonoscopy where they compared instant utility with remembered utility. Instant
utility was the average of utility that results from adding up all instant reports of pain as
the colonoscopy takes place, whereas remembered utility refers to the evaluation of the
colonoscopy made at the end.
Redelmeier and Kahneman (1996) observed that although their colonoscopies varied
in duration from 4 to 69 minutes, the correlation between the duration of a procedure and
the patient’s subsequent evaluation was only 0.03. The peak/end rule refers to the fact
that evaluation of the experience was heavily influenced by the peaks and the end, that
is extreme moments of pain and by how the experience ended. The patients’ subsequent
evaluation of the procedure was predicted with relatively high accuracy (r = .67) from
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the average of the most intense level of pain reported during the procedure, and of the
mean pain level reported over the last three minutes. 4
The discrepancies between instant utility and remembered utility in the colonoscopy
would be analogous to the relationship between objective and subjective happiness, and
this is why Kahneman (1999) concluded that objective happiness should be preferred.
However, very soon after he acknowledged the importance of remembered utility as well,
because even if remembered utility is a distorted view of reality it is the view that stays
with us for as long as memory allows, and so these subjective accounts should not be
neglected (Fredrickson, 2000; Kahneman, 2000).
The distinction between objective and subjective happiness is similar to that between
the different components of SWB: affect and cognition, enjoyment and life evaluation
(Diener, 1984). In the view of the former discussion, it is clear that both components
are important: enjoyment as much as satisfaction with life. Enjoyment of activities
capture how the individual feels at each moment whereas satisfaction with life tells us
the assessment that the person makes of a certain period of his life – which may be
subject to heuristics such as the ones described above. But also because certain decisions
or actions, may affect the two differently. Consider doing a PhD, it may make your days
less pleasurable due to the long hours you have to work, but it may have a very positive
impact on life satisfaction if doing so means accomplishing a dream one had.
Thus, these two parts capture different things, both are important and may differ,
and it is precisely because they may differ that both should be measured. Hence, the
analysis of work-life balance could not be complete if any of these two measures were
absent. The analysis of balance carried out here is not only focused on diary measures
of affect that are closer to instant utility but also why we consider life evaluations and
experience of time crunch.
The expectations that influence how certain events affect our life satisfaction, may
operate at the country or cultural level. For instance, work could produce more or less
satisfaction with life depending on how work-oriented the country in which the person
lives is. I think it is plausible to argue that in countries with a great work culture such
as the US, life satisfaction is optimised at a higher number of hours of paid work than
in countries where there is not so much of a work culture and where leisure time is very
valued such as France or Spain. Then I would perhaps expect that if this analysis was
done with US data then higher optimal points would be found for satisfaction that with
the current French dataset. However I would expect enjoyment or time crunch to follow
4The Peak/End rule implies a counter-intuitive prediction: adding a period of pain to an unpleasant
episode will actually improve its remembered utility (Redelmeier et al., 2003). For instance, leaving the
colonoscope in place for about a minute after terminating the examination improved the evaluation of
the procedure because it reduced the pain in the final moments of the procedure even thought it just
added an extra minute of discomfort (The extra minute is distinctly uncomfortable, but not very painful)
(Redelmeier et al., 2003)
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the same rules everywhere and, thus, optimal points to be more similar across countries.
I see no reason why doing 10 hours of paid work should produce time crunch in France
but not in the Netherlands. Similarly, I see no reason why the number of hours that
optimises enjoyment should vary across countries, after all, the rules determining when
people get tired of work and stop enjoying it should be quite universal.
Then, assuming that the optimal points for enjoyment are the same across countries,
and that optimal satisfaction points can vary across countries, the culture of the country
could affect the size of the trade-off between enjoyment and satisfaction. Thus, if the
former were true, achieving balance and optimising all SWB outcomes may be easier in
some countries than in others.
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4.3 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
This paper aims at shedding light empirically on work-life balance. It will do so by
exploring the relationship between hours of paid work and different subjective well-being
outcomes. Work hours that maximise well-being will be considered conducive to balance.
There may be many different combinations of work and ‘life’ – everything else other
than paid work – that produce balance, or perhaps there is just one point, a unique
combination, that maximises well-being.
Given the enormousness of the research question at hand, the analysis will be restricted
to workers, in particular to employees, and to diaries reported to be ‘typical working days’.
The analysis would undoubtedly be much more interesting if we included other groups,
such as retired individuals and homemakers, but this would make the chapter much more
complex and lengthy, and will therefore be left for future research. One of the key aspects
of this study is the selection of well-being outcomes that will be used as benchmarks for
defining the optimal points. This selection has been guided by the theory but with the
limitations that the data imposes. However, it should be highlighted that the richness of
the data source in question – the latest French time use survey – allows a quite satisfactory
measurement of subjective well-being. Ideally we would also explore objective well-being
outcomes, such as physical health, but this chapter will focus on subjective well-being
only.
First, we will explore the crude relationship between hours worked and the different
well-being outcomes. This is useful because it will give us a first picture of how employees
– in France in this case – are doing. After this, regression analysis will follow, where the
well-being outcomes will be explained as a function of hours of paid work and several
control variables. This will allow us to get closer to causal estimates. However we should
bear in mind that this is a purely cross-sectional study, it will only compare diaries of
individuals that work more to those of individuals that work less and by doing so it will
try to draw some conclusions about work-life balance. However, we cannot ignore the
fact that these individuals may differ in more than working hours (and the variables that
we control for). So, as usual, endogeneity is a concern.
If we could run an experiment, we would assign hours of work randomly to employees,
and measure their SWB levels. Unfortunately we cannot do that, but, luckily, employers
do it very often: 65% of the employees have a schedule imposed by their employers. These
individuals are told how much, and when, to work. The remaining 35% of employees
have some power in deciding how much and when to work. Employees with an imposed
schedule are of course not a random sample of the employees; there may be self-selection
into these types of jobs (and even more into the other 35%). However, employees with
an imposed schedule are such a large part of the workforce that it is almost like an
experiment, and, in any case, it is very interesting to explore the relationship between
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hours of work and SWB for this large proportion of workers that are ‘forced’ to work a
given number of hours. It is also very interesting to see if the remaining 35% of employees
do ‘react’ very differently to working hours than employees with an imposed schedule.
The estimates would be even more credible if the relationship between hours of work and
SWB remained very similar for potentially very different individuals such as those that
work free hours. However, if they did not, this would not invalidate the conclusions that
we could draw from the employees with imposed schedules, which are to me the closest
we will get here to the causal ones.
One further step to get credible estimates, and at the same time to tackle the sec-
ond research question, is to explore the relationship between hours of work and SWB
separately for individuals that like their jobs to different degrees. Bear in mind that
preferences towards work, liking the job, is one of the main candidates to be one of those
unobserved characteristics driving both working hours and subjective well-being. Indi-
viduals are asked about their job satisfaction, and I will use this variable to divide the
sample into two groups: individuals above the median, and individuals below it. For
simplicity I will often refer to those as the likes and not likes, but it should be kept in
mind that most individuals in the not likes are actually satisfied with their jobs, just less
so than the individuals in the likes. By exploring the relationship between hours of work
and enjoyment for these two groups separately, we should be able to say something about




The key explanatory variable of this chapter is the number of hours spent in paid work,
and it is well known that time use data is superior to conventional surveys measuring
working hours – both paid and unpaid work (Bonke, 2005; Gershuny and Robinson, 1994).
Hence time use data is preferred. Among all the time use surveys available, not many
are as rich in terms of SWB data as the last French time use survey. In fact it is one of
the few sources that contains enjoyment rates linked to each episode of activity. It took
place in six waves between September 2009 and September 2010, and it is representative
of the French population in France and overseas. Households and their members were
interviewed with the aim of collecting data on the way individuals organise their time as
well as a large number of characteristics of households, and individuals.
Figure 4.1: The diary, part 1: the activities
The columns displayed in Figure 4.2 would be shown to the right of the
columns here.
Data is collected on two visits, face-to-face with an interviewer using computer-aided
data collection. The survey targeted around 12,000 households, and within each house-
hold two people are randomly selected, and each of them is asked to fill in two diaries: one
during the week and one at the weekend, in addition to the questionnaire. This means
that in total approximately 24,000 individuals are interviewed and that we have approxi-
mately 48,000 diaries. However, not all these diarists are asked to rate the pleasantness or
enjoyment of the activities they do. Since doing so adds a substantive burden to diarists,
just a 5% random subsample is asked to do so. This subsample was also asked about
satisfaction with life in general and some life domains. This amounts to approximately
900 households, 1200 individuals, and 2,400 diaries. However, given that we restrict the
analysis to working days approximately half of the diaries are excluded from the analysis
and we remain with one diary per person. Sample size is further reduced because we
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exclude diaries of low quality, and those diaries of individuals that in ‘typical working
days’ report less than 2 hours of paid work, and self employed individuals for reasons
that we will explain later.
Figure 4.2: The diary, part 2: characteristics of the activity
The respondent must note down the details of their activities over a set day as shown
in Figure 4.1. Each line in the diary corresponds to an elementary time unit of 10 minutes
and respondents are asked to report all activities that have lasted at least 10 minutes,
writing down the start and end times of the activities in succession, which helps them
remember what they did and when they did it. They are encouraged to carry the diaries
with them and fill them in during spare moments or at the end of the day at worst, to avoid
relying heavily on memory. In addition to reporting the main activity, respondents are
also asked to report secondary activities (in case there were any), where the activity took
place, and whether there was someone with them (and who that person was eventually),
as well as the purpose of the activity.5 This can be seen in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, which
show the diary forms that the 95% of diarists had to fill in. The other 5% had to fill a
similar diary but with an extra column where the respondent had to rate the enjoyment
of the activity (see Figure 4.3). They were not asked to do so every 10 minutes but only
whenever there was a change in any of the columns he had filled in, that is, every time
there was a change in either: the main activity, the secondary activity, the location or
the presence of other persons or the purpose of the activity.
In principle, asking about the enjoyment of past activities could be problematic be-
cause what people enjoy and what they remember they enjoyed may not necessarily be
the same (Kahneman, 1999). For this reason collecting SWB information ex-post is, in
general, not advisable. However, the way in which affective information was collected
5This information is available at: http://www.insee.fr/en/methodes/default.asp?page= sources/ope-
enq-emploi-du-temps-edt-2009.htm. Last accessed on 26 August 2014.
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Figure 4.3: Diaries with enjoyment
Note that enjoyment rate seems to go from -3 to +3. I think this was the
original plan, however in the end they used a 1-7 score.
reduces this bias substantially (Kahneman et al., 2004b). Note that the individual is
somehow forced to “walk” through the 24-hour period and this helps him recall his feel-
ings at the time with great accuracy. Evoking the context of the previous day is intended
to elicit specific and recent memories, thereby reducing errors and biases of recall (Belli,
1998; Robinson and Clore, 2002, cited in Kahneman et al. (2004b)). This ‘day reconstruc-
tion’ (using Kahneman et al., 2004b, terminology) does in fact reduce that bias almost
entirely, as they demonstrated by comparing the results of the self reports of emotions
experienced the preceding day, to those reported as the activity took place using the
experience sampling method (Csikszentmihalyi and Larson, 1987).6
Enjoyment answers ranged from 1 to 7, with 1 being “very unpleasant” and 7 being
“very pleasant” or “very enjoyable”. But SWB is more than enjoyment and the French
dataset does in fact include other interesting variables. Individuals are asked about their
health, and health related habits such as smoking, skipping meals or cutting back on
sleep, and subjective well-being in many ways. There is also information about feelings
of time pressure, how busy the person is, how bored, life satisfaction and satisfaction
with several life domains, and so on.
6The ESM methodology was developed by Csikszentmihalyi and Larson (1987). Participants in ESM
studies are prompted to record where they are, what they are doing, and how they feel several times
throughout the day. This provides a rich description of a sample of moments in respondents’ lives, and
avoids the distortions that affect the delayed recall and evaluation of experiences (Kahneman et al.,
2004b, p. 1776). In addition, Gershuny (2013) using two independent surveys from the 1980s that used
different designs and coding systems for the UK and US respectively, produced strikingly similar results,
speaking in favour of the methodology (Gershuny, 2009, p. 14)
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4.4.1 The dependent variables
Several dependent variables will be used in order to capture, as well as possible, the three
main SWB components: satisfaction, positive and negative affect. To this end, all the
questions or variables that captured any of this were selected from the questionnaire.
Table A19 in the appendix (on page 198) shows the original question wording and the
possible answers, and Table 4.1 shows the actual variables constructed and finally used.
Table 4.1: Subjective well-being variables
Concept Variable
Positive affect Average daily enjoyment
Frequency of pleasant moments
Negative affect Frequency of unpleasant moments
Frequency of neutral moments
Feelings rushed
Busyness




Satisfaction with leisure time
Satisfaction with social life
The first variable that we will use is a measure of daily enjoyment that is simply the
average of the enjoyment ratings experienced during the day. This is a measure of the
affective component of SWB, and it could be considered a proxy of Kahneman’s ‘objective
happiness’ (Kahneman, 1999), because it adds up the experienced utility of each moment.
However, since enjoyment ratings are not collected at exactly the moment they occur, our
measure may not be considered totally “objective”, because it may capture experienced
utility to some extent (although as Kahneman et al. (2004b) showed, this type of bias is
kept to a minimum with ‘day reconstruction’). Its distribution can be found in Figure
4.4, where it can be seen that most people have pleasant days. Average daily enjoyment
is then an average of pleasant and unpleasant moments, of very pleasant moments and
less pleasant activities. While this is interesting, Schimmack (2008) reminds us that well-
being is not the intensity but the frequency of positive and negative affect. Therefore they
will also be explored by building measures of the proportion of time spent in a pleasant
state and the proportion of time spent in an unpleasant state. When reporting enjoyment,
individuals can choose to say that an activity is neither pleasant nor unpleasant. I will
measure that too.
There are many other variables at our disposal to measure negative states, to be more
specific, there are several measures of time crunch, such as reports of rushed feelings and
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of some dependent variables
(a) Average daily enjoyment (b) How often do you feel rushed?
(c) Cut back on sleep when you need time? (d) Satisfaction with life
reports of how busy the person is that I will also use. In addition to self-reports of feelings
of time pressure, there is information about ‘to what extent the person cuts back on sleep
or whether he/she skips meals to save time’. These measures are interesting because they
are objective measures of time crunch or its consequences and, therefore, they will tell
us whether self reports of busyness are actually capturing something meaningful, rather
than just a complaint – perhaps a ‘yuppie kvetch’ – without consequences. Figure 4.4
shows that most people experience time crunch relatively often since most individuals
feel rushed at least once a week and almost 60% of the individuals cut back on sleep
sometimes or often. The cognitive component of SWB will be measured using all the
satisfaction measures we have: satisfaction with life, with job, with leisure time and with
social relationships. Figure 4.4 shows that most people are quite satisfied with their lives
(although the proportion of people that report being indifferent is remarkably high).
4.4.2 Independent variables
Individuals write down the activities they do in the diaries, using their own words, and
these activities are later coded using a very detailed scheme of activities. Out of all of
those activities, special attention will be given to those considered to be paid work, which
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Table 4.2: Distribution of time across the main 4 activities (hours per day)
Paid Unpaid Leisure Personal
Gender Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd
Female 8.1 2.46 2.6 1.92 3.0 1.89 10.3 1.63
Male 9.0 2.30 1.5 1.46 3.3 1.95 10.1 1.58
Total 8.6 2.43 2.1 1.78 3.1 1.93 10.2 1.61
Personal activities: sleeping and personal care activities. Leisure: eating, work breaks; social
activities; physical exercise (mostly outdoors); TV watching; reading or listening to the radio;
doing nothing, thinking, resting, smoking; arts and hobbies; computer games, internet; social
travel. Unpaid work : cooking; household upkeep; shopping and services; construction and
repairs; gardening and pet care; childcare; adult care; completing diary or unclassifiable. Paid
work: actual work; commuting to the workplace; job search activities; trainings.
is the key independent variable of this study, whose effect on SWB we want to estimate.
Thus, total amount of time spent in paid work is the key independent variable, whose
effect on SWB we will explore. It includes actual work, commuting to the workplace and
also job search activities or trainings. Table A20 in the appendix (page 199), shows the
activities that are included under paid work. The remaining time is either spent in unpaid
work, leisure time or sleep and personal care activities. Table 4.2 shows the distribution
of time across these four main groups of activities for individuals in employment in a
typical working day, and Figure 4.5 shows the distribution of hours of paid work for that
same sample.
As soon as one turns to the time use literature it becomes apparent that there are
certain variables that are important because of the influence they have for how time is
spent. Those are mainly gender, age, household composition, income, among others. In
almost all countries, men usually work longer hours in employment than women, although
throughout the world women continue to bear the major responsibility for housework and
child care, irrespective of their working status (Bianchi et al. 2000; Gregory and Milner
2009 cited in Fagan et al., 2012). Household composition – the existence of children and
that of a partner to share the burdens with – is an important control because the amount
of domestic work increases when there are children or adults to take care of. Income
is important because it can be used to purchase substitutes for domestic hours of work
(e.g. child care, cleaners, delivery services etc.). Thus, these socio-demographic variables
will be the first set of controls that we will introduce. The second ones will be variables
that try to capture characteristics of the job that may influence work-life balance such
as work schedule, shift work, type of job, etc. We will also take into account other time
aggregates – e.g. unpaid work – when exploring the relationship between paid work and
well-being outcomes.
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of hours of paid work.
(a) Males (b) Females
Source: INSEE, 2008-09 Time Use Survey. This Figure includes only individuals in
employment in typical working days. The sample contains 2,311 men and 2,353 women.
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4.5 RESULTS
The following pages will explore the relationship between hours of work and subjective
well-being, measured in different ways. The first part of this section will explore the
relationship between working hours and daily enjoyment, frequency of pleasant, unpleas-
ant and neutral moments. The second part is devoted to time crunch, and the third, to
exploring the relationship between working hours and several measures of satisfaction.
The structure followed in these three parts will be the same. First I will show the crude
relationship (before controls) between hours of paid work and the former outcomes. Sec-
ondly, we will see how the relationships vary when control variables are included. Finally,
we will try to address potential endogeneity concerns by exploring separately employees
with different work schedules, and individuals that like their jobs to different extents (the
likes versus the not likes).
Out of all the variables that will be used in this section, only the time crunch questions
are asked of the whole sample. Enjoyment ratings and satisfaction questions are only
asked of the 5% subsample. This means that sample size will be rather small –around
300 individuals and diaries – for the first and third part of the results. The subsection
on time pressure will benefit from a larger sample, of approximately 4,300 cases for most
of the subsection (although when the time pressure analysis is done separately for likes
and not likes we are restricted again to the 5% subsample). Precisely because of the
sample size limitations, I decided to exclude self-employed individuals from the analysis,
because preliminary analyses showed that they behaved quite differently than employees,
but they were too few in number to be able to study them on their own.7
4.5.1 Hours of work and enjoyment
Figure 4.6 shows the relationship between hours of work and several measures of affect:
average daily enjoyment, proportion of time spent in a pleasant state, proportion of time
spent in an unpleasant state and, finally, the part of time spent in a ‘neutral’ state,
that is neither pleasant nor unpleasant. The line shows the estimated marginal effect for
different working hours, and the shaded area is the 95 per cent confidence interval. Figure
4.6 reveals the crude relationship between hours of paid work and affect; therefore, no
confounding factors are taken into account. Here we just see how employees who work
more and less are doing in terms of the former affect measures. Two main messages can
be taken from Figure 4.6. The first is that hours of work seem to reduce the pleasantness
of our day. This is summarised in Figure 4.6a that shows a gentle but clear decline in
enjoyment as individuals that work more are considered. Looking at the other three
7Since in the end we are working with a subsample of the subsample, I considered it best not to use
weights. To my understanding those should be used only when I am using the entire sample, and since
I am less concerned with representativeness than with causality I decided not to use them.
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Figures – 4.6b, 4.6c, and 4.6d – we see how this comes about. Individuals that work
more hours do experience less pleasant moments than those that work less, and they
also experience a greater proportion of neutral moments, and slightly more unpleasant
moments as well.8
Figure 4.6: The crude relationship between hours of paid work and affect
(a) Average daily enjoyment (b) Proportion of pleasant time
(c) Proportion of unpleasant time (d) Proportion of neutral time
Estimates based on 331 diaries of employees in typical working days. Bear in mind that
unlike conventional measures of working hours, here work includes not only actual time
working but also the time spent going to work and so on and time in which you are not
in the office but you are for instance preparing or waiting for work to begin. The curves
displayed here come from the regressions of the “empty model” column in Tables A21,
A22, A23, and A24 respectively, on pages 204 to 207.
The other message to be taken from Figure 4.6 is that employees seem to be doing
quite well, almost regardless of the number of hours they work. While individuals that
work less do experience on average more pleasant days, even those that do work a lot
have quite enjoyable days as well. Note that even individuals that work 10 hours a day
spend around 80% of their time in a pleasant state. But Figure 4.6 is just the crude
relationship between working hours and affect. These marginal effects cannot be used to
8Nevertheless, these are just averages; it may be worth mentioning that 50% of the employees do not
report any unpleasant activity, and only 66% report some neutral moment. These figures are very much
in line with those of Kahneman et al. (2004b) and Krueger (2007).
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infer that working more will make our day less pleasant. In order to make such claims
causal estimates are needed. We will try to get closer to those in several ways. First
by adding control variables, second by exploring the relationship between working hours
and affect (after controls) for individuals with different types of schedules, and finally,
running separate analysis for likes and not likes.
Figure 4.7 shows the relationship after controls, net of socio-demographics for the
same affect outcomes. For each of them we run two regressions, one with a basic (but
quite comprehensive list of regressors) and a second one with even more controls. Since
the estimates resulting from these two regressions were very similar we decided not to
show the confidence intervals, as doing so would not allow us to see the differences in
the estimates. The regression tables from where these estimates come can found in the
appendix (Tables A21 to A24 on pages 204 to 207). Note that to better appreciate the
trends across working hours we have restricted the scales of the vertical axis considerably.
For example, Figure 4.7a only shows enjoyment levels going from a neutral point to
very enjoyable, and that is why it may seem that the declining trend has become more
accentuated after controls, but this is actually not the case.
However the other affect measures – the proportion of pleasant, unpleasant, and
neutral time – have become more accentuated as controls have been added. For instance,
note that the proportion of pleasant time experiences a greater decline with working
hours. This is especially the case for the proportion of time experienced in a pleasant
state – Figure 4.7b – and for neutral moments – Figure 4.7d. The marginal effects from
the regression with the extra set of controls shows a slightly stronger effect of working
hours. For instance Figure 4.7d shows the marginal effects of hours of work on the
proportion of time in a neutral state, that is neither pleasant nor unpleasant and this
proportion goes up from 5% to 15% between an individual that works 4 hours to one
working 12 hours.9
I have decided not to include any regression table in the main text in order to keep it
short, and because, after all, what I am most concerned with is not the explanation of the
whole variation in daily enjoyment or any of the other SWB outcomes considered, but,
with the relationship between working hours and those outcomes, which can be much
better captured with graphs. It should be noted that sample size is not that large and
therefore there are some coefficients that while being sizeable will not show statistical
significance because the standard errors are too big. The first thing that one sees when
looking at the regression for daily enjoyment (and similar findings apply to the other
9The ‘main controls’ are gender, age, partnership status, the presence of children, employment status
of the partner, employment relation and salary, work place, hours of unpaid work, timing of the paid
work, and whether it was a weekend or not, among others. The ‘extra regressors’ (also listed in the
empirical strategy section) are: the type of job, type of schedule, whether the individual knows the
schedule for the following day, week and month, evening or night work, and work in the weekends,
whether the work is or is not controlled and whether the person can easily be absent from work, etc.
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Figure 4.7: The relationship between hours of paid work and affect after controls
(a) Average daily enjoyment (b) Proportion of pleasant time
(c) Proportion of unpleasant time (d) Proportion of neutral time
These estimates are based on a sample of 331 employees. Confidence intervals are not
displayed so that the slight differences in the curves can be appreciated. The curves
displayed here come from the regressions of the “basic controls” column in Tables A21,
A22, A23, and A24 respectively, on pages 204 to 207.
affect measures) is that most of the socio-demographics do not have an effect on daily
enjoyment, which is very similar to the findings of Kahneman et al. (2004b).10 I also tried
running separate regressions of enjoyment as a function of working time for the former
socio-demographic groups separately and the shape of the curves was virtually the same.
While socio-demographic variables have a strong effect on time use patterns, they do not
seem to have an effect on how much we enjoy the activities, neither on how enjoyment
varies as a function of time. What these socio-demographics seem to be doing is to place
individuals at different points of the curve.
If we had an unbiased estimator of the effect of working hours on enjoyment, we could
conclude from Figure 4.7 that every additional hour of work reduces our enjoyment.
10The only exceptions to this are income and job satisfaction. Income is negatively correlated with
daily enjoyment and job satisfaction is positively correlated. Having a partner or having children seems
to have some effect, but the large standard errors makes it impossible to get statistically significant
results.
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Figure 4.8: Hours of paid work and enjoyment by schedule type
There are 212 individuals with imposed schedule, 77 with some
mixed schedule type and 42 with free schedule.
However, the estimates shown here are just the result of comparing diaries of people that
work more to diaries of people that work less and, although we control for many possible
confounding factors, there may be something about some individuals that makes them
work more, and at the same time makes them enjoy their jobs more. In such scenarios,
the bias produced would make the curves showing marginal effects look flatter than they
actually are. And yet, we find a negative slope for daily enjoyment, suggesting that for
the average employee, working more makes his or her day more unpleasant. Besides,
individuals that are the most satisfied with their jobs work as much as those that like
their jobs less (making the former scenario less likely). Average working hours is 8.7 for
both individuals above the median in terms of job satisfaction as well as for those below
(and the standard deviations are very similar as well, 2.3 and 2.05 for likes and not likes
respectively). The shape of the whole distribution also looks very similar (see Figure A4
in the appendix, on page 201).
The former makes sense if we bear in mind that most employees do not decide how
much to work. Figure 4.8 explores the marginal effects of hours of work on enjoyment
separately for employees with different types of schedules. The message seems clear: it
does not matter a great deal. Hours of paid work seem to reduce daily enjoyment for all
employees regardless of their schedule type, although this trend is clearer for employees
with an imposed schedule (65% of the total). The shapes of the curves are not exactly
the same, but the general trend is a declining one for all, especially for the range of hours
where we have more workers and therefore where the confidence intervals are narrow
enough. We do not show the confidence intervals because it would make it impossible to
see the differences in the estimates (they were so wide that the scale of the horizontal axis
has been reduced). Note that the marginal effects for schedule types other than imposed
schedules are based on very few observations and the confidence intervals are therefore
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very wide. Thus the estimates for these other schedule types should be taken with greater
caution. The curve that interests us most is that of employees with an imposed schedule
and when we look at those, we see the same that we saw in Figure 4.7a: working hours
reduce daily enjoyment. This result was in a way the expected one, since this type of
employee – with an imposed schedule – is the majority.11
Yet there is one further step to get credible estimates and at the same time tackle the
second research question. Next I will explore enjoyment as a function of working hours
separately for individuals that are above the median in terms of job satisfaction and for
those below. This will hopefully shed light on one of the main questions this paper seeks
to address: whether people who like their jobs more need less leisure time. And, at the
same time, since liking one’s job is one of the main ‘unobserved’ features that may bias
the estimate of interest, this analysis would also advance in the direction of getting an
unbiased estimate. The results are shown in Figure 4.9.
The curves in Figure 4.9 show the marginal effects after controlling for the main set
of controls (adding the extra regressors did not change the results much). These results
seems to be telling us clearly that liking one’s job matters, so much so that the main
conclusion drawn from the analysis so far changes to a considerable extent. So far we
had concluded that working reduces daily enjoyment. However, we now see that this is
no longer the case if you like your job quite a lot. For instance, Figure 4.9a shows that,
for both likes and not-likes, daily enjoyment is quite high at 4 hours of work, but what
happens with every additional hour of work after that is very different for likes and not
likes. While the likes experience an increase in daily enjoyment up to 6 hours of work,
where they reach the maximum, and then experience a very gentle decrease, the not
likes only get worse when they work more hours. Therefore, in order to maximise daily
enjoyment an individual with job satisfaction below the median should work as little as
possible, whereas for individuals that like their jobs more than the median, working a
non-negligible number of hours is what makes them maximise enjoyment. In fact given
how flat the curve is, a level of daily enjoyment very close to the optimal can be reached
for quite a wide range of hours (see Table 4.3). However things look very different for the
not likes that experience a decline in daily enjoyment of a significant magnitude (0.25
between 4 and 8 hours of work).12
Consistently with the marginal effects for daily enjoyment of likes and not likes,
Figures 4.9b, 4.9c and 4.9d, show that the proportion of time in a pleasant, unpleasant
and neutral state also varies with job satisfaction. Figure 4.9b, for instance, shows that
11The exploration of marginal estimates for the other outcomes are included in the appendix in Table
A5 on page 202.
12Does the former mean that individuals with job satisfaction below the median do not enjoy their
jobs? Not at all, the only reason why not likes experience a decrease in daily enjoyment as well as a
worsening in any of the other measures of affect, is not that their jobs makes them feel bad, instead it
has to do with the fact that they do less of other things that they enjoy more such as being at leisure.
Figure A6 in the appendix shows this.
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Figure 4.9: Hours of paid work and enjoyment for likes and not likes
(a) Average daily enjoyment estimates (b) Pleasant moments
(c) Unpleasant moments (d) Neutral moments
Note: In our sample there are 162 employees with job satisfaction above the median, 180
employees with job satisfaction below the median. The vertical lines show the optimal
points. The curves displayed here come from the regressions of the “likes” and “not likes”
columns in Tables A21, A22, A23, and A24 respectively, on pages 204 to 207.
as hours of work increase, the frequency of pleasant moments goes down, but it does so
at a much faster rate for the not likes than for likes. With regard to the experience of
unpleasant moments, they clearly go up with hours of work for not likes, but for likes they
always remain at lower levels than for not likes and, in fact, they reach a minimum at
approximately 7 hours, and then increase gently. With regard to neutral moments (Figure
4.9d), they increase as we work more, but they do increase more, with every hour, for
individuals with lower job satisfaction. Note that for 4 hours of work the expected value
of neutral moments is slightly below 10% for both likes and not likes, while for 12 hours
of work, the frequency of neutral feelings has doubled for not likes and it is just slightly
above 10% for likes.13
13These results come from the regressions found in Tables A22 to A24 in the appendix.
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4.5.2 Hours of work and time crunch
Time pressure is a negative state (as it is the frequency of unpleasant moments). Time
pressure is also one of the most recurring negative outcomes that working seems to pro-
duce and, therefore, a very familiar phenomenon to almost all workers. Another example
of negative state is the frequency of unpleasant moments that we saw in the previous
section. Ideally we would also look at other negative states, such as tiredness or bore-
dom, which are available in the French dataset, but we must leave these for the time
being and focus on time pressure. This will be done mainly through the exploration of
the relationship between working hours and the variable rushed feelings, but we will also
look at the self-reports of busyness, and at the two measures of actual behaviour that
reflect time pressure: skipping meals or cutting back on sleep to save time.
The empirical strategy followed in this section is very similar to that of the previous
one. I start by exploring the crude relationship between working hours and the former
outcomes, then controls are added and finally a separate analysis for employees with
different types of schedules is run, as well as for likes and not-likes. With the exception
of the latter, the sample size in this section is much larger because the time pressure
questions are asked of the whole sample. The results of this section suggest that that the
more you work, the more likely you are to feel rushed, busy, skip meals or cut back on
sleep to make up time. Some differences are found, however, between likes and not likes,
but this time the results are mixed because although for every level of working hours
individuals who like their jobs more seem to be less rushed, they experience a greater
increase in feeling rushed as they work more, which does not happen to the not likes.
Figure 4.10 shows the gross relationship between hours of paid work and the measures
of time pressure discussed above. The graphs show marginal effects and 95% confidence
intervals. Note that these intervals are much narrower than the ones in the previous
section because sample size is 15 times larger. The first thing that comes to our attention
when looking at these four graphs is that experiencing time pressure is a very familiar
phenomenon. Looking at Figure 4.10a we see that individuals working as little as 4 hours
experience feelings of time pressure at least once a week on average. It is also remarkable
that the expected value of busyness is above the neutral point for all employees regardless
of how much they work. Similarly, individuals doing as little as two hours of paid work
report skipping meals and cutting back on sleep time to save time. As expected, all these
four measures of time pressure increase with the number of hours worked. For instance,
individuals doing 12 hours of paid work a day compared to those doing 2 or 4 hours, go
from reporting feeling rushed once a week to several times a week.
It may seem odd to see that these time pressure measures are not minimised at 2
hours, but recall that this is the crude relationship and that individuals that report very
little paid work may be doing more unpaid work, which may equally produce time crunch.
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Figure 4.10: Hours of work and time pressure
(a) How often do you feel rushed? (b) How busy are you?
(c) Cut back on sleep when you need time? (d) Skip meals when you need time?
Estimates based on approximately 4,300 observations. As usual, the vertical lines in-
cluded in each of the four graphs mark the optimal points – hours of paid work where
the negative outcome in question is minimised. The curves displayed here come from the
regressions of the “empty model” column in Tables A26, A27, A28, and A29 respectively,
on pages 209 to 212.
This is why next we look at the relationship between hours of work and the time crunch
measures after controls, in Figure 4.11. The graphs shown in Figure 4.11 come from the
regressions shown in Tables A26 to A29, shown in the appendix (pages 209 to 212).
Figures 4.11a to 4.11d show two set of estimates, corresponding to the marginal effects
of hours of work on time crunch coming from 2 different regressions: one with the main
controls and the second one with the extra set of controls, although it may be hard to
see that there are two estimates there because most of the time the estimates completely
overlap. Note that now the marginal effects have become closer to a straight line, they are
less curvilinear, meaning that, ceteris paribus, individuals doing more paid work report
more time crunch. It is no longer the case that individuals doing very few hours of paid
work are more rushed than those doing 4 or 6 hours of paid work (which makes sense). In
other words, it seems that in order to minimise rushed feelings one should work as little
as possible (which seems reasonable). However, with regards to cutting back on sleep
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Figure 4.11: Hours of work and time pressure after controls
(a) How often do you feel rushed? (b) How busy are you?
(c) Cut back on sleep when you need time? (d) Skip meals when you need time?
Estimates based on 4,300 diaries approximately. Vertical lines show optimal points –
hours of paid work where the negative outcome in question is minimised. The curves
displayed here come from the regressions of the “basic controls” column in Tables A26,
A27, A28, and A29 respectively, on pages 209 to 212.
and skipping meals, we also observe that the curve has become less curvilinear, although
for those last two measures, optimal points are reached at positive hours of work.
Unlike in the enjoyment regressions, here, the socio-demographics are clearly related
to experiencing time pressure. For instance, women are more likely to experience time
pressure, and the size of the effect is substantive. Having children has a positive, sub-
stantive and statistically significant relation with all measures of time pressure. Having
a partner also seems to matter but the effects are mixed; it seems to clearly reduce the
likelihood of cutting back on sleep or skipping a meal to gain time, but it increases feelings
of busyness and being rushed (although the standard errors are so large that the results
are not statistically significant). The amount of time devoted to unpaid work increases
feelings of time pressure, feeling busy, and makes it more likely that we will skip a meal or
cut back on our sleep. However, this does not seem to imply a ‘yuppie kvetch’ since the
salary effect goes away when job features are controlled for (with the exception of cutting
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back on sleep). For further details see the regression tables in the appendix, Tables A26
to A29.
Figure 4.12: Hours of work and time pressure by schedule type
(a) How often do you feel rushed? (b) How busy are you?
(c) Cut back on sleep when you need time? (d) Skip meals when you need time?
These marginal effects are estimated with 2,952 individuals with an imposed schedule,
966 with a mixed schedule and 560 with a free schedule. This time confidence intervals
are much narrower than in the previous section but still overlapped and so we decided
not to include them.
One of the things done in the previous section to give more credibility to the esti-
mates was to explore the marginal effects separately for employees with different types
of schedules, paying special attention to individuals that could not choose how much or
when to work. Here we do the same, with the advantage of having a much larger number
of employees even for less common schedule types. The results of this exploration can be
found in Figure 4.12 which supports the conclusions reached so far: the more you work,
the more time crunch you experience. This is the case for all types of workers, regardless
of their type of schedule. Although some differences are observed across schedule types,
the trend is the same for all. It is noticeable that individuals with free schedules seem to
feel more rushed than other types of employees for a given number of working hours, al-
though for long hours of work they tend to converge. Thus, the more you work, the more
time pressure you feel, regardless of the time crunch measures we look at, and regardless
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of the schedule the individuals has.
Figure 4.13: Time crunch for likes and not-likes
(a) How often do you feel rushed? (b) How busy are you?
(c) Cut back on sleep when you need time? (d) Skip meals when you need time?
Note: There are 162 employees with job satisfaction above the median, 180 employees
with job satisfaction below the median. The vertical lines show the optimal points. The
curves displayed here come from the regressions of the “likes” and “not likes” columns
in Tables A26, A27, A28, and A29 respectively, on pages 209 to 212.
Next we run a separate analysis for individuals with job satisfaction above the median
– the likes, and individuals below the median – the not likes. Unfortunately the job
satisfaction question only applies to the 5% subsample and therefore the marginal effects
shown in Figure 4.13 are based on far fewer individuals than previous figures in this
section. Interestingly, individuals with high job satisfaction experience a greater increase
in time pressure – for all measures – than individuals that like their jobs less. However,
at the same time, for any given number of hours, they report lower levels of time crunch
than individuals that like their jobs less. This is for instance the case for the question
of rushed feelings. However, for the other three variables, the marginal effects cross and
therefore likes are not less rushed at all levels of working hours. They are less so up to
8 hours approximately and they are more rushed than not likes. These results should
nevertheless, be taken with caution given that the sample size is rather small, but I think
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that these could be confirmed with a larger sample since they make sense. Individuals
that like their jobs more may be also more involved and high involvement puts greater
pressure on employees to do their jobs well, which may become more difficult as the
number of hours goes up.
Considering the variable ‘feelings of time pressure’ alone, one might think that there
is some over-reporting of time crunch because people who work very little also report
being very busy and rushed. However, this is precisely why I wanted to include variables
like ‘skipping meals’ or ‘cutting back on sleep’, because those show, that regardless of
whether there is a more or less ‘legitimate’ reason for feeling rushed, feeling rushed has
actual and real consequences. In other words, feeling rushed means that you behave as if
you were so, regardless of where that rushed feeling comes from. The more one works, the
more one cuts sleeping time and so on. I think this phenomenon requires more attention
and a better understanding.
4.5.3 Hours of work and satisfaction
This section explores the relationship between hours of paid work and satisfaction, the
component of SWB with the greatest cognitive charge. To be more specific we will explore
the relationship between hours of paid work and satisfaction with life in general, with the
job, with leisure and with social relationships. Unfortunately, only the 5% subsample was
asked the satisfaction questions – as well as the enjoyment variable, therefore sample size
is, again, rather small. Figure 4.14 gives us a first idea of what the relationship between
hours of work and satisfaction is like. Note that all the estimates are well above the
indifference level which means that for all the working hours considered here – a quite
comprehensive and normal range of hours – workers are expected to enjoy high satisfaction
with life in general, and with the domains here considered, almost irrespective of how
much they work.
There is some variation, however, depending on the variable we look at. For instance
the curves for life satisfaction and job satisfaction are flatter than for the other two. In
particular, the life satisfaction curve is a very gentle inverted U-shape, with individuals
being most satisfied with their lives at approximately 7 hours of paid word, and those
working less or more than that being slightly less satisfied. The curve for job satisfaction
seems even flatter than life satisfaction, which means that the expected level of job
satisfaction is almost irrespective of the number of hours worked, which I find rather
surprising. In relation to satisfaction with social relationships, we observe that individuals
that work more are less satisfied with their social life than those working less, although
not much less. Note that the expected level of satisfaction with social life is always
above 4. Satisfaction with leisure time is the domain with the greater differences between
individuals that work less and individuals that work more. However, I am not sure that
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Figure 4.14: Hours of paid work and satisfaction
(a) Satisfaction with life (b) Job satisfaction
(c) Satisfaction with social relationships (d) Satisfaction with leisure time
Note: N=496. Vertical lines indicate optimal points, that is, levels of working hours
where satisfaction is maximised. The curves displayed here come from the regressions of
the “empty model” column in Tables A30, A31, A32, and A33 respectively, on pages 213
to 216.
the shape of the curve is the expected one, since satisfaction with leisure time seems to
be increasing with hours of work until 10 hours and then declines. It makes sense to some
extent that if an individual works very little and has too much leisure time, he does not
value it that much, however, I would also expect some dissatisfaction among individuals
working 10 or 12 hours a day, but this does not seem to be the case.
However these are just crude correlations. It is possible that things will change when
we control for possible confounding factors. We see this in Figure 4.15. But there is no
change; all the curves remain more or less the same – expect for perhaps the one for
leisure satisfaction, which is slightly less pronounced. So we move now to exploring likes
and not likes.14
14I also explored how the relationship of interest varied with schedule type, and the results of this
exploration can be found in the appendix, in Figure A3, but they are not shown here because they do
not add much. Unlike in previous sections, where different schedules did not matter which reinforced
the idea that the estimates were quite robust, here they do vary, and I am not sure how to explain this
variation.
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Figure 4.15: Hours of work and satisfaction after controls
(a) Satisfaction with life (b) Job satisfaction
(c) Satisfaction with social relationships (d) Satisfaction with leisure time
Note: employees: 391, self employed: 81. The curves displayed here come from the
regressions of the “basic controls” column in Tables A30, A31, A32, and A33 respectively,
on pages 213 to 216.
It is particularly interesting to see what happens to satisfaction when we explore likes
and not likes separately. The results of this exploration are shown in Figure 4.16. The
first thing we can note is that these three measures of satisfaction remain very high for
all groups, employees who like their jobs more than the median, and also for employees
who do not like their jobs that much. The most interesting thing that we see is that
satisfaction with life is maximised with a positive number of hours for both likes and not
likes. In other words, everyone, regardless of how much they like their job maximises
satisfaction if they work. But, the optimal number of hours is always higher for likes
than for not-likes, and not only that, but the curve for likes is almost always above the
curve for not-likes, meaning that for almost any number of hours of work, likes are more
satisfied than not-likes. In addition because of having a higher optimal point, this means
that they can be balanced even if they work more than those individuals that do not like
their jobs.
With regards to life satisfaction in particular – Figure 4.16a – we see that employees
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Figure 4.16: Hours of work and satisfaction by liking
(a) Satisfaction with life (b) Satisfaction with social relationships
(c) Satisfaction with leisure time
Note: The CI for employees that like and not just overlap for the first 4 hours of work, so
actually for between 4-8 hours. After this there is no overlap. The estimates shown in this
table are based on 190 observations for employees with job satisfaction above the median and
208 below. The curves displayed here come from the regressions of the “likes” and “not likes”
columns in Tables A30, A31, A32, and A33 respectively, on pages 213 to 216.
that are more satisfied with their jobs are always more satisfied with their lives than those
that are less happy about their jobs, and that while not likes peak at 6.7 hours, likes do
so at 9.6 hours. The curves are, however, so flat that levels of satisfaction virtually similar
to those of the optimal points can be reached for a quite wide range of hours around the
optimal point. With regards to satisfaction with social relationships, likes are also more
fortunate because after 5 hours of work (before the curves overlap), satisfaction is always
higher for likes than for not likes. In addition, whereas satisfaction decreases with every
hour of work for the employees with low job satisfaction, for individuals that like their
jobs, the opposite happens, satisfaction with social relationships seems to increase up to
almost 10 hours of work when it reaches the maximum. This may be explained by a more
satisfactory social life in the work place. Whereas for individuals that do not like their
jobs that much, every additional hour of work reduces leisure time for socialising.
I do not know exactly how to explain the relationship between hours of work and
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satisfaction with leisure time. The curve that ‘not likes’ face is to be expected, a gentle
inverted u-shape, but ‘likes’ seem to be more satisfied with their leisure time the less
leisure time they have. One possible explanation could be that they really make the most
of their free time and therefore it is very intense leisure that they enjoy. Nonetheless, I
think it is a little odd; yet it is worth exploring the utility function of leisure for ‘likes’
and ‘not likes’, which could be illuminating. Figure 4.16c showed that individuals with
high job satisfaction are more satisfied with their leisure as they do more hours of paid
work, however, since not all time not spent in paid work is leisure, we start by showing
the relationship between leisure satisfaction and actual leisure time. Next to it we plot
the other utility function of leisure understood as the relationship of enjoyment of leisure
time as a function of time spent in leisure.
Figure 4.17: Leisure satisfaction, and leisure enjoyment as a function of leisure duration.
(a) Satisfaction with leisure (b) Enjoyment of leisure
The likes are individuals above the median in terms of job satisfaction, N=191, The not
likes are individuals below the median in terms of job satisfaction, N=200. Confidence
intervals are not displayed because they overlap and it would not be possible to appreciate
the differences in the curves.
Figure 4.17a shows that as we put in the horizontal axis hours of leisure time rather
than paid work, the relationship varies a bit, now we see that leisure satisfaction does not
decrease permanently as we spend more time in leisure. Satisfaction with leisure declines
at first but then it remains stable at a high level of satisfaction between 6 and 10 hours.
This makes it a bit less puzzling but I am still surprised to see that leisure satisfaction is
highest among those with the least leisure time. Figure 4.17b does not solve the puzzle
because it shows that leisure time does remain almost equally pleasant regardless of the
number of hours spent in leisure (although there is a very gentle u-shape). This is so for
both likes and not likes, and therefore calls into question the utility function explanation
because on the one hand there is almost no decline, and on the other hand the utility
function is very similar for both groups.
I am not sure that the utility function alone can explain the decline that the likes
experience in leisure satisfaction as they spend more time in leisure time, because I expect
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leisure satisfaction to be somewhat related to the amount of time spent in leisure and to
it being considered sufficient by the individual. There are some questions in the dataset
that ask individuals what they would like to do more of if they had more time. For
instance, if you had more hours in a day would you work more, have more leisure, and
so on. I think that these questions can help to shed light on this precise issue because
they can show if there are differences between likes and not likes, in their desire for more
hours of leisure. If for instance the likes ’ desire for extra leisure is smaller than that of
the not likes, this could explain why they are so satisfied with very little leisure.
Figure 4.18: Desire for extra leisure time.
(a) Extra hours of leisure desired (b) Extra hours of leisure/Extra hours of work
The likes are individuals above the median in terms of job satisfaction, N=191. The not
likes are individuals below the median in terms of job satisfaction, N=200. Confindence
intervals are not displayed because they overlap and it would not be possible to appreciate
the differences in the curves.
Figure 4.18 shows the desire that individuals express for more free time (figure 4.18a)
and for more free time compared to how much work they would like to do (figure 4.18b).
The latter is important because most individuals express a desire to do more of almost
all activities, and thus I think that comparing the desire for leisure with that for more
work may be a better estimate of the desire for extra leisure time. Figure 4.18a shows
that both ‘likes’ and ‘not likes’ would like to have more free time than they actually have,
and that this desire is greater for the ‘likes’ than for ‘not likes’ which is consistent with
the satisfaction with leisure time that is always lower for ‘not likes’ than for ‘likes’. The
desire for more free time of ‘not likes’ declines with hours of leisure (expected) up to
6 hours of leisure approximately, and then goes up again (this is not so expected, but
confidence intervals are so wide there that I would not be so certain about this). The
desire for more free time of ‘likes’ is almost the same between 0 and 4 hours of leisure
and then starts to decline.
Figure 4.18b shows clearly that all employees’ desire for leisure compared to work
goes down as they spend more time in leisure, however different patterns emerge for likes
and not likes. While likes ’ desire for leisure declines linearly with hours of leisure, for
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not likes it takes 2-3 hours for the relative desire for leisure to decline. Note that ‘likes’
with 1 hour of leisure desires twice as much extra leisure time than extra work time,
whereas ‘likes’ desire 1.6 times more leisure than work. I think that Figure 4.18 can
explain partly why the ‘likes’ are more satisfied with their leisure time than not likes for
all levels of work, however I think it does not shed light on the puzzling pattern that
we aimed at shedding light on because we saw that, as one would expect, the desire for
leisure is highest (absolute and relative to desire for more work) when the individual has
the least leisure time. In any case the sample size is rather small, and so this remains
highly speculative, and thus the puzzle remains for future research.
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4.6 CONCLUSION
By using time diaries of different individuals, in particular the diaries of typical working
days of employees, we have explored how several SWB outcomes vary with hours of
work. In doing so we have discovered several things. On the one hand, we have seen
that employees experience relatively high levels of enjoyment and satisfaction, almost
regardless of how much they work. Unfortunately this is also the case for time crunch,
which is experienced to a non-negligible extent by all employees. On the other hand, the
analysis carried out suggests that there is indeed an optimal number of hours for almost
all the subjective well-being outcomes considered, and that these do not always coincide;
in other words, there are trade-offs. However, these trade-offs are greater if you do not
like your job that much, whereas if you do like your job, you can almost “have it all”.
Besides, optimal points are usually higher for individuals that like their jobs more, which
could be interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that those that like their jobs more do
indeed need less leisure time. Table 4.3 summarises the main findings.
When we observe the crude relationship between hours of work and affect we see
that more hours of work seem to reduce the pleasantness of our day, this is so because
individuals that work more hours experience less pleasant moments than those that work
less, and in turn they experience a greater proportion of neutral moments, and slightly
more unpleasant moments as well. This remains the case even after controlling for the
usual socio-demographics and job characteristics. However, when we look separately at
individuals above and below the median in terms of job satisfaction, different patterns
clearly emerge in favour of individuals who like their jobs more, who maximise daily
enjoyment and minimise the proportion of unpleasant time at a positive number of hours.
This is not the case for individuals who do not like their jobs that much because for them
every hour of work reduces enjoyment, the proportion of pleasant moments, and increases
the proportion of unpleasant and neutral time (compare columns 1 and 5 in Table 4.3).
Note that due to how flat some of the curves of marginal effects are, levels of SWB very
close to the optimal ones can be reached in a quite wide range of hours (see columns 2
and 6 in Table 4.3).
Satisfaction levels are high almost regardless of the number of hours worked. The most
interesting thing that we see is that satisfaction with life is maximised with a positive
number of hours for employees that like their jobs more, but also for those that do not
like their jobs that much. In other words, everyone, regardless of how much they like
their jobs, needs to do some hours of work to optimise satisfaction with life, although,
the optimal number of hours is always higher for likes than for not-likes, and not only
that, but the curve for likes is almost always above the curve for not-likes, meaning that
for almost any hour of work, likes are more satisfied than not-likes. Thus, from looking
at the evidence of affect and satisfaction we can say that individuals that like their jobs
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Table 4.3: Optimal number of hours by subjective well being outcome
Job satisf.> p50 Job satisf.< p50
SWB Outcome Optimal O. Range E(Y) E(avg) Optimal O. Range E(Y) E(avg)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Daily enjoyment 6.0 2.6-9.6 4.26 4.23 Min. – 4.26 3.94
Pleasant time (%) 4.0 1.1-7.0 89.0 86.5 Min. – 88.3 74.2
Unpleasant time (%) 7.1 5.4-8.8 3.0 3.4 Min. – 3.6 10.0
Neutral time (%) Min. – 6.35 10.08 Min. – 8.12 15.78
Feeling rushed 4.9 3.2-6.6 2.87 3.05 8.3 6.4-10.4 3.51 3.51
Feeling busy Min. – 3.55 3.64 9.6 6.0-12.0 3.56 3.57
Cutting back on sleep Min. – 1.51 1.73 9.4 7.3-11.6 1.70 1.70
Skipping meals 2.2 0.0-3.3 1.45 1.71 Max. – 1.64 1.79
Life Satisfaction 9.6 7.2-12.2 4.26 4.25 6.7 4.0-9.6 3.96 3.94
Social life 9.6 5.2-14.0 4.32 4.32 Min. – 4.33 4.04
Leisure time Max. – 4.05 3.86 6.7 4.8–8.6 3.79 3.71
The first column shows the number of hours that optimise each SWB outcome (‘Optimal’). The next
column shows the ‘Optimal range’ that is, a bracket of hours where the individual would achieve a
level of SWB very close to the optimal (less than 0.05 different for enjoyment, satisfaction and cutting
back on sleep or skipping meals, less than 1% for the frequency of pleasant moments, and less that
0.5% for the frequency of unpleasant moments). The third column ‘E(Y)’ shows the expected value of
SWB for the optimal number of hours (those shown in the first column). ‘E(avg)’ shows the expected
value of SWB for the individuals that works the average number of hours. When in the optimal point
column we see “Min.” that means that the optimal point is achieved by working as little as possible,
and when it says “Max.” it means that point is reached by working as much as possible.
more do indeed need less leisure time since they can maximise SWB by working more
hours than individuals that like their jobs less. But this does not mean that they need
to actually work more than individuals that like their jobs less, because the flatness of
the marginal effects makes it possible for them to enjoy levels of SWB very similar to the
optimal ones for a very wide range of hours.
The analysis carried out here seems to suggest that the more you work, the more likely
you are of feeling rushed, busy and the more likely you are to skip meals or cut back on
your sleep to make up time. These results seem to be robust because they remain the
same after controls and also regardless of the type of schedule employees have. However,
when we explore separately individuals that like their jobs more and those that like it
less, different – and not very clear – patterns emerge for each of them. But this time,
the advantages go in the opposite direction. Likes optimise rushed feelings at a lower
number of hours than not likes, and should work as little as possible to optimise the other
measures of time crunch. This may be explained by greater work involvement of the likes,
it seems to be the price to pay for liking a job. It should be highlighted, however, that
although the optimal point is lower for likes, until approximately 8 hours of work, they
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experience lower levels of time pressure than not likes.
To conclude we can say that there are indeed optimal hours of work to maximise
well-being, but that those optimal points do not always coincide. However, the trade-offs
are smaller for individuals that like their jobs more, than for those that like their jobs
less. In particular, likes optimise enjoyment and satisfaction at a positive, and even large,
number of hours, but do experience time pressure nonetheless. While individuals that do
not like their jobs that much should work for some time to optimise satisfaction with life,
but doing so reduces their daily enjoyment. Although these results should be taken with
caution because they are based on cross-sectional data and a relatively small sample, I
think that the fact that most employees cannot choose how much to work, and that we
take into account job preferences – which may be an important factor explaining some
of the variation in working hours – gives some credibility to the causal interpretation
of the results. In any case the precise points obtained here and displayed in Table 4.3
should just be taken as approximations. One further limitation of this study is that the
exclusion of the self employed, while necessary, gives the small sample size; and the fact
that the self employed seemed to behave quite differently, means that the results are less





5.1 THE THESIS CONTRIBUTION TO THE STUDY OF SUBJECTIVE WELL-
BEING
Two major theories of subjective well-being are need theories and comparison theories.
Whereas the first hold that SWB is the result of need gratification (Veenhoven, 1991;
Veenhoven and Ehrhardt, 1995), comparison theories, or theories of relative utility, hold
that people assess the adequacy of their situation in relation to variable standards such as
other people, or themselves in the past. In other words, all judgements are relative, and
the same event can be judged as positive or negative, depending on the social comparison
that is made (Duesenberry, 1949; Lance et al., 1995; Parducci, 1968, 1995). Hence, while
need theories predict that improving everyone’s SWB is possible, relative utility theories
hold that happiness is partly a zero-sum game, and that we live on an hedonic treadmill
that makes us return to our happiness set point (Brickman and Campbell, 1971; Helson,
1964; Lykken and Tellegen, 1996).
The debate about the absolute versus relative nature of happiness became extremely
popular with Easterlin’s “Does economic growth improve the human lot? Some empirical
evidence” (Easterlin, 1974). In this article, Easterlin questioned whether happiness had
accompanied economic growth, and his answer was essentially “no”. First, he compared
several countries with different levels of wealth and did not find significant differences
in happiness among them. Second, he observed how in the US, between 1946 and 1970
income levels doubled but and average happiness levels remained unchanged. Finally, he
observed how within each country, the better off were happier than the less well off. In
his view, relative theories (Parducci, 1968, 1995) explained all of these outcomes. The
hedonic treadmill was responsible for the stagnation of happiness because, as income
went up, so did people’s expectations, keeping SWB at the same level in spite of the
improvement in income, and social comparisons explain why the better off are happier
than the less well off. In this context, he argued, raising the happiness of all seemed
impossible (Easterlin, 1974).
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However, some later studies with better datasets – with more countries and longer
time series – have found that richer countries, are indeed happier than poorer ones (e.g.
in 2000, average happiness in Denmark was 8.5 and 5.5 in Greece), and that economic
growth does in fact come with an increase in average happiness levels (Diener and Oishi,
2000; Hagerty and Veenhoven, 2003; Inglehart and Klingemann, 2000; Veenhoven, 1989,
1991; Veenhoven and Hagerty, 2006b). For example, Veenhoven (1989) showed that in
post-war Western Europe and Brazil, a rise in income was followed by an increase in
happiness. The former has given support to need theories, and it is incompatible with
an extreme interpretation of the hedonic treadmill, according to which we systematically
adapt to higher income levels (Brickman and Campbell, 1971). Some things should
produce permanent changes in happiness, and those may be unequally distributed across
countries, otherwise, the variation we observe in levels of SWB across the globe would
not be possible.
In almost every country, individuals in the upper part of the income distribution do
report higher SWB levels than less well-off individuals, which Easterlin (1974) explained
using social comparisons. However, the relationship between income and SWB is weaker
in richer countries. In fact, it is almost negligible in wealthy countries suggesting that
it may not be social comparison but need satisfaction that explains this differential (Di-
ener and Oishi, 2000). These authors find a correlation of 0.14 in Norway compared to
0.38 in South Africa, which they interpret as being the result of all citizens in Norway
having greater chances of satisfying their needs than in South Africa. Poor individuals
in rich countries may benefit from universal healthcare, while in poor countries, even the
wealthiest individuals may not be able to avoid violence or insecurity.
To sum up, the fact that people are happier in rich countries than in poor countries,
and, that in the time series, rises in income are usually followed by rises in average SWB
levels, suggests clearly that SWB is partly linked to objective life circumstances. The
within-country correlations between income and SWB – which are smaller and almost
negligible in some countries – point in the same direction. Besides, the lack of a clear re-
lationship between income inequality and levels of SWB (Veenhoven, 1993, 1997), further
questions the idea that inequality undermines happiness. Yet, there are plenty of studies
using data for a single country – and comparing richer and poorer individuals – that
argue that relative income matters for happiness (e.g. Ferrer-i Carbonell, 2005; McBride,
2001). These claims are clearly incompatible with the macro evidence, besides having
serious flaws at the theoretical and empirical level. Chapter 2, “Who cares about the
Joneses!”, reviews and attempts to challenge that literature. It does so at the theoretical
level by considering the some of the psychological literature on social comparisons, and
at the empirical level by exploring the within-individual variation in relative income on
life satisfaction and mental distress using the BHPS, and showing that changes in relative
income – a function of own income and the income of reference – do not explain SWB.
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Most authors trying to test need theories have used income as a proxy for need satis-
faction. While this may be sufficient for comparing poor and rich countries, this approach
is clearly limited as countries grow richer, because in some rich countries everyone has
access to good health care, whereas in others this is not the case. Hence, in two countries
with similar income, need satisfaction could differ substantially. This may explain why
the relationship between income and life satisfaction is less clear at higher income levels
(Diener and Oishi, 2000), and probably why Easterlin and Veenhoven have quarrelled so
much about it (Easterlin, 1974, 1995, 2001; Hagerty and Veenhoven, 2003; Veenhoven,
1989, 1991; Veenhoven and Hagerty, 2006b).
Measuring need satisfaction directly, instead of using per capita income as a proxy
is desirable. Chapter 3 does this by using a sample of 19 European countries, from the
third and sixth round of the European Social Survey where a special module on SWB
was included that made measuring emotions with accuracy possible. It tries to explain
the class-based differential in the experience of positive and negative emotions with four
groups of variables: health, safety, social life and labour market outcomes. Since the
former are unequally distributed across classes, and have been shown to affect SWB,
they could be explaining SWB differences across social classes, and since this inequality
should also vary across countries, they could also explain why social class matters more
in some countries than in others.
Chapter 3 uses survey questions to approximate need satisfaction. For instance, one
of the questions used to proxy social life asks individuals about the frequency of social
meetings, the possible answers are “almost every day”, “several times a week”, “once a
week” or “less than once a month”. Similar questions are used to assess the satisfac-
tion of other needs. While this is surely better than per capita income to measure need
satisfaction, the former variables are just an approximation, more or less accurate, of
the amount of social life, because on the one hand it relies on the individual’s recall, and
second, because it is a categorical variable – i.e., seeing friends once a week for one hour is
not the same as spending an entire day with them, but the ESS question would not differ-
entiate between the two situations. Time diaries would allow a much better measurement
of socialising because they provide a very detailed account of how the individual spends
their time, and with whom they are at all times (and even of the quality of that experi-
ence). Thus, diaries could contribute to a clearer understanding of the link between need
satisfaction and SWB. Chapter 4 is an example of that approach. It uses time diary data
from France to explore the relationship between working hours and different well-being
outcomes with the aim of empirically determining which work amounts optimise SWB.
Several well-being outcomes are considered – enjoyment of activities, satisfaction, and
feelings of time pressure – with the intention of measuring SWB comprehensively, but
also with the aim of explaining the potential trade-offs among different SWB outcomes,
which is an issue of great importance for SWB research but to which little attention has
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been devoted so far. Not all workers like their jobs to the same extent, and Chapter 4
investigates to what degree liking a job can affect the optimal number of hours, and more
generally the relationship between hours of work and SWB.
In the following pages the main findings of these three chapters will be presented, as
well as their main limitations. How the findings of the thesis relate to the SWB theories
will also be discussed, as well as policy implications and ideas for future research. Since
Chapters 2 and 3 are more clearly connected to the absolute versus relative nature of
SWB, the policy implications of these two chapters will be discussed together. The final
section will be entirely devoted to Chapter 4.
5.2 HAPPINESS, ABSOLUTE OR RELATIVE?
5.2.1 Challenging the relative income hypothesis
According to the relative income hypothesis, having an income below that of your ref-
erence group reduces SWB, while having an income above that of the reference group
raises SWB (Clark, 1996). In this context, an individual’s SWB depends not only on his
own situation, but also on that of others (Parducci, 1968, 1995). However, social com-
parisons are complex and flexible processes in which the individual plays an important
role and, therefore, assuming that a contrast in incomes will produce a given effect seems
unreasonable. In fact, it has been shown that individuals often use social comparisons
in a self-serving way (Brown and Dutton, 1995; Diener and Fujita, 1997). Individuals
could simply choose wisely the reference groups so that they benefit from a comparison
or simply avoid income comparisons altogether if their financial situation is bad.
Besides, unlike need theories, which predict SWB as a consequence of need satisfaction
of which the individual does not need to be aware, relative deprivation theories require
the active participation of the individual by engaging in a social comparison, however
they do not seem to make use of social comparisons that often. When asked whether
comparing one’s income with that of other individuals was or was not important, the
majority of individuals from several European countries answered that this was not the
case (ESS, own calculation). When Schimmack et al. (2002) asked some individuals to
report their life-satisfaction and immediately after to report their thoughts during the life-
satisfaction judgements, social comparisons were mentioned just 6% of the time. Hence,
assuming that people make income comparisons when judging their lives is also a very
strong assumption. This contrasts with the lab evidence in which individuals have been
found to make great use of social comparisons when making judgements (Parducci, 1968,
1995; Smith et al., 1989). Diener and Fujita (1997) explain this contradiction as being
the result of experiments forcing individuals to focus on differences between individuals
and into making comparisons, which may not apply to natural settings.
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In the light of the former evidence, the weak evidence that supporters of the relative
income hypothesis have found seems less surprising (see Table 2.1). Using data from the
BHPS, Chapter 2 shows that changes in relative income are not associated with changes
in life satisfaction or mental distress. Relative income is defined by the ratio between
own income and the income of the reference group. Two measures of income are used:
usual net payment per month and a measure of per capita household income. Defining
the income of reference is, in my opinion, the most controversial part of this and all
other papers that try to assess the effects of relative income on SWB. First, because
it is difficult to identify the group of reference, and second because even knowing the
group of reference, it is difficult to know the type of comparison that is being made.
A variety of reference groups have been used in the literature, as well as in Chapter
2 – i.e., individuals in the same region, with the same education level, in the same
occupation, ethnic group and a combination of the former. It is assumed, as in the rest
of the literature, that incomes above that of the reference group should raise SWB and
incomes below it should reduce SWB. The results of the fixed effects regressions of SWB
on relative income question the relative income hypothesis, because changes in relative
income do not affect either life satisfaction or mental distress. Although in most cases the
coefficients have neither statistical nor practical significance, there are some coefficients
that are statistically different from zero but that have no practical significance. For
example, an individual in the third income quintile earning approximately 1,000 pounds
who experiences an increase in his own income of 20% (while the income of reference
stays unchanged at 1,000), has an expected increase in life satisfaction of just 0.018.
These results are quite robust because they do not vary depending on whether earnings
or per capita household income is used, neither with the reference group, nor with the
SWB outcome considered. Besides, the results are not driven by ‘special’ individuals
because the distribution of personality is almost identical for individuals experiencing
the most change and those experiencing the least change. I also looked separately at
the effects of changes in relative income driven by own income and the income of the
reference group, since the latter should be more exogenous than the first, finding no
relevant differences. Other robustness checks were carried out that supported the main
results.
Although this is not the first study to question the idea that relative income matters
for SWB (Diener and Fujita, 1997; Diener et al., 1999; Veenhoven, 1991, 1993), it is, to
my knowledge, one of the few that explicitly attempts to challenge the relative income
hypothesis. Many researchers have in fact found no effects, but they have not been
very open to interpreting their findings as contradicting the relative income hypothesis.
Publication bias towards ‘effects’ rather than ‘no effects’ may have had something to do
with it, but I also think that the main reason the weak evidence was so quickly accepted
as giving support to the relative income hypothesis is that it is very much in line with
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deeply rooted ideas about the importance of relative standing (Solnick and Hemenway,
1998; Veblen, 1899).
5.2.2 The class-based emotional gap
In most countries upper-class individuals enjoy, on average, higher SWB than middle-
and lower-class individuals. Chapter 3 takes data from several European countries that
took part in the third and sixth rounds of the European Social Survey, and tries to
explain differences in positive and negative emotions with the following group of variables:
health, safety, social life, employment and financial situation. The initial idea was that
of exploring class-based differences in happiness and life satisfaction, but it soon became
clear that comparing those across countries presented methodological issues that would
compromise the credibility of the research, thus the focus was placed on exploring the gaps
in positive and negative emotions instead – which, unlike the former, could be compared
across countries (Huppert et al., 2009; Van de Velde et al., 2010).
The countries with the smallest gaps in negative emotions between the upper and
lower class in 2006, were Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark and Russia, all with a
gap below 0.05. The largest emotional gaps are found in Slovenia, Belgium, Bulgaria and
Slovakia, where the gap lies between 0.15-0.20.1 In countries with small gaps the lower
class has a higher prevalence of depression of between 2 and 5 percentage points more
than the upper class, whereas in countries with the largest gaps, those differences are
of 15 to 25 percentage points. In countries with small gaps, the experience of negative
emotions is low, with an average score between 0.5 and 0.6, for the entire population,
which means that individuals experience negative emotions somewhere between ‘never’
and ‘sometimes’.2
Countries with the highest scores are: Bulgaria, Russia and Slovakia, with average
scores above 0.9 in all cases. In the former, the upper class may experience negative
emotions with as little frequency as individuals in Norway or Switzerland, but the mid-
dle and lower class depart substantially from that level. For instance, in Slovenia the
depression rate among the upper class is just 6.7, even lower than that of Norway, but it
is more than three times higher for the lower class. Other examples of such countries are
the Netherlands, Ireland, Finland, Cyprus, and Belgium. But, there are other countries
where everyone is just worse off in general, such as Bulgaria, Estonia, Poland, Portugal,
Russia and Slovakia.
The explanation put forward in Chapter 3 is that differences in negative emotions
1Remember that gaps show the difference in affect scores across classes. Both positive and negative
affect scores range from 0 to 3, and gaps, the difference between these scores between social classes, in
our sample go from 0.01 to 0.25, with a mean of 0.12 and a SD of 0.066.
2Russia is an exception to the former because it is the only country in the sample with a very
small class gap and high level of negative emotions. In other words, in Russia, there is equality in the
distribution of positive and negative emotions because everyone is almost equally unhappy.
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between the upper and the lower class are mostly driven by differences in health and
employment and, consequently, that the differences in the gaps across countries are due
to differences in the differentials in those variables across countries. Feeling safe and
having successful social relationships are no less important for negative emotions, but
since they are more equally distributed across classes (and better satisfied) they contribute
to the differences in negative emotions existing across classes and countries to a lesser
extent. For instance, in the UK, the proportion of individuals with depressive symptoms
among lower-class individuals is almost double that of upper-class people (15 versus 27
per cent). This is explained by differences in health and financial strain across classes.
There is a difference of 13.6 percentage points between the upper and lower class in
the proportion of individuals that report having good health, and a difference of 10
percentage points in financial strain between upper- and lower-class people. Differences
in terms of social life and safety feelings are below 5 percentage points. Consistently with
the ‘needs explanation’, in countries with the smallest differences in negative emotions,
across classes, the distribution of need satisfaction is more equal. For instance, in Sweden,
there is just a 4 percentage points difference in depression rates between upper and lower
class individuals, and this is explained by a less than 5 points difference in good health
between the upper and lower class, and another 5 points difference between the upper
and lower class in terms of financial strain.
The former examples also show that per capita GDP is insufficient to explain well-
being at certain levels. Sweden and the UK have quite similar per capita GDP levels –
Sweden, 32,000 USD, and the UK, 29,000 USD, and yet they provide different levels of
need satisfaction to their populations. In Sweden, average need satisfaction – the average
of the proportion of individuals with good health, that feel safe, have a good social life,
and have enough income – is 89.3, whereas in the UK it is 81.3. Some may argue that
income inequality may be behind this, since in Sweden income inequality is much lower
than in the UK (the Gini index is 34 in the UK and 23 in Sweden). Yet, income inequality
does not seem to be a necessary condition for providing high and equal need satisfaction.
Switzerland is a good example because it is a country with high income inequality (Gini
index of 29.9), and yet average need satisfaction in that country is much higher than in
the UK, 90.25. In fact, need satisfaction is as high as in Sweden, and as egalitarian.
Having the same questions in 2006 and 2012 presented an exceptional opportunity be-
cause the economic crisis occurred right in between these two rounds. The financial crisis
of 2008 destroyed many jobs and forced many people into unemployment and financial
hardship. Since unemployment and financial hardship were precisely among the variables
that explained most of the differences in negative emotions across classes, having a large
and somewhat exogenous shock on those, being able to explore their emotional conse-
quences was an extremely interesting opportunity for testing causality. Between 2006
and 2012 the proportion of individuals that experienced economic difficulties increased
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dramatically in countries like Spain (from 14.8 to 33.0) due to a rise in unemployment
levels (from 4.4 to 21.4), as did depression rates (from 19.2 to 25.1), just as need theo-
ries would predict. Similar stories are found for Ireland and Cyprus. At the same time,
there were countries such as Bulgaria, Poland or Slovakia, where the economic situation
improved between 2006 and 2012, and the prevalence of depression went down.
The results of this study clearly support need theories, however we must be cautious
because our analysis does not say anything about the cognitive component of SWB, life
satisfaction, and, while we are very successful in explaining the gaps in negative emotions
– as well as its variation across countries, we are less successful at explaining positive
emotions. My intuition is that those would be better explained if the measurement of
need satisfaction improved. Having sufficient social contacts may be enough for not
feeling bad and preventing depression, but having a very satisfactory social life explains
why some people have more or less positive emotions. This brings me to a more general
limitation of the analysis that should be kept in mind: need measurement is still quite
limited.
Another important limitation of Chapter 3 is that individuals that never took part
in the labour market are excluded from the analysis, and so are homeless people and
other marginal individuals that do not take part in surveys. This is very unfortunate
since those are the most disadvantaged members of society, whose emotional differences
with the top of society, this paper aimed at capturing. Although individuals that never
worked and do not have a social class are a small percentage in most countries, they
exist and they are mostly women, low educated, and have significantly lower SWB than
individuals included in the analysis. The exclusion of homeless people is probably a
bigger problem. Unfortunately we cannot do much with the dataset at hand, but this
issue should be addressed by future research since it does not make much sense to be
concerned with SWB and not know anything about the group with higher chances of
having low SWB. Yet, while the former limitation probably does make the description
of inequality in the distribution of SWB provided in this chapter biased downwards, this
chapter is still interesting from the causal point of view, because explaining away the
differences between the lower and upper class shows that need satisfaction affects SWB.
5.2.3 Policy implications: the inequality that matters
Sociologists have worked extensively in understanding objective differences in well-being
between the most and the least privileged members of society (Rose and Harrison, 2012).
However, very little is known about how their feelings differ. SWB is an important life
outcome that is unequally distributed over the population. To the extent that inequality
in the distribution of SWB is class based, public policy may be able to do something
about it. However, before that an understanding of how those differences are produced is
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required. Relative utility theories predict that such gaps or differentials should exist since
inequality and social comparisons should, by definition, make the better off feel better
than the less well off; whereas absolute utility theories predict the existence of a gap in
SWB due to differences in need satisfaction. The cross-country comparisons and time
series data (Diener and Oishi, 2000; Veenhoven and Hagerty, 2006b) have given support
to need theories and less so to relative utility claims, since the correlation between income
and SWB is weaker in rich countries. Yet, most studies connecting needs and SWB have
use income per capita as a proxy for need satisfaction, which is clearly insufficient when
looking at already rich countries.
Chapter 3 takes data from the European Social Survey and tries to explain the class-
based differential in the experience of positive and negative emotions across 19 European
countries following the needs approach. The analysis suggests that health and financial
strain explain most of the class differential as well as its cross-country variation in gaps
(and levels) because these are the two factors that differ more between classes and between
countries. Social life and safety feelings are remarkably equal across the population, and
therefore, although important to SWB, they do not play an important role in explaining
differences across countries. This gives support to need theories and takes it away from
relative theories because, first, it is clear that in countries where need satisfaction is
most egalitarian, so are emotions (e.g. Norway, Sweden or Switzerland). Second, in all
countries in our sample, the class differences disappear when needs are accounted for,
suggesting that if there were no differences in needs they would be egalitarian in terms
of SWB, like Norway, Sweden or Switzerland. The former is reinforced by the analysis of
the consequences of the crisis, which produced the expected effects: increase of negative
emotions where the economic situation deteriorated and reduction in the frequency of
those where the financial situation improved. Finally, in an earlier version of the research,
income inequality was included as a country-level regressor, and it had no impact at all
on the emotional gap.
Chapter 2 also challenges relative utility theories. It starts by questioning the sim-
plistic way in which social comparisons are supposed to happen, and at the empirical
level, by showing that changes in relative position do not affect life satisfaction or mental
distress. Although the chapter has some important weaknesses, such as the definition
of the reference group, and the fact that comparisons take place in a certain way, which
should make us cautious about the results, it also reminds us that there is no convincing
evidence about the effects of relative income for SWB. Therefore, more studies are needed
and, until then, caution is required when claiming that inequality reduction is crucial for
sustaining happiness. The existing evidence simply does not support that claim.
Chapter 2 as well as all the articles that try to test the relative income hypothesis
face an enormous challenge: identifying the group of reference and the type of comparison
that the individual makes (i.e. is the individual that has less than the reference group
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being negatively affected by seeing that others have more than him, or is he instead
motivated to work harder to be like the others in the future?). However, regardless of
how people compare, in a country with greater inequality, social comparisons should have
a greater effect. Yet, the evidence available does not support this since researchers have
not found any relationship between SWB and mean income of the nation (Diener et al.,
1995), nor with the maximum income, the minimum, or with the skew of the distribution
(Hagerty, 2000). Need theories receive support, while relative theories do not. This has
important policy implications that are discussed next, the first one, that everyone’s SWB
can improve at once, and the second one, that the usefulness of relative poverty lines and
the concept of relative deprivation is doubtful.
Happiness is not a zero-sum game because if it were, upper, middle and lower class
should, by definition, differ in their SWB levels, and this is not always the case. For
instance, in Switzerland, Norway, and some other countries, the frequency with which
different social classes experience positive and negative emotions is virtually the same.
There is income inequality, and there probably always will be, therefore, knowing that
this is not going to prevent anyone from enjoying higher SWB is good news.
The OECD, as part of its aim of keeping track of citizens’ well-being, periodically
constructs a measure of poverty for all European countries. This measure gives the
proportion of individuals below a certain threshold. However, this threshold is not the
income level that citizens in each country need to purchase basic commodities, but 50%
of the median household income. In other words, it is a relative poverty measure. There
seem to be practical reasons behind the adoption of the relative poverty line, e.g., avoiding
economic hardship is a primary objective of social policy. As perceptions of ‘a decent
standard of living’ vary across countries and over time, no commonly agreed measure of
‘absolute’ poverty across OECD countries exists. A starting point for measuring poverty
is therefore to look at ‘relative’ poverty, whose measure is based on the income that is most
typical in each country in each year. (Factbook, 2010). This is unfortunate, because with
this measure we are not capturing deprivation but income distribution – which may be
important, but is not the same as poverty. The following example will make clear why I
think this is so.
According to the former definition, Switzerland and Slovakia have almost the same
proportion of poor people since they have similar poverty rates. According to the OECD
poverty in Switzerland is 8.7 and in Slovakia, 8.1 (see Table A9). Yet, living standards
differ so much that while in Switzerland only 11.4% of individuals aged 30-60 present
depressive symptoms, the equivalent in Slovakia is 36.1% (ESS, own calculation). This
is because need satisfaction in higher in Switzerland than in Slovakia (despite income
inequality being much higher in Switzerland than in Slovakia). Average need satisfaction
is 90.3% in Switzerland versus 70.3% in Slovakia, because the proportion of people with
good health, feeling safe, socialising enough, and having enough income, is much higher
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in Switzerland than in Slovakia, and in consequence, more people are suffering in Slovakia
than in Switzerland. Besides, while income inequality is higher in Switzerland than in
Slovakia (the Gini Index in Switzerland is 29.9 while in Slovakia it is just 23.3, almost as
low as that of Sweden), need satisfaction is not only higher, but more equal in Switzerland.
In consequence, not only is depression lower on average in Switzerland, but there is less
inequality in the distribution of depression across the Swiss population. The depression
gap is 4.7 percentage points between the upper and lower class. This is 14 percentage
points higher in Slovakia for the lower than the upper class. Equality in SWB applies to
other outcomes as well such, as positive emotions or happiness and life satisfaction. In
this context, does it make sense to say that poverty is equal in Switzerland and Slovakia?
According to the OECD, in the Mid-2000s, 6.8% of people in Norway were poor.
Thus, the poorest 6.8% of the population in Norway are defined as poor (while none of
the richer individuals is considered poor). Yet, when we look at negative emotions and
depression rates by class in Norway we find that the negative emotions score are virtually
the same across classes. Not surprisingly, the proportion of individuals depressed or with
depressive symptoms is very similar for upper- and lower-class individuals, 8.3 and 10.0
per cent respectively. There is depression among lower-class individuals, but it does not
seem to be related to income since surely they differ between the upper and lower class
and yet they feel the same. Does it make sense then to define the 6.8% of the population
with the lowest income in Norway as poor?
Relative poverty lines do not make much sense, and yet, they are incredibly widespread,
for example, the ‘At-risk-of-poverty’ measure developed by Eurostat is essentially the
same, just using 60% of median equivalised income after social transfers, rather than
50%. But there are many more institutions that use them, and researchers use them to
measure deprivation and to signal the population in need. This is mistaken in itself, but
also because it means often that these nonsense measures replace absolute deprivation,
absolute poverty measures are much more important. Besides, there are already good
measures to keep track of income inequality such as the Gini index or the quintile ratio,
thus relative poverty does not add much.
It is worth emphasising that the analysis carried out in Chapters 2 and 3 suggest that
income inequality per se does not affect SWB, while need satisfaction – i.e. health and
avoiding financial strain – does. Therefore, the aim of reducing income inequality under
the belief that this reduction, per se, will bring happiness, should be abandoned because
income inequality in itself has very little to do with human suffering. This does not mean
that policy makers should not care about income inequality. There are several reasons
why they may want to do so. For instance, income inequality could affect SWB indirectly,
via making the universal health care less likely. It is also possible that income inequality
directly affects some outcomes that we value such as economic growth. If more unequal
countries grow less, governments would have one reason to target inequality. And, last
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but not least, governments may want to target inequality simply because citizens dislike
it.
5.3 WORKING HOURS AND SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING
5.3.1 How much we should work?
Most of the research concerning the relationship between work and well-being has focused
on the negative aspects of working ‘too much’, or at the ‘wrong hours’ (see Fagan et al.,
2012, for a review). However, we know much less about the benefits of work, and, in
particular, about how much to work to maximise well-being. This is at odds with the
insights of important psychologists working in the area of SWB, that have highlighted
the importance of being devoted to our job, or having one that we are passionate about,
as a key for happiness (Lykken, 1999; Seligman, 2002). Most individuals are satisfied
with their jobs, but some more than others, Chapter 4 explores the dynamics between
hours of work and SWB, separately for individuals with high and low satisfaction, with
the aim of understanding the effects of liking a job for work-life balance. The chapter
uses the diaries of typical working days of employees from France from the last time use
survey. This survey was carried out between September 2009 and September 2010 and, in
addition to some typical SWB questions, it contains enjoyment ratings for each episode
of activity for a 5% subsample.
The analysis suggests that all employees experience relatively high levels of enjoyment
and satisfaction, almost regardless of how much they work. Unfortunately, time crunch is
also very high for all employees. Exploring separately individuals according to how sat-
isfied they are with their jobs shows some interesting patterns. There is indeed variation
with working hours, and there is a particular number of hours that maximises SWB, but
optimal hours differ depending on the SWB outcome we look at. In other words, there
are trade-offs, and those trade-offs are greater if you are among those with low job sat-
isfaction. Individuals above the median in terms of job satisfaction optimise enjoyment
and satisfaction at 6 and 9.5 hours respectively, and the frequency of unpleasant moments
is minimised at around 7 hours of work. Whereas, individuals that do not like their jobs
that much should also do some work to optimise satisfaction with life (6.7 hours), but
doing so reduces their daily enjoyment considerably, and increases the proportion of time
spent in an unpleasant state.
Optimal points are usually higher for individuals with high job satisfaction, suggest-
ing that individuals that like their jobs more do indeed need less leisure because they can
afford to work longer hours and still optimise SWB. The former does not mean, how-
ever, that they need to actually work more than individuals that like their jobs less, to
maximise SWB, because the flatness of the marginal effects makes it possible for them
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to enjoy levels of SWB almost identical to the optimal ones for a very wide range of
hours. For example, by working 8 hours, individuals with high job satisfaction do reach
almost optimal enjoyment and life satisfaction levels, and always higher than those of
individuals with low job satisfaction. They do not minimise time crunch however, since
most time crunch measures are minimised by working as little as possible. Individuals
with low satisfaction can optimise life satisfaction and time crunch at once, but not daily
enjoyment. However, although individuals with low job satisfaction optimise time crunch
at around 8-9 hours of work, for that amount of work, they do experience more time
pressure than individuals with high job satisfaction.
Although these results should be taken with caution because they are based on cross-
sectional data and a relatively small sample, the fact that most employees cannot choose
how much they work, gives some credibility to the causal interpretation of the results.
Note that 65% of employees have an imposed schedule and, in consequence, the distribu-
tion of working hours is almost identical for individuals with high and low job satisfaction.
Besides, running a separate analysis for employees with high and low job satisfaction –
which may be an important factor explaining some of the variation in working hours –
gives further credibility to the causal interpretation of the results. Chapter 4 does not
say anything about the what divides people into high and low job satisfaction, it just
explores the differences in SWB as a function of working hours, between individuals that
like their jobs more and those that like their jobs less. Chapter 4 shows that liking one’s
job is important in the dynamic between hours of work and SWB. Besides, to the extent
that one believes that job satisfaction can be enhanced, the results of this analysis all
have important policy implications.
Chapter 4 has several limitations that should be mentioned before discussing policy
implications. One of them, perhaps a minor one, is that liking one’s job, or job satisfac-
tion, is not a binary issue, and thus, by treating it as binary we lose a lot of the variation
for the sake of simplicity. Future analyses should consider treating job satisfaction as
a continuous variable. A major limitation of Chapter 4 is that it ignores important
groups of the population such as retired individuals, homemakers, and students. They
are excluded from the analysis for practical reasons, not because they do not interest
us. Although homemakers and retired people do not do paid work, they do different
activities, some leisure ones, and other more obligatory ones, because they are required
to maintain quality of life – such as personal care and preparing meals, which may be
more or less conducive to well-being. The analysis would improve considerably if the
homemakers and retired individuals were included. The exclusion of the self-employed
is also unfortunate, but it was inevitable given the sample size. They are an important
group, because, if I am not mistaken, many jobs are becoming more like those of self-
employed individuals, and therefore understanding them means understanding a big, and
most importantly growing, part of the population. Unfortunately, they were so few and
147
they seem to be facing very different SWB functions as a function of time at work, and
thus I opted to leave them out. Finally, I would like to highlight once more, that most
of the results presented in Chapter 4 are based on a relatively small sample, of less than
400 diaries. Chapter 4 would benefit from a larger sample, as well as from having more
diaries for each individual, so to be able to explore the within-individual variation.
5.3.2 Policy implications and future research
Work-life balance has concerned policy makers for some time, but lately the issue has
attracted more attention – probably due to the flexibilisation of working time arrange-
ments and the increased participation of women into the labour market (Boulin et al.,
2006; Messenger, 2004). Examples of this concern are several political initiatives to re-
duce working time to 35 hours per week or to impede the ‘contamination’ of leisure with
work related activities such as checking emails. In Spain, for instance, a few political
parties are proposing the 35-hour working week as a way to reduce unemployment, and
presumably improve the quality of life by making it easier to achieve work-life balance.
However, if the economics of this initiative are doubtful, the alleged benefits for work-life
balance are even more dubious.
As much as these proposals may seem to be common sense, there is no evidence,
to my knowledge, that reducing the working week to 35 hours will help us have more
balanced lives. In fact, the analysis carried out in Chapter 4 questions such assumptions,
since many employed individuals can maximise daily enjoyment and life satisfaction by
working more than 40 hours per week.3 Besides, the SWB curves as a function of working
hours are usually so flat at around the optimal points that a variety of work hours can
bring levels of SWB very close to the optimal, suggesting that a reduction of 1 hour a
day would not change things much. This should make us wonder whether initiatives such
as the 35-hour working week make much sense from the perspective of well-being. Table
5.1 tries to show this.
Columns (I) to (III) in Table 5.1 compare SWB for individuals working 35 and 40
hours per week. It does so showing the estimated SWB levels for individuals working
7 and 8 hours a day respectively. Columns (I) and (II) show the predicted values, and
(III) shows the difference between (I) and (II), that is, the expected gain in SWB of
reducing daily hours of work from 8 to 7, and thus the weekly hours from 40 to 35. As
expected, there is practically no change between the 40-hour working week and the 35-
hour one. For instance, daily enjoyment would increase by 0.03 (just 6% of a standard
deviation). The expected change is also insignificant in life satisfaction and time pressure,
quantitatively but probably also statistically speaking. For instance, working 8 hours
3To know the exact number of proportion of employees that optimise SWB working 40 hours per
week, we would need to treat job satisfaction as a continuous variable.
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Table 5.1: Is the 35-hour work week worthwhile?
Hours of work Job satisfaction (40 hrs.)
SWB Outcome 35 hrs. 40 hrs. Diff. > p50 < p50 Diff.
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Daily enjoyment (1-5) 4.14 4.10 0.03 4.24 3.98 0.25
Unpleasant time (%) 5.6 6.1 -0.5 3.2 9.2 -6.1
Neutral time (%) 11.8 12.6 -0.8 9.8 14.5 -4.8
Life Satisfaction (0-10) 8.16 8.17 -0.01 8.47 7.90 0.58
Feeling rushed (%) 58.8 59.2 -0.4 53.3 55.6 -2.2
‘Feeling rushed’ shows the proportion of people that report feeling rushed several times a week
or every day”.
versus doing 7 hours, would increase life satisfaction by 0.01 and reduce time pressure by
just 0.4 percentage points. It seems, then, that reducing the working week to 35 hours
would not affect SWB very much. Whereas liking one’s job seems to provide greater
improvements in terms of SWB, columns (IV) to (VI) show this precisely. Individuals
with low job satisfaction spend 3 times more time in an unpleasant state than individuals
with high job satisfaction, and, 50% more time in a neutral state. The former reduces
daily enjoyment by half a standard deviation (0.25), and life satisfaction by one standard
deviation.4
It is important to highlight that while Table 5.1 does show with some credibility that
reducing the working day by one hour would not affect SWB, it does not prove that
the differences displayed in Col (VI) are showing causal effects, but they are suggestive.
It seems very plausible that liking what you do makes you happier and more satisfied
with your life, and it also seems likely that we are capable of improving job satisfaction.
Besides, it is important to note that in any case, the power of improving quality of
life through a reduction in work time – or via advancing retirement – is quite limited.
Work occupies approximately one half of our waking time if we work 40 hours per week,
almost as much as if we work 35 hours per week. So, focusing on improving the quality
of working time seems to be a strategy with much more potential. In the light of the
research presented here, it makes no sense to keep thinking about work as a pain to avoid,
but, instead, as a goldmine to exploit.
Besides, there is a lot of research showing that the health of individuals engaged in paid
work is better than that of those out of the labour force (Damaske et al., 2014; Kahneman
et al., 1999), which suggests that the SWB of homemakers and retired individuals should
not, in principle, be higher than that of workers. Yet, with the current analysis we cannot
answer that yet. This is left for future research, where I hope to compare not only average
4Note that the improvement would not change much if we looked separately at individuals with high
and low job satisfaction separately.
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levels of SWB for homemakers and retired individuals, but also explore work-life balance;
that is, explore the relationship between e.g. hours of unpaid work and SWB. The former
should be done for both homemakers and retired individuals.
I am particularly interested in exploring the effects of retirement for SWB or work-life
balance. In this analysis we find that work is good for SWB – especially for employees
with high job satisfaction, which makes me wonder about the effects of retirement for
SWB. I would like to explore work-life balance for retired individuals, and its relation
to hours of work (unpaid work in this case). I would like to investigate carefully the
relationship between work and SWB for individuals of different ages, distinguishing by
occupations types, if possible (it is not possible with the French dataset because the
subsample with affect is very small), to see if as people age, activities become less pleasant
or tiring. The former analysis, together with the more general comparison of employed
and non-employed individuals could shed light on the adequacy of early retirement, an
issue of extreme policy relevance. My guess is that if we could explore these by type of
activity we could find important differences since occupations that are more demanding
physically could create a burden as we age – whereas this would not be the case with
researchers or intellectual workers in general, whose SWB should not necessarily improve
with retirement.
One of the most interesting findings of Chapter 4 is the existence of trade-offs between
affect and cognition – between enjoyment and life satisfaction, especially among employees
with low job satisfaction. The existence of trade-offs among SWB components highlights
the importance of not limiting the analysis to a single SWB measure. For instance, the
exclusive focus of National Time Accounts on affect could lead us to erroneous conclusions,
since based on enjoyment solely we would conclude that working is bad for individuals that
do not like their jobs, however, if satisfaction is taken into account, we would conclude
otherwise. Chapter 4 uses several measures that capture different aspects of SWB, yet
there are more variables that could be incorporated into the analysis such as tiredness or
boredom, which are present in the French dataset.
It is also important to understand better the interrelations between affect and cogni-
tion, to which very little attention has been paid so far. In this chapter we have seen that
being satisfied with the job is one example of a variable that reduces the discrepancies
between satisfaction and affect. Another example could be culture. For instance, in a
sexist culture, working long hours outside the household could reduce life satisfaction for
women with small children. It would be extremely interesting to replicate this analysis
with other datasets from different countries to compare the emerging trade-offs. I would
expect the relationship between working hours and affect to be more or less the same
everywhere while the relationship between working hours and satisfaction to vary across
countries, and perhaps also across socio-demographic groups.
Finally, greater efforts should be made to understand better the time pressure phe-
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nomenon, because all workers experience it to a large extent even if they do not work
that much, and, moreover, regardless of whether they are very satisfied with their jobs
or not. Besides, time crunch is the only outcome, of those considered so far, that is not
optimised simultaneously with life satisfaction and affect for individuals with high job
satisfaction. We may be tempted to conclude that time crunch is just a complaint with-
out further consequences. The fact that individuals with high life satisfaction, high daily
enjoyment, and high job satisfaction can report very high levels of time crunch inclines
me to agree with that position, however, we cannot be sure. In fact, precisely to address
that suspicion, I included alternative and, perhaps somewhat more ‘objective’ measures
of time crunch such as the extent to which people skip meals and cut back on sleep to
save time, and it turned out that the majority of people, almost 65% of those who report
feeling quite rushed, do skip meals and cut back on sleep to save time. Hence, we cannot
simply conclude that time crunch reports are unimportant. Further research is clearly
needed, but, given that time crunch may indeed be a serious issue, I think I will take a
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6.1 APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 2
Table A1: Cross-tabulation between income quintiles and subjective well being (UK,
2002)
Quintile Earnings (£) Life-Satisfaction Mental Distress N
mean SD mean SD mean SD
1 325.9 141.6 7.21 1.98 3.12 1.52 1,676
2 718.1 90.0 6.95 2.01 3.03 1.46 1,742
3 1001.0 82.0 7.02 1.86 2.97 1.39 1,681
4 1331.4 117.9 7.13 1.73 2.87 1.33 1,556
5 2172.8 700.7 7.18 1.67 2.85 1.31 1,424
Quintile Household income (£) Life-Satisfaction Mental Distress N
mean SD mean SD mean SD
1 732.2 246.4 6.91 2.51 3.33 1.66 3,385
2 1280.6 142.4 7.00 2.32 3.17 1.54 3,073
3 1800.3 162.3 7.10 2.13 3.06 1.48 2,962
4 2455.1 232.8 7.17 1.89 3.01 1.42 2,821
5 4260.5 2095.6 7.32 1.74 2.90 1.38 2,715
This table has been obtained using wave 12th of the BHPS, corresponding to the year 2002. All
amounts expressed in sterling pounds. The reason why the number of observations across quintiles
does vary more than expected, is that quintiles where calculated for each wave and for all individuals
for whom we had per capita household income information, while this table includes only individuals
for whom we have per capita household income, life satisfaction and mental distress.
178
Table A2: The effects of relative income on life-satisfaction by sign of change (using First
differences rather than Fixed effects.)
Earnings Per capita HH. Income
all ch(ri) > 0 ch(ri) < 0 all ch(ri) > 0 ch(ri) < 0
Region19 0.085∗∗∗ 0.071∗ -0.009 0.030∗ 0.029 -0.005
(0.024) (0.033) (0.041) (0.013) (0.020) (0.020)
Region133 0.082∗∗∗ 0.064 -0.018 0.030∗ 0.037 -0.001
(0.024) (0.033) (0.041) (0.013) (0.020) (0.020)
Education 0.079∗∗ 0.073∗ -0.032 0.024 0.038 -0.003
(0.024) (0.034) (0.040) (0.013) (0.020) (0.020)
Occupation 0.076∗∗ 0.112∗∗ -0.087∗ 0.025 0.043 -0.007
(0.025) (0.038) (0.041) (0.018) (0.028) (0.029)
Ethnicity 0.084∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗ -0.018 0.031∗ 0.042∗ -0.002
(0.025) (0.035) (0.042) (0.014) (0.021) (0.021)
Pr. wage 0.045 0.055 -0.075 0.027 0.053∗∗ -0.009
(0.024) (0.032) (0.043) (0.014) (0.020) (0.021)
N 57,359 30,585 26,774 114,364 58,891 55,473
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Columns ‘all’ contain all
individuals, and the other columns, ‘ch(ri) > 0’ and ‘ch(ri) < 0’ contains regression with positive
and negative changes in relative income respectively.
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Table A3: The effects of relative income on mental distress by sign of change (using First
differences rather than Fixed effects.)
Earnings Per capita HH. Income
all ch(ri) > 0 ch(ri) < 0 all ch(ri) > 0 ch(ri) < 0
Region19 -0.078∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ -0.015 -0.023 0.009
(0.016) (0.021) (0.029) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012)
Region133 -0.058∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗ -0.010 -0.026∗ 0.000
(0.017) (0.023) (0.030) (0.009) (0.012) (0.014)
Education -0.063∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ -0.012 -0.029∗ 0.005
(0.016) (0.022) (0.028) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013)
Occupation -0.051∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗ 0.068∗ -0.000 -0.033 0.006
(0.017) (0.026) (0.028) (0.012) (0.017) (0.022)
Ethnicity -0.072∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ -0.020∗ -0.038∗∗ -0.001
(0.017) (0.023) (0.029) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013)
Pr. wage -0.057∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗ -0.011 -0.038∗∗ -0.000
(0.016) (0.021) (0.029) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013)
N 89,243 47,422 41,821 179,378 90,396 88,982
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001, Columns ‘all’ contain all
individuals, and the other columns, ‘ch(ri) > 0’ and ‘ch(ri) < 0’ contains regression with positive
and negative changes in relative income respectively.
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6.2 APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 3
Table A4: Class size
2006 2012
Country Upper Middle Lower Upper Middle Lower
Belgium 49.5 22.4 28.1 49.9 19.9 30.2
Bulgaria 28.4 23.1 48.5 28.3 23.6 48.1
Cyprus 22.8 41.6 35.6 30.7 35.1 34.2
Denmark 51.5 17.4 31.1 50.9 22.2 26.9
Estonia 37.6 13.4 49.1 40.3 19.0 40.7
Finland 41.6 27.2 31.3 43.7 24.9 31.4
Germany 39.3 29.5 31.3 48.7 22.7 28.6
Ireland 44.9 31.8 23.4 39.2 29.6 31.2
Netherlands 53.0 22.7 24.3 53.2 22.4 24.4
Norway 45.9 25.4 28.7 59.1 17.2 23.8
Poland 24.3 29.8 45.9 33.7 29.3 37.0
Portugal 17.8 30.8 51.4 16.9 32.2 50.9
Russia 31.1 21.8 47.1 34.6 26.6 38.8
Slovakia 34.5 21.3 44.2 41.8 21.3 36.9
Slovenia 38.5 22.2 39.4 42.4 19.7 37.9
Spain 25.8 33.8 40.4 42.2 21.9 36.0
Sweden 48.1 25.0 26.9 52.4 20.4 27.1
Switzerland 46.5 31.4 22.1 57.7 21.8 20.5
UK 47.6 26.5 25.9 45.5 29.4 25.1
Total 39.0 26.1 34.9 42.3 24.2 33.5
Each column shows the proportion of the sample in each social class.
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Table A5: Social class distribution and individuals with no social class
Upper Middle Lower No class
Country % N % N % N % N
Belgium 48.8 457 22.1 207 27.7 260 1.4 13
Bulgaria 26.2 182 21.4 146 44.8 305 7.6 45
Cyprus 20.9 118 38.0 200 32.5 170 8.6 44
Denmark 50.2 411 17.0 139 30.3 248 2.4 20
Estonia 37.2 264 13.3 94 48.7 345 0.8 6
Finland 41.2 375 26.9 245 31.0 282 0.9 8
Germany 38.1 558 28.6 432 30.3 486 3.0 40
Ireland 42.5 396 30.1 249 22.2 203 5.2 47
Netherlands 52.1 563 22.3 236 24.0 246 1.6 16
Norway 45.4 434 25.1 240 28.4 271 1.0 10
Poland 23.5 214 28.9 244 44.5 375 3.0 25
Portugal 16.5 191 28.6 288 47.8 495 7.1 66
Russia 29.5 365 20.7 240 44.8 514 5.0 54
Slovakia 32.3 296 20.0 183 41.4 379 6.2 57
Slovenia 36.1 264 20.8 152 36.9 270 6.2 45
Spain 24.3 234 31.9 299 38.1 356 5.7 52
Sweden 46.8 466 24.3 242 26.2 261 2.6 26
Switzerland 45.6 481 30.8 288 21.6 198 2.0 15
UK 46.8 557 26.1 310 25.5 312 1.6 24
Total 37.6 6826 25.2 4434 33.6 5976 3.6 613
Source: The European Social Survey, 3rd round of data.
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Table A6: Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression scale (CES-D)
2006 2012
Country Upper Middle Lower Avg. Gap Upper Middle Lower Avg. Gap
Belgium 0.57 0.71 0.76 0.66 -0.19 0.58 0.67 0.75 0.65 -0.17
Bulgaria 0.87 0.91 1.02 0.95 -0.16 0.72 0.78 0.83 0.78 -0.11
Cyprus 0.57 0.62 0.71 0.63 -0.14 0.61 0.71 0.77 0.70 -0.16
Denmark 0.58 0.58 0.63 0.59 -0.05 0.56 0.61 0.58 0.58 -0.02
Estonia 0.77 0.81 0.86 0.82 -0.09 0.66 0.79 0.89 0.78 -0.22
Finland 0.58 0.58 0.64 0.60 -0.06 0.53 0.59 0.61 0.56 -0.08
Germany 0.68 0.74 0.81 0.73 -0.13 0.68 0.69 0.79 0.71 -0.11
Ireland 0.56 0.55 0.62 0.57 -0.06 0.55 0.55 0.64 0.57 -0.09
Netherlands 0.58 0.68 0.68 0.61 -0.11 0.59 0.61 0.62 0.58 -0.03
Norway 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.52 -0.02 0.45 0.53 0.54 0.48 -0.09
Poland 0.67 0.81 0.92 0.83 -0.25 0.62 0.66 0.76 0.67 -0.14
Portugal 0.78 0.83 0.92 0.86 -0.14 0.69 0.86 0.89 0.85 -0.20
Russia 0.92 0.98 0.93 0.94 -0.01 0.87 0.89 0.89 0.88 -0.01
Slovakia 0.81 0.93 0.96 0.90 -0.15 0.79 0.77 0.90 0.81 -0.10
Slovenia 0.55 0.67 0.75 0.65 -0.20 0.46 0.57 0.61 0.53 -0.15
Spain 0.60 0.64 0.74 0.67 -0.14 0.65 0.80 0.84 0.75 -0.19
Sweden 0.58 0.66 0.61 0.61 -0.04 0.56 0.57 0.62 0.58 -0.06
Switzerland 0.55 0.60 0.59 0.57 -0.04 0.55 0.63 0.62 0.58 -0.08
UK 0.65 0.66 0.79 0.68 -0.14 0.66 0.70 0.73 0.67 -0.08
Total 0.66 0.70 0.79 0.71 -0.11 0.63 0.70 0.76 0.68 -0.12
The CES-D (Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression scale) is a summary measure of negative affect
that ranges from 0 to 3. The ‘Gap’ column shows the gap in the CES-D score between upper and lower
class individuals (Gap=upper-lower).
183
Table A7: Positive affect (PA)
2006 2012
Country Upper Middle Lower Avg. Gap Upper Middle Lower Avg. Gap
Belgium 1.84 1.70 1.73 1.78 0.11 1.85 1.81 1.71 1.80 0.14
Bulgaria 1.57 1.49 1.38 1.46 0.19 1.85 1.81 1.61 1.73 0.23
Cyprus 1.72 1.67 1.54 1.64 0.19 1.97 1.86 1.81 1.89 0.17
Denmark 1.87 1.85 1.92 1.88 -0.05 1.93 1.85 1.94 1.91 -0.01
Estonia 1.81 1.78 1.59 1.70 0.22 1.91 1.74 1.66 1.78 0.25
Finland 1.73 1.69 1.69 1.71 0.04 1.82 1.73 1.74 1.78 0.09
Germany 1.81 1.78 1.66 1.76 0.15 1.87 1.86 1.76 1.83 0.12
Ireland 1.85 1.88 1.91 1.88 -0.06 1.96 1.91 1.89 1.92 0.07
Netherlands 1.92 1.80 1.82 1.87 0.10 1.98 1.97 1.94 1.99 0.03
Norway 1.84 1.83 1.91 1.86 -0.07 1.98 1.96 2.02 1.99 -0.04
Poland 1.69 1.61 1.56 1.61 0.13 1.87 1.87 1.76 1.84 0.11
Portugal 1.78 1.71 1.64 1.70 0.14 1.80 1.65 1.65 1.67 0.16
Russia 1.63 1.54 1.54 1.57 0.10 1.73 1.70 1.68 1.72 0.05
Slovakia 1.84 1.68 1.67 1.73 0.17 1.88 1.92 1.79 1.87 0.09
Slovenia 1.95 1.87 1.80 1.88 0.15 2.07 2.02 2.00 2.04 0.07
Spain 1.67 1.76 1.62 1.68 0.05 1.67 1.60 1.54 1.62 0.13
Sweden 1.75 1.69 1.75 1.74 0.00 1.86 1.90 1.84 1.86 0.03
Switzerland 1.94 1.88 1.96 1.93 -0.01 2.01 1.98 2.00 2.01 0.01
UK 1.68 1.72 1.65 1.70 0.03 1.75 1.70 1.73 1.75 0.02
Total 1.78 1.74 1.68 1.74 0.09 1.87 1.82 1.76 1.83 0.11
PA is a summary measure of positive affect that ranges from 0 to 3. The ‘Gap’ column shows the gap
in the Affect score between upper and lower class individuals (Gap=upper-lower).
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Table A8: Depression rates
2006 2012 Ch.
Country Upper Middle Lower Avg. Gap Upper Middle Lower Avg. Gap Avg.
Belgium 9.9 24.6 25.8 17.7 -15.9 12.0 17.3 24.6 16.9 -12.6 -0.7
Bulgaria 33.5 31.4 43.4 37.7 -9.8 23.7 25.4 30.2 26.8 -6.5 -8.8
Cyprus 9.3 11.7 20.1 13.8 -10.8 16.8 24.7 28.4 23.3 -11.6 8.7
Denmark 9.5 7.9 15.0 10.8 -5.5 8.5 16.9 14.4 12.1 -5.9 1.3
Estonia 23.3 22.8 26.0 24.5 -2.8 16.4 24.3 34.0 25.2 -17.6 0.7
Finland 10.1 11.8 14.9 12.1 -4.8 7.3 10.6 13.2 9.8 -5.9 -2.3
Germany 14.6 20.3 26.2 19.5 -11.6 15.7 17.0 25.5 18.7 -9.9 -1.8
Ireland 12.2 11.7 13.5 12.1 -1.3 14.6 15.3 20.2 16.2 -5.6 4.1
Netherlands 11.7 17.0 20.0 14.7 -8.3 12.3 14.6 19.4 13.6 -7.1 -0.7
Norway 8.3 7.9 10.0 8.6 -1.7 4.2 9.6 11.4 6.9 -7.2 -1.8
Poland 20.3 26.6 37.4 29.8 -17.1 14.5 18.9 24.8 19.3 -10.3 -11.0
Portugal 24.2 28.9 38.3 32.6 -14.1 21.3 28.9 31.3 29.1 -10.0 -4.7
Russia 35.3 34.9 30.9 33.2 4.4 31.2 31.7 31.2 31.0 0.0 -3.7
Slovakia 27.0 38.5 41.0 36.1 -13.9 26.6 25.4 34.2 28.3 -7.6 -5.7
Slovenia 6.8 16.0 22.5 15.0 -15.7 7.1 11.7 15.5 10.7 -8.4 -4.1
Spain 13.2 14.4 27.4 19.2 -14.1 18.2 28.7 31.4 25.1 -13.3 5.9
Sweden 11.2 19.5 15.3 14.5 -4.1 10.6 17.8 17.3 14.0 -6.8 -0.5
Switzerland 8.7 14.0 13.5 11.4 -4.8 9.6 15.5 15.1 11.7 -5.5 -0.3
UK 16.5 17.7 27.0 18.9 -10.5 19.0 26.1 23.0 21.2 -4.0 1.8
Total 16.7 19.6 26.6 20.1 -8.7 15.8 20.8 25.2 19.6 -8.3 -1.4
Being depressed means having a CES-D score –measure of negative emotions– above or equal to 1. The
last column, ‘Ch. avg.’ shows the change in average depression rates for the population between 2006
and 2012.
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Table A9: Macro indicators
2006 2012
Country GDPpc Growth Gini Poverty GDPpc Growth Gini
Belgium 37,918 2.7 27.8 8.8 43,395 -0.1 26.5
Bulgaria 4,313 6.5 31.2 n.a. 7,022 0.6 33.6
Cyprus 23,863 4.1 28.8 n.a. 26,352 -2.4 31.0
Denmark 50,462 3.4 23.7 5.3 56,364 -0.4 28.1
Estonia 12,472 10.1 33.1 n.a. 16,887 3.9 32.5
Finland 39,487 4.4 25.9 7.3 45,649 -1.0 25.9
Germany 35,237 3.7 26.8 11.0 42,597 0.7 28.3
Ireland 52,118 5.5 31.9 14.8 45,921 0.2 29.9
Netherlands 41,458 3.4 26.4 7.7 45,960 -1.2 25.4
Norway 72,959 2.3 29.2 6.8 99,635 2.9 22.5
Poland 8,958 6.2 33.3 14.6 12,721 1.9 30.9
Portugal 19,177 1.5 37.7 12.9 20,175 -3.2 34.5
Russia 6,947 8.1 38.7 n.a. 14,090 3.4 39.7
Slovakia 12,842 8.4 28.1 8.1 16,892 1.8 25.3
Slovenia 19,405 5.8 23.7 n.a. 22,059 -2.5 23.7
Spain 27,847 4.1 31.9 14.1 28,281 -1.6 35.0
Sweden 43,948 4.3 24.0 5.3 55,039 0.9 24.8
Switzerland 54,140 3.8 30.3 8.7 78,928 1.0 28.8
UK 40,807 2.8 32.5 8.3 38,648 0.3 31.3
Total 32,766 4.6 29.9 9.6 36,601 0.4 29.7
Note: ‘GDPpc’ contains per capita Gross Domestic product in current USD, and ‘Growth’
annual growth (World development indicators, World Bank). ‘Gini’ is the Gini index of equiv-
alised disposable income ranging from 0 to 100 (Eurostat, SILC). ‘Poverty’ is a measure of
relative poverty that shows the proportion of individuals below 50% of median household
income (obtained from the OECD, corresponds to Mid 2000).
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Table A10: Good health
2006 2012
Country Upper Middle Lower Avg. Upper Middle Lower Avg.
Belgium 86.2 76.3 70.8 79.7 83.7 78.9 68.7 78.2
Bulgaria 67.5 57.9 58.6 61.0 80.0 72.8 64.8 71.3
Cyprus 93.7 90.1 82.2 88.1 87.8 83.7 78.0 83.1
Denmark 85.4 77.7 71.8 79.9 83.7 78.2 70.8 79.2
Estonia 58.7 47.9 38.3 47.1 64.8 47.6 41.6 52.1
Finland 80.5 73.5 65.6 74.0 80.8 73.1 70.2 75.9
Germany 73.2 64.8 58.0 65.8 68.8 61.0 54.7 62.8
Ireland 88.1 88.2 80.0 86.2 86.0 84.2 85.2 85.5
Netherlands 83.8 73.7 70.9 78.4 82.4 76.2 70.1 77.6
Norway 87.3 79.2 71.6 80.8 86.9 72.6 72.8 81.0
Poland 72.4 54.6 49.5 56.4 70.9 64.3 63.9 66.5
Portugal 63.4 51.3 48.1 51.8 74.1 69.0 63.8 67.6
Russia 37.1 26.2 27.0 30.1 34.7 35.4 32.0 33.4
Slovakia 74.2 60.7 58.3 64.0 78.1 68.4 63.4 70.8
Slovenia 73.9 61.8 44.1 59.5 77.2 63.6 50.8 64.9
Spain 75.8 66.5 60.9 66.5 70.5 65.7 58.0 64.9
Sweden 82.8 78.9 78.2 80.5 86.5 80.5 75.8 82.3
Switzerland 91.4 81.2 82.3 86.3 86.9 80.7 84.2 85.3
UK 81.5 77.6 67.7 76.8 78.2 80.7 70.9 77.2
Total 78.0 68.4 58.6 68.6 76.7 69.6 62.8 70.3
Individuals that reported their health to be either “good” or “very good”. The remaining
individuals do report their health to be “fair”, “bad” or very bad”
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Table A11: Feeling safe
2006 2012
Country Upper Middle Lower Avg. Upper Middle Lower Avg.
Belgium 87.5 73.8 79.6 82.2 90.8 84.9 79.4 86.2
Bulgaria 44.3 44.4 54.9 49.0 60.0 56.3 60.8 59.6
Cyprus 86.2 84.3 93.8 88.2 76.0 64.5 70.3 70.1
Denmark 92.7 87.8 87.4 90.2 95.1 90.4 94.9 94.1
Estonia 64.1 59.1 61.4 62.0 72.8 74.3 69.6 71.6
Finland 92.8 89.4 92.9 91.9 94.8 92.8 95.2 94.5
Germany 88.1 77.2 77.3 81.4 86.4 79.3 80.0 83.1
Ireland 73.6 73.1 68.3 72.3 80.0 79.9 77.2 79.2
Netherlands 90.1 86.1 78.1 86.2 90.9 90.0 84.8 89.4
Norway 97.0 87.5 94.8 94.0 93.2 93.8 93.1 93.3
Poland 73.1 75.9 78.1 76.2 87.6 83.6 88.0 86.2
Portugal 82.7 86.1 81.6 83.0 81.0 75.2 79.0 77.7
Russia 57.2 56.7 62.0 59.2 57.8 62.5 65.0 61.7
Slovakia 68.5 62.9 69.8 67.3 71.4 69.2 76.3 73.1
Slovenia 92.7 90.7 92.5 92.4 95.6 96.4 95.9 96.0
Spain 85.4 75.4 78.5 79.2 83.0 82.1 81.9 82.6
Sweden 91.0 82.2 87.4 87.8 92.2 85.1 88.3 89.7
Switzerland 91.5 83.6 84.2 87.5 92.7 85.1 88.8 90.3
UK 74.4 58.8 70.2 69.1 80.6 72.5 81.5 78.8
Total 82.6 76.2 77.1 78.9 83.8 78.3 79.2 80.9
Individuals that reported they felt either “safe” or “very safe” when walking alone in the dark
in the area where they lived. The rest are individuals that feel “unsafe” or “very unsafe”.
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Table A12: Lives with a partner
2006 2012
Country Upper Middle Lower Avg. Upper Middle Lower Avg.
Belgium 86.7 79.7 77.3 82.5 77.4 74.1 70.8 74.4
Bulgaria 72.9 85.4 83.9 81.6 73.4 74.9 77.2 75.7
Cyprus 85.5 88.1 88.8 87.8 75.8 83.2 82.0 80.5
Denmark 81.0 82.7 76.2 78.6 82.0 82.7 71.4 78.8
Estonia 77.7 77.7 72.2 75.0 74.7 71.0 63.0 68.6
Finland 82.4 78.4 68.8 77.1 74.9 71.6 67.9 72.3
Germany 75.7 76.1 72.4 74.7 74.9 79.9 74.1 75.9
Ireland 82.9 82.9 77.4 81.6 78.1 75.4 71.1 75.0
Netherlands 79.4 80.3 81.2 80.1 80.7 79.6 73.4 78.7
Norway 78.8 81.2 77.5 79.0 76.5 71.2 72.8 74.6
Poland 85.8 80.4 75.7 79.4 81.8 78.0 75.2 78.1
Portugal 70.3 81.4 81.7 79.7 67.7 72.5 73.0 72.1
Russia 72.9 72.7 75.1 73.8 71.4 68.1 73.9 71.7
Slovakia 82.1 82.5 81.5 81.9 79.7 82.3 74.6 77.8
Slovenia 81.1 82.9 85.9 83.3 74.5 77.2 75.6 74.8
Spain 80.0 80.1 76.7 78.7 74.5 70.2 74.6 73.6
Sweden 82.2 76.4 72.0 78.0 78.0 72.4 72.7 75.3
Switzerland 79.2 82.9 85.7 81.8 74.9 80.1 77.0 76.4
UK 81.4 81.0 70.6 78.5 78.1 75.9 66.5 74.8
Total 80.0 80.4 77.5 79.2 76.6 75.5 72.8 75.0
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Table A13: Frequent social meetings
2006 2012
Country Upper Middle Lower Avg. Upper Middle Lower Avg.
Belgium 69.1 65.4 64.6 67.0 62.4 58.4 55.9 59.9
Bulgaria 57.5 50.7 53.3 54.4 53.6 56.8 52.5 53.8
Cyprus 44.3 44.0 42.6 43.6 50.9 46.4 39.8 45.6
Denmark 72.7 73.4 69.6 72.1 65.7 67.0 61.6 64.9
Estonia 54.4 51.1 50.3 51.8 42.8 38.0 34.0 38.3
Finland 71.5 64.1 62.4 66.7 61.8 58.7 59.2 60.1
Germany 54.4 55.5 50.3 53.1 59.6 48.8 49.5 54.2
Ireland 61.7 57.7 63.1 60.8 46.0 43.8 51.9 47.1
Netherlands 80.8 78.3 64.7 76.4 74.7 71.8 70.2 73.0
Norway 77.2 78.3 75.3 76.9 72.7 67.1 71.8 71.6
Poland 35.8 33.2 33.0 33.6 33.8 33.8 27.7 31.2
Portugal 89.8 90.9 86.0 88.0 76.4 80.3 74.4 76.7
Russia 46.0 42.8 33.5 39.8 40.6 42.2 34.9 39.4
Slovakia 58.4 50.8 54.7 54.9 54.8 54.1 54.8 55.1
Slovenia 50.6 52.6 39.6 46.7 58.2 47.7 50.2 53.6
Spain 77.2 77.8 72.1 75.4 70.6 72.9 65.1 68.9
Sweden 70.8 65.3 64.8 67.9 73.3 78.7 70.0 73.6
Switzerland 79.2 70.8 74.4 75.5 72.6 65.0 59.6 68.1
UK 63.4 63.5 63.2 63.4 57.4 52.0 56.0 55.1
Total 65.7 62.6 58.1 62.2 59.7 55.8 53.5 56.7




Country Upper Middle Lower Avg. Upper Middle Lower Avg.
Belgium 3.5 6.2 14.3 7.0 2.6 10.5 16.2 7.9
Bulgaria 7.1 8.4 30.9 18.2 10.5 13.9 19.6 15.4
Cyprus 1.1 2.1 4.1 2.4 7.1 15.1 15.7 12.6
Denmark 1.3 2.4 3.4 2.1 3.1 5.6 11.9 5.9
Estonia 0.4 9.0 4.4 3.4 4.1 8.8 12.1 8.0
Finland 1.2 9.3 14.5 7.4 3.9 10.3 15.5 8.8
Germany 5.7 11.1 12.8 9.3 2.2 5.3 9.6 5.0
Ireland 1.8 1.7 8.3 3.3 11.1 11.9 32.6 18.3
Netherlands 2.2 3.4 7.0 3.6 2.5 5.1 5.4 3.8
Norway 0.7 3.2 2.6 1.8 1.2 4.7 3.0 2.2
Poland 3.1 9.5 11.9 8.8 4.1 10.0 13.2 8.8
Portugal 3.7 5.7 16.0 10.4 13.8 19.8 31.0 24.0
Russia 1.5 0.5 6.7 4.3 3.1 4.0 4.5 4.4
Slovakia 2.3 4.8 13.5 7.7 3.4 6.4 15.9 8.8
Slovenia 2.5 5.5 12.2 6.9 9.3 12.5 21.9 13.7
Spain 2.1 4.2 6.4 4.4 14.4 18.7 31.0 21.4
Sweden 1.8 3.5 3.9 3.0 2.1 4.4 7.5 3.9
Switzerland 0.8 1.7 5.9 2.2 1.3 2.9 1.5 2.0
UK 2.9 3.4 7.6 4.1 5.0 8.8 11.7 7.5
Total 2.4 5.0 9.8 5.8 5.5 9.4 14.7 9.6
Note: the unemployment figures displayed here may differ from official unemployment from
more reliable sources like national labour force surveys because of the higher quality of the
later to measure unemployment, and also because this table only provides Figures for the
age-group 30-60.
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Table A15: Financial strain
2006 2012
Country Upper Middle Lower Avg. Upper Middle Lower Avg.
Belgium 13.2 24.2 29.5 20.2 11.8 25.4 38.4 22.5
Bulgaria 62.8 77.9 83.5 76.4 48.5 72.3 82.5 70.4
Cyprus 14.3 25.5 35.8 26.5 32.7 55.6 64.3 51.4
Denmark 3.7 6.5 7.4 5.3 4.6 5.6 5.6 5.0
Estonia 20.5 32.3 35.2 29.4 20.9 36.7 46.6 34.4
Finland 6.9 11.5 14.2 10.4 9.3 13.7 20.5 13.6
Germany 8.7 18.2 31.6 18.7 9.3 14.9 25.6 15.2
Ireland 6.6 11.3 15.5 10.4 22.7 35.8 48.0 34.7
Netherlands 6.7 14.2 23.3 12.4 5.9 13.6 23.7 12.0
Norway 3.9 12.1 11.8 8.3 5.0 9.6 14.4 7.9
Poland 22.3 36.8 48.7 38.8 18.5 33.2 40.9 30.9
Portugal 11.0 26.6 45.6 33.6 26.0 48.6 60.7 50.9
Russia 55.2 65.5 70.6 64.9 52.5 53.2 59.3 55.4
Slovakia 22.0 36.3 56.9 40.7 26.0 32.4 50.5 36.5
Slovenia 5.7 8.1 21.6 12.6 6.8 17.8 28.9 17.1
Spain 4.4 10.5 25.3 14.8 18.6 35.6 49.7 33.0
Sweden 4.1 11.2 8.1 7.1 6.3 21.8 15.6 12.1
Switzerland 7.6 12.3 18.5 11.4 5.6 12.6 21.7 10.3
UK 11.7 17.1 21.3 15.6 16.2 23.4 33.7 22.3
Total 13.2 22.7 35.6 23.7 16.9 31.8 43.3 29.2
Individuals that find it “difficult” or “very difficult” to live on present income. The rest are
individuals that report either “living comfortably” or “coping” on present income.
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Table A16: Regression output
(PA) (CES-D)
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Upper class -0.039∗∗ (0.015) 0.002 (0.007)
Middle class -0.009 (0.012) -0.012 (0.006)
Hampered, a bit -0.063∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.082∗∗∗ (0.007)
Hampered, a lot -0.136∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.200∗∗∗ (0.013)
Very bad -0.251∗∗∗ (0.038) 0.444∗∗∗ (0.028)
Bad -0.190∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.235∗∗∗ (0.012)
Good 0.184∗∗∗ (0.009) -0.137∗∗∗ (0.006)
Very Good 0.394∗∗∗ (0.011) -0.250∗∗∗ (0.008)
Trust 0.011∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.012∗∗∗ (0.001)
Assaulted recently -0.014 (0.008) 0.034∗∗∗ (0.006)
Very unsafe 0.002 (0.017) 0.060∗∗∗ (0.013)
Unsafe -0.054∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.055∗∗∗ (0.007)
Very safe 0.060∗∗∗ (0.008) -0.025∗∗∗ (0.006)
Partner 0.132∗∗∗ (0.007) -0.138∗∗∗ (0.005)
Intimate, has 0.130∗∗∗ (0.014) -0.119∗∗∗ (0.010)
Less than once a month -0.121∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.128∗∗∗ (0.009)
Once a week -0.048∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.043∗∗∗ (0.008)
Almost every day 0.094∗∗∗ (0.007) -0.063∗∗∗ (0.005)
Unemployed -0.036∗∗ (0.014) 0.050∗∗∗ (0.010)
Out of the lf. 0.008 (0.010) 0.020∗∗ (0.007)
Past short unemp. -0.039∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.024∗∗∗ (0.006)
Past long unemp. -0.051∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.052∗∗∗ (0.007)
Confortably 0.074∗∗∗ (0.008) -0.053∗∗∗ (0.006)
With difficulty -0.135∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.105∗∗∗ (0.007)
With great difficulty -0.267∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.249∗∗∗ (0.010)
Constant 1.508∗∗∗ (0.094) 0.973∗∗∗ (0.069)
sd(Upper) 0.053*** (0.012) 0.020*** (0.007)
sd(Middle) 0.037*** (0.012) 0.000*** (0.000)
sd(Constant) 0.082*** (0.014) 0.052*** (0.009)
sd(Res) 0.569*** (0.002) 0.418*** (0.002)
N 34,330 34,367
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 To make the table shorter we have not include in
the output the control variables age and gender, but they are included in the regression.
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Table A17: The distribution of the crisis across classes
Social class
Country Upper Middle Lower Total
Belgium 2.2 -7.3 -1.1 -0.7
Bulgaria -10.0 -6.0 -13.1 -10.9
Cyprus 8.3 13.0 8.3 9.5
Denmark -1.0 8.9 -0.6 1.3
Estonia -6.9 1.4 8.0 0.7
Finland -2.8 -1.2 -1.7 -2.3
Germany 1.7 -3.3 -0.7 -0.9
Ireland 2.4 3.6 6.7 4.1
Netherlands -1.1 -2.4 -0.6 -1.1
Norway -4.1 1.7 1.4 -1.8
Poland -5.4 -7.7 -12.6 -10.4
Portugal -0.3 0.0 -7.0 -3.5
Russia -4.4 -3.2 0.3 -2.2
Slovakia -3.0 -13.1 -6.8 -7.8
Slovenia -0.8 -4.3 -6.9 -4.3
Spain 5.1 14.3 4.0 5.9
Sweden -0.6 -1.7 2.0 -0.5
Switzerland 0.8 1.5 1.6 0.3
UK 2.4 8.4 -4.0 2.3
Total -0.9 0.1 -1.2 -1.2
Each column shows the proportion of increase in depression in that class.
The column ‘Total’ gives us the overall change in depress in the country.
The columns do not add up to the Total column because for that to
happen we would have to weight the increase in each class by class size.
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Figure A1: The class gap in negative emotions with and without the non-employed.
Source: The European Social Survey, 3rd round of data. The bars captures the size of the
class gap between upper and lower class in negative emotions. The darkest bar shows the gap
if non employed individual were excluded from the analysis and if we add the light bar to it
we have the class gap when all non employed individuas are part of the analysis (this is the
one analysed in Chapter 3).
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6.2.1 Gender analysis of the class gap in negative emotions
The aim of this appendix is that of exploring gender differences in the relationship between
social class and SWB. For the sake of simplicity I will limit the analysis to the class gap
in negative emotions between upper and lower class individuals.
Figure A2 shows the class gap for males and females. The first thing we observe is
that the class gap is much larger for females than males in almost all countries. For
example in the UK, in 2012, the gap in the negative emotions score is 0.1 for males and
0.25 for women. In Belgium and Slovenia the class gap for men is 0.1 too but that for
women approximately 3 times the male’s gap. The Netherlands is an exception because
there the class-gap is larger for men than for women, it is 0.07 for women and double
that amount for men. Second, when the analysis is carried out separately for men and
women, the ranking of countries in terms of the class gap changes substantively, although
some countries remain in similar positions, like Scandinavian countries remaining at the
top for both men and women, and Eastern European countries, such as Poland, being at
the bottom.
Figure A2: The class gap in the CES-D score for males and females.
(a) Males (b) Females
Source: The European Social Survey, 3rd and 6th round of data. Controls include health,
safety, social life, employment, and financial situation.
Despite the non negligible difference in the strength of the correlation between class
and negative emotions across gender, the factors mediating such relationship seem to the
same because in both cases the gap is explained when health, employment, safety and
social life are controlled for – see Figure A2, and, when we make a decomposition, the
relative contribution of each group of variables remains quite similar for men and women
– see Table A18. Note that for both, health, labour force status, and financial strain
explain most of the gap in negative emotions, 82 and 85 per cent for men and women
respectively. There are however slight variations across gender, for instance, in safety and
financial strain that explains more the men’s gap than women’s and health plays a more
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important role explaining class-based differences in negative emotions among women.
Then, if the same variables explain the class gap for men and women, and if the
contributions of the different group of variables are more or less the same for men and
women, this means that the reason why the class gap in negative affect is larger for men is
because the gaps in health, financial strain and so on, is greater among women than men.
In other words, it is a story of composition. The UK is one example of country where the
association between social class and negative emotions varies substantially with gender.
Note that the gap is 0.1 approximately for men and almost 0.25 for women. and this is so
because the differences in terms of employment, financial strain, heath and so on, between
upper and lower class people, are much wider for women than men. The employment
gap is of 15 percentage points for men and 24 for women. The gap in financial strain
is 13 percentage points for men and 22 for women, and so on. Whereas in Denmark,
where the class gaps are similar for men and women so are the gaps for men and women
in employment, financial strain and the rest. For instance, the gender gap in financial
strain is 3 percentage points.
Table A18: Contribution of each group of variables to the class gap in negative emotions
Gender Social Safety Health Labour Income Total
Male 7.0 10.9 19.7 11.5 51.0 100
Female 9.9 5.0 31.8 11.4 42.0 100
Note: To approximate the contribution of each group of variables, we simply compare the
upper class coefficient of two models: (1) the full model, and (2) the full model without the
variables whose contribution we want to assess (call this A). We would do this 5 times, one for
each group of variables. Then we add up the former differences (call this B). The contribution
of each group of variables would then be equal to (A/B)*100.
Thus, running separate analyses for men and women shows that there are indeed
important differences in the association between class and negative emotions by gender.
That is, not only does the former association vary across countries (object of analysis of
Chapter 3), but it also varies substantially across gender. In almost every counter the
class gap is much larger for women than for men. Although the analyses displayed in this
appendix do not invalidate the story told in Chapter 3 – since the same variables seem to
explain both gaps successfully – it shows that the class gaps observed in Chapter 3 hide
important gender differences.
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6.3 APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 4
Table A19: Subjective well-being questions in the French dataset
Concept Question Possible answers
Enjoyment of
activities
How pleasant was the activity? 1(very unpleasant) -7(very pleasant)
Time pressure How often do you feel rushed? Would
you say it is . . . ?
Every day, A few times a week, About
once a week, About once a month, Less
than once a month
Busyness All in all, where would you say you
stand in terms of busyness?




When you need more time, do you tend
to cut back on your sleep, to do with?
Often, From time to time, Never
Skipping meals When you need more time, do you
sometimes skip a meal or eat a quick
snack in order to have the time to do
something else?
Often, From time to time, Never
Life satisfaction All things considered, how satisfied
would you say you are with your
current life in general?
1(Very dissatisfied) - 10(Very satisfied)
Job satisfaction How satisfied would you say you are
with your job?
1(Very dissatisfied) - 10(Very satisfied)
Satisfaction
with leisure
How satisfied would you say you are
with your leisure?
1(Very dissatisfied) - 10(Very satisfied)
Social
satisfaction
How satisfied would you say you are
with your relationship with your family,
your relatives, friends and neighbours?
1(Very dissatisfied) - 10(Very satisfied)
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Table A20: What paid work includes
Work or related
• normal paid work outside home
• normal paid work at home
• travel during work (excluding commute to
work)
• work connected with agriculture
• participation in the activity–work–of
another hh member
• other paid work second job, undeclared
• strikes and walkouts
• non work at workplace, preparing,
changing, waiting to start
• meetings, union activities
Job search or trainings
• job search activities
• occupational or professional education
• normal school
• homework, study
• internships as part of formal education
• training outside profession, self-chosen, or
to change job
• other courses: driving school, cooking,
dressmaking etc
Commuting
• school or work commuting
• other travel excluding work travel
• child-related travel
• travel for another household
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Figure A3: Hours of work and satisfaction by schedule type
(a) Satisfaction with life (b) Job satisfaction
(c) Satisfaction with social relationships (d) Satisfaction with leisure time
Note: These estimates are based on 249 employees with an imposed schedule, 95 with a
mixed schedule, some mixed arrangement where the employee has some choice, and 50
employees with a free schedule.
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Figure A4: Hours of paid work for likes and not likes
(a) Job satisfaction>p50 (b) Job satisfaction<p50
The likes are individuals with job satisfaction above the median, and the not likes are
individuals with job satisfaction below the median.
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Figure A5: The relationship between working hours and affect by schedule type
(a) Average daily enjoyment (b) Proportion of pleasant time
(c) Proportion of unpleasant time (d) Proportion of neutral time
These marginal effects have been build with 212 individuals with imposed schedule, 77
with some mixed schedule type and 42 with free schedule. Note that the margins in this
figure are a bit smaller than in previous ones this is because CI were very wide below 2
hours and therefore I decided to just show a narrower interval/bracket of hours. Still the
CI are very wide for the extremes.
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Figure A6: Enjoyment of work and leisure for likes and not likes
(a) Employees with job satisfaction > p50 (b) Employees with job satisfaction < p50
(c) Employees with job satisfaction > p50 (d) Employees with job satisfaction < p50
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Paid -0.059 -0.013 -0.035 0.059 -0.079
(0.044) (0.053) (0.059) (0.080) (0.084)
PaidXPaid 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Age -0.032 -0.028 -0.027 -0.052*
(0.018) (0.019) (0.033) (0.023)
AgeXAge 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.010 0.024 -0.007 0.017
(0.056) (0.066) (0.085) (0.080)
Dependant 0.135* 0.120 0.142 0.199*
(0.062) (0.065) (0.095) (0.089)
Partner 0.035 0.083 0.315* -0.260
(0.098) (0.101) (0.146) (0.142)
Partner employed 0.032 -0.013 -0.125 0.224
(0.088) (0.092) (0.130) (0.124)
log(Salary) -0.115* -0.042 -0.146 -0.075
(0.057) (0.071) (0.075) (0.100)
Unpaid -0.024 -0.032 -0.019 -0.068*
(0.021) (0.022) (0.031) (0.031)
Weekend 0.112 0.089 0.046 0.118
(0.069) (0.077) (0.113) (0.091)
Timing 0.008 0.009 -0.042 0.020
(0.010) (0.012) (0.021) (0.012)
TimingXTiming -0.000 -0.000 0.000* -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Works office+home -0.065 -0.075 0.099 -0.221
(0.123) (0.131) (0.173) (0.187)
Works at home 0.029 -0.123 0.077 0.101
(0.157) (0.179) (0.210) (0.268)
Job satisfaction 0.230*** 0.234***
(0.035) (0.037)
Constant 4.490*** 4.385*** 3.950*** 7.106*** 5.249***
(0.182) (0.630) (0.723) (1.061) (0.931)
N 347 331 331 158 173
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note that the regression for employees with extra regressors –“Employees + extras”– does
include additional variables that are not shown in the table due to space limitations. Those
variables are: type of job, schedule, how predictable working hours are, whether the person
works in the evenings, nights or weekends, whether the jobs is or not controlled and how easy
it is for the person to be absent.
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Paid (hrs) -1.009 -0.371 -1.333 1.241 -3.268
(1.867) (2.318) (2.582) (3.144) (3.928)
PaidXPaid -0.007 -0.067 -0.042 -0.122 0.026
(0.115) (0.130) (0.142) (0.165) (0.240)
Age -0.848 -0.715 -0.504 -1.540
(0.774) (0.818) (1.312) (1.074)
AgeXAge 0.011 0.009 0.007 0.020
(0.009) (0.010) (0.016) (0.013)
Male -1.631 -0.000 -1.807 -2.586
(2.448) (2.877) (3.348) (3.735)
Dependant 3.100 2.573 2.217 6.681
(2.734) (2.820) (3.757) (4.151)
Partner 2.298 5.109 13.106* -8.943
(4.286) (4.402) (5.770) (6.645)
Partner employed 1.803 -0.347 -1.796 6.988
(3.837) (3.997) (5.120) (5.792)
log(Salary) 0.509 1.199 -1.257 2.453
(2.519) (3.105) (2.965) (4.663)
Unpaid (hrs) -0.626 -1.224 -0.418 -2.717
(0.925) (0.966) (1.236) (1.456)
Weekend 1.353 1.776 2.433 -0.676
(3.008) (3.367) (4.441) (4.266)
Timing 0.491 0.452 -0.204 0.535
(0.431) (0.502) (0.836) (0.565)
TimingXTiming -0.003 -0.003 0.001 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Works office+home -4.366 -4.340 5.240 -16.316
(5.390) (5.722) (6.838) (8.748)
Works at home 4.193 -2.021 -2.180 17.066
(6.875) (7.783) (8.287) (12.501)
Job satisfaction 8.771*** 7.913***
(1.513) (1.622)
Constant 89.257*** 39.944 50.894 100.390* 91.001*
(7.771) (27.596) (31.514) (41.885) (43.453)
N 347 331 331 158 173
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note that the regression for employees with extra regressors –“Employees + extras”– does
include additional variables that are not shown in the table due to space limitations. Those
variables are: type of job, schedule, how predictable working hours are, whether the person
works in the evenings, nights or weekends, whether the jobs is or not controlled and how easy
it is for the person to be absent.
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Paid (hours) -0.453 -1.078 -0.988 -2.480 2.060
(1.153) (1.413) (1.551) (1.467) (2.709)
PaidXPaid 0.046 0.106 0.115 0.170* -0.058
(0.071) (0.079) (0.086) (0.077) (0.165)
Age -0.074 -0.444 0.079 0.269
(0.472) (0.491) (0.612) (0.740)
AgeXAge -0.000 0.004 -0.002 -0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
Male 0.956 -0.390 -0.580 2.037
(1.492) (1.728) (1.563) (2.576)
Dependant -2.037 -0.954 -0.623 -5.615
(1.666) (1.694) (1.753) (2.863)
Partner 1.692 0.277 -8.627** 13.413**
(2.613) (2.644) (2.693) (4.583)
Partner employed -3.544 -1.843 1.579 -9.864*
(2.339) (2.401) (2.390) (3.995)
log(Salary) -0.295 -0.444 1.257 -2.809
(1.535) (1.865) (1.384) (3.216)
Unpaid (hours) 0.574 0.716 0.154 1.734
(0.564) (0.580) (0.577) (1.004)
Weekend -1.408 -1.240 0.339 -2.360
(1.834) (2.023) (2.073) (2.942)
Timing -0.355 -0.161 0.346 -0.452
(0.263) (0.302) (0.390) (0.390)
TimingXTiming 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Works office+home 2.966 2.549 1.134 4.143
(3.285) (3.437) (3.191) (6.034)
Works at home -0.902 2.396 0.819 -6.730
(4.190) (4.675) (3.867) (8.622)
Job satisfaction -5.070*** -4.299***
(0.922) (0.975)
Constant 7.450 54.716** 51.156** 0.613 34.449
(4.798) (16.820) (18.930) (19.548) (29.970)
N 347 331 331 158 173
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note that the regression for employees with extra regressors –“Employees + extras”– does
include additional variables that are not shown in the table due to space limitations. Those
variables are: type of job, schedule, how predictable working hours are, whether the person
works in the evenings, nights or weekends, whether the jobs is or not controlled and how easy
it is for the person to be absent.
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Paid (hours) 1.462 1.449 2.322 1.239 1.208
(1.606) (2.101) (2.366) (2.709) (3.679)
PaidXPaid -0.038 -0.039 -0.072 -0.048 0.032
(0.099) (0.118) (0.131) (0.142) (0.225)
Age 0.921 1.159 0.424 1.271
(0.701) (0.749) (1.130) (1.006)
AgeXAge -0.011 -0.014 -0.005 -0.016
(0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012)
Male 0.675 0.390 2.387 0.549
(2.219) (2.636) (2.885) (3.499)
Dependant -1.063 -1.619 -1.594 -1.066
(2.478) (2.584) (3.237) (3.888)
Partner -3.989 -5.386 -4.480 -4.470
(3.885) (4.033) (4.972) (6.224)
Partner employed 1.741 2.190 0.217 2.876
(3.479) (3.662) (4.412) (5.425)
log(Salary) -0.215 -0.755 0.001 0.356
(2.283) (2.845) (2.555) (4.367)
Unpaid (hours) 0.052 0.508 0.264 0.983
(0.838) (0.885) (1.065) (1.363)
Weekend 0.055 -0.536 -2.772 3.037
(2.727) (3.085) (3.827) (3.996)
Timing -0.136 -0.291 -0.142 -0.083
(0.391) (0.460) (0.720) (0.529)
TimingXTiming 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Works office+home 1.400 1.791 -6.374 12.173
(4.886) (5.242) (5.892) (8.195)
Works at home -3.291 -0.375 1.361 -10.336
(6.232) (7.130) (7.140) (11.710)
Job satisfaction -3.701** -3.614*
(1.372) (1.486)
Constant 3.292 5.340 -2.050 -1.003 -25.450
(6.685) (25.016) (28.872) (36.092) (40.702)
N 347 331 331 158 173
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note that the regression for employees with extra regressors –“Employees + extras”– does
include additional variables that are not shown in the table due to space limitations. Those
variables are: type of job, schedule, how predictable working hours are, whether the person
works in the evenings, nights or weekends, whether the jobs is or not controlled and how easy
it is for the person to be absent.
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Qualified worker or highly
skilled
0.079 0.551 -7.844* 0.073 -0.006 0.181
(0.143) (0.389) (3.749) (0.163) (0.195) (0.186)
Technician -0.127 0.632 -4.483 0.064 0.319 0.076
(0.159) (0.440) (4.164) (0.184) (0.220) (0.210)
Staff category B or
equivalent
-0.072 0.615 -4.075 -0.029 0.503* 0.169
(0.176) (0.486) (4.611) (0.203) (0.242) (0.231)
Foreman, administrative or
commercial control
-0.035 0.612 -6.767 0.138 0.321 0.163
(0.169) (0.468) (4.435) (0.196) (0.234) (0.223)
Category A staff or
equivalent
-0.221 0.578 -4.269 0.118 0.247 0.173
(0.178) (0.496) (4.659) (0.208) (0.248) (0.237)
Engineer or executive -0.134 0.873 -6.240 0.030 0.356 -0.022
(0.166) (0.464) (4.350) (0.194) (0.232) (0.221)
Staff category C or D or
equiv.
-0.051 0.425 -4.368 -0.182 0.377 -0.261
(0.161) (0.451) (4.217) (0.187) (0.224) (0.213)
Employee of office, trade,
personal services
0.079 0.624 -8.070* -0.002 0.202 0.122
(0.141) (0.385) (3.683) (0.161) (0.193) (0.183)
knows if works the next day 0.049 0.075 0.303 0.269 0.269 0.135
(0.122) (0.356) (3.188) (0.149) (0.178) (0.170)
knows if works the next
week
-0.122 -0.092 -1.326 0.036 -0.049 0.120
(0.121) (0.348) (3.156) (0.146) (0.175) (0.167)
knows if works the next
month
-0.005 -0.329 4.187 0.025 -0.044 0.045
(0.082) (0.232) (2.137) (0.097) (0.116) (0.111)
Occasionally works evenings -0.041 0.308 3.308 0.006 -0.096 -0.180
(0.085) (0.239) (2.234) (0.100) (0.120) (0.114)
Occasionally works nights 0.138 -0.240 -1.385 0.115 0.353* 0.204
(0.094) (0.280) (2.473) (0.117) (0.139) (0.133)
Occasionally works
Saturdays
-0.077 -0.122 1.910 0.026 0.135 0.068
(0.084) (0.241) (2.201) (0.101) (0.121) (0.115)
Occasionally works Sundays 0.198* -0.229 -5.775* -0.155 -0.167 -0.006
(0.087) (0.249) (2.266) (0.104) (0.124) (0.118)
Working hours are
controlled
-0.045 -0.165 4.277** -0.180* -0.267** -0.070
(0.061) (0.175) (1.585) (0.072) (0.086) (0.082)
Can be absent from work
easily
-0.005 -0.008 1.706 0.050 -0.095 -0.127
(0.062) (0.177) (1.612) (0.074) (0.088) (0.084)
Some choice in schedule 0.020 0.306 -2.166 0.108 0.160 0.032
(0.069) (0.201) (1.796) (0.084) (0.100) (0.095)
Free to choose working
hours
0.028 0.304 0.114 0.155 0.148 0.229
(0.102) (0.292) (2.671) (0.121) (0.144) (0.137)
N 331 389 331 391 391 391
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Note that this table does not include the main controls, but they are part of the regression.
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Paid (hours) -0.064 -0.115 -0.013 -0.158 -0.188
(0.036) (0.157) (0.173) (0.234) (0.233)
PaidXPaid 0.008*** 0.011 0.006 0.014 0.012
(0.002) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014)
Age -0.030 -0.002 0.056 -0.076
(0.053) (0.055) (0.098) (0.064)
AgeXAge 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Male -0.712*** -0.655*** -0.605* -0.822***
(0.162) (0.188) (0.248) (0.216)
Dependant -0.015 -0.114 0.213 -0.341
(0.183) (0.190) (0.288) (0.241)
Partner -0.066 -0.015 -0.234 -0.072
(0.290) (0.301) (0.445) (0.387)
Partner employed 0.422 0.380 0.629 0.225
(0.255) (0.266) (0.391) (0.334)
log(Salary) 0.655*** 0.378 0.454 0.850**
(0.172) (0.212) (0.233) (0.273)
Unpaid (hours) 0.131* 0.133* 0.145 0.156
(0.062) (0.064) (0.095) (0.084)
Weekend 0.215 0.297 0.022 0.562*
(0.198) (0.223) (0.309) (0.255)
Timing 0.034 0.010 0.155** 0.019
(0.027) (0.032) (0.056) (0.031)
TimingXTiming -0.000 -0.000 -0.001* -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Works office+home 0.434 0.609 0.268 0.345
(0.338) (0.355) (0.508) (0.460)
Works at home 0.060 -0.406 0.207 -0.894
(0.465) (0.516) (0.673) (0.672)
Job satisfaction -0.438*** -0.501***
(0.099) (0.106)
Constant 3.422*** -0.486 1.469 -7.830** -0.942
(0.145) (1.851) (2.127) (2.957) (2.614)
N 4616 389 389 190 199
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note that the regression for employees with extra regressors –“Employees + extras”– does
include additional variables that are not shown in the table due to space limitations. Those
variables are: type of job, schedule, how predictable working hours are, whether the person
works in the evenings, nights or weekends, whether the jobs is or not controlled and how easy
it is for the person to be absent.
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Paid (hours) -0.067*** -0.021 0.085 0.008 -0.064
(0.017) (0.073) (0.079) (0.120) (0.097)
PaidXPaid 0.006*** 0.002 -0.003 0.001 0.003
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Age -0.051* -0.033 -0.035 -0.052
(0.025) (0.025) (0.051) (0.027)
AgeXAge 0.001* 0.000 0.000 0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Male -0.194* -0.129 -0.240 -0.161
(0.076) (0.086) (0.128) (0.091)
Dependant 0.006 -0.038 0.050 -0.097
(0.086) (0.087) (0.147) (0.104)
Partner 0.346* 0.406** 0.127 0.556***
(0.138) (0.139) (0.237) (0.165)
Partner employed -0.235 -0.295* -0.037 -0.417**
(0.122) (0.123) (0.211) (0.141)
log(Salary) 0.345*** 0.215* 0.294* 0.390***
(0.081) (0.097) (0.121) (0.116)
Unpaid (hours) 0.048 0.057 0.045 0.043
(0.029) (0.030) (0.049) (0.036)
Weekend -0.039 -0.015 -0.010 -0.077
(0.093) (0.102) (0.161) (0.108)
Timing 0.009 -0.015 0.018 0.016
(0.012) (0.015) (0.029) (0.013)
TimingXTiming -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Works office+home 0.071 0.175 0.161 -0.036
(0.158) (0.162) (0.261) (0.194)
Works at home 0.219 0.087 0.005 0.466
(0.217) (0.236) (0.346) (0.285)
Job satisfaction 0.020 -0.014
(0.047) (0.049)
Constant 3.741*** 1.464 2.439* 1.023 1.460
(0.067) (0.863) (0.971) (1.519) (1.095)
N 4603 387 387 188 199
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note that the regression for employees with extra regressors –“Employees + extras”– does
include additional variables that are not shown in the table due to space limitations. Those
variables are: type of job, schedule, how predictable working hours are, whether the person
works in the evenings, nights or weekends, whether the jobs is or not controlled and how easy
it is for the person to be absent.
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Paid (hours) -0.098*** -0.143 -0.047 -0.060 -0.223
(0.018) (0.081) (0.085) (0.118) (0.121)
PaidXPaid 0.008*** 0.011* 0.006 0.008 0.012
(0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Age -0.020 0.003 -0.015 -0.028
(0.027) (0.027) (0.049) (0.034)
AgeXAge 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Male 0.030 0.047 0.024 0.081
(0.084) (0.092) (0.125) (0.114)
Dependant -0.057 -0.121 0.135 -0.280*
(0.094) (0.092) (0.144) (0.128)
Partner -0.007 -0.038 -0.397 0.272
(0.150) (0.147) (0.223) (0.205)
Partner employed -0.063 -0.055 0.191 -0.244
(0.132) (0.130) (0.197) (0.177)
log(Salary) 0.232** 0.037 0.107 0.475**
(0.089) (0.104) (0.117) (0.144)
Unpaid (hours) 0.072* 0.102** 0.082 0.078
(0.032) (0.032) (0.048) (0.044)
Weekend -0.038 -0.085 -0.035 -0.043
(0.102) (0.109) (0.155) (0.136)
Timing -0.018 -0.003 -0.007 -0.013
(0.014) (0.016) (0.028) (0.016)
TimingXTiming 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Works office+home -0.136 -0.183 0.040 -0.338
(0.174) (0.174) (0.256) (0.243)
Works at home 0.703** 0.504* 0.835* 0.466
(0.240) (0.253) (0.339) (0.356)
Job satisfaction 0.015 0.004
(0.051) (0.052)
Constant 1.920*** 1.658 1.776 1.798 0.383
(0.072) (0.952) (1.040) (1.488) (1.362)
N 4620 391 391 191 200
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note that the regression for employees with extra regressors –“Employees + extras”– does
include additional variables that are not shown in the table due to space limitations. Those
variables are: type of job, schedule, how predictable working hours are, whether the person
works in the evenings, nights or weekends, whether the jobs is or not controlled and how easy
it is for the person to be absent.
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Paid (hours) -0.075*** -0.063 -0.030 -0.018 -0.055
(0.018) (0.078) (0.083) (0.111) (0.116)
PaidXPaid 0.007*** 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.000
(0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Age -0.023 0.000 -0.011 -0.041
(0.026) (0.027) (0.046) (0.032)
AgeXAge 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Male -0.225** -0.236** -0.126 -0.256*
(0.080) (0.090) (0.118) (0.109)
Dependant 0.027 0.028 0.020 -0.001
(0.090) (0.091) (0.136) (0.122)
Partner -0.020 -0.025 -0.246 0.077
(0.144) (0.145) (0.210) (0.196)
Partner employed -0.107 -0.120 0.072 -0.216
(0.127) (0.128) (0.186) (0.169)
log(Salary) 0.264** 0.240* 0.066 0.588***
(0.085) (0.102) (0.111) (0.138)
Unpaid (hours) 0.001 0.011 0.054 -0.018
(0.031) (0.031) (0.045) (0.043)
Weekend -0.004 -0.110 0.122 -0.089
(0.098) (0.107) (0.146) (0.130)
Timing -0.009 -0.005 0.029 -0.007
(0.013) (0.015) (0.027) (0.016)
TimingXTiming 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Works office+home -0.218 -0.242 -0.193 -0.251
(0.167) (0.171) (0.241) (0.233)
Works at home 0.349 0.058 0.600 -0.123
(0.231) (0.249) (0.320) (0.341)
Job satisfaction 0.019 0.006
(0.049) (0.051)
Constant 1.858*** 1.117 0.762 0.195 -0.370
(0.072) (0.914) (1.024) (1.405) (1.304)
N 4620 391 391 191 200
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note that the regression for employees with extra regressors –“Employees + extras”– does
include additional variables that are not shown in the table due to space limitations. Those
variables are: type of job, schedule, how predictable working hours are, whether the person
works in the evenings, nights or weekends, whether the jobs is or not controlled and how easy
it is for the person to be absent.
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Paid (hours) 0.084 0.065 0.012 0.151 0.084
(0.054) (0.067) (0.072) (0.085) (0.106)
PaidXPaid -0.006 -0.005 -0.002 -0.008 -0.006
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Age 0.004 0.005 -0.023 0.014
(0.023) (0.023) (0.036) (0.030)
AgeXAge -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.213** 0.222** 0.213* 0.251*
(0.069) (0.078) (0.090) (0.100)
Dependant 0.015 -0.038 -0.016 0.078
(0.078) (0.079) (0.104) (0.112)
Partner 0.012 -0.022 0.037 0.001
(0.124) (0.126) (0.161) (0.179)
Partner employed 0.044 0.050 -0.048 0.126
(0.109) (0.112) (0.142) (0.155)
log(Salary) -0.026 -0.085 -0.072 0.102
(0.074) (0.089) (0.085) (0.126)
Unpaid (hours) -0.010 0.001 0.015 -0.008
(0.027) (0.027) (0.034) (0.039)
Weekend 0.048 0.060 -0.045 0.093
(0.085) (0.093) (0.112) (0.119)
Timing -0.041*** -0.029* -0.091*** -0.023
(0.011) (0.013) (0.021) (0.014)
TimingXTiming 0.000*** 0.000* 0.001*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Works office+home -0.080 -0.082 -0.145 0.111
(0.145) (0.149) (0.185) (0.212)
Works at home -0.048 -0.099 0.063 -0.055
(0.199) (0.216) (0.245) (0.311)
Constant 3.805*** 5.568*** 5.400*** 8.101*** 3.520**
(0.223) (0.770) (0.859) (1.075) (1.191)
N 409 391 391 191 200
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note that the regression for employees with extra regressors –“Employees + extras”– does
include additional variables that are not shown in the table due to space limitations. Those
variables are: type of job, schedule, how predictable working hours are, whether the person
works in the evenings, nights or weekends, whether the jobs is or not controlled and how easy
it is for the person to be absent.
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Paid -0.039 -0.073 -0.074 0.019 -0.062
(0.068) (0.081) (0.086) (0.049) (0.094)
PaidXPaid 0.002 0.003 0.004 -0.001 0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006)
Age -0.009 -0.004 -0.060** -0.026
(0.027) (0.028) (0.021) (0.026)
AgeXAge 0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.052 0.191* 0.085 -0.048
(0.084) (0.093) (0.052) (0.088)
Dependant 0.053 0.069 0.082 0.185
(0.095) (0.095) (0.060) (0.099)
Partner -0.162 -0.108 -0.092 -0.168
(0.151) (0.150) (0.093) (0.159)
Partner employed 0.115 0.059 0.077 0.161
(0.133) (0.133) (0.082) (0.137)
log(Salary) 0.045 -0.105 -0.101* 0.273*
(0.090) (0.106) (0.049) (0.112)
Unpaid -0.035 -0.038 0.003 -0.058
(0.032) (0.032) (0.020) (0.034)
Weekend -0.047 0.008 0.014 -0.096
(0.103) (0.112) (0.065) (0.105)
Timing 0.001 -0.017 -0.018 0.007
(0.014) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013)
TimingXTiming -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Works office+home 0.080 0.133 0.307** -0.156
(0.176) (0.178) (0.107) (0.188)
Works at home 0.205 0.149 0.221 0.210
(0.242) (0.258) (0.142) (0.275)
Constant 4.030*** 4.074*** 5.332*** 7.080*** 2.076
(0.286) (0.937) (1.026) (0.624) (1.053)
N 404 391 391 191 200
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note that the regression for employees with extra regressors –“Employees + extras”– does
include additional variables that are not shown in the table due to space limitations. Those
variables are: type of job, schedule, how predictable working hours are, whether the person
works in the evenings, nights or weekends, whether the jobs is or not controlled and how easy
it is for the person to be absent.
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Paid (hours) -0.058 -0.036 -0.080 0.043 -0.112
(0.060) (0.075) (0.082) (0.090) (0.128)
PaidXPaid 0.002 0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
Age 0.017 0.014 -0.063 0.046
(0.025) (0.026) (0.037) (0.036)
AgeXAge -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male -0.006 0.020 0.010 -0.036
(0.078) (0.089) (0.095) (0.121)
Dependant 0.060 0.023 0.039 0.134
(0.088) (0.090) (0.110) (0.135)
Partner -0.566*** -0.561*** -0.309 -0.823***
(0.139) (0.143) (0.170) (0.217)
Partner employed 0.411*** 0.397** 0.209 0.645***
(0.123) (0.127) (0.150) (0.187)
log(Salary) -0.072 -0.089 -0.181* 0.134
(0.083) (0.101) (0.089) (0.152)
Unpaid (hours) -0.034 -0.024 0.019 -0.078
(0.030) (0.031) (0.036) (0.047)
Weekend 0.082 0.101 0.064 0.110
(0.095) (0.106) (0.118) (0.143)
Timing -0.004 0.004 -0.039 0.011
(0.013) (0.015) (0.022) (0.017)
TimingXTiming 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Works office+home -0.188 -0.245 0.097 -0.400
(0.162) (0.170) (0.195) (0.257)
Works at home -0.302 -0.297 -0.395 -0.035
(0.224) (0.246) (0.258) (0.376)
Constant 4.507*** 4.804*** 4.604*** 8.312*** 2.502
(0.246) (0.865) (0.978) (1.134) (1.439)
N 409 391 391 191 200
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note that the regression for employees with extra regressors –“Employees + extras”– does
include additional variables that are not shown in the table due to space limitations. Those
variables are: type of job, schedule, how predictable working hours are, whether the person
works in the evenings, nights or weekends, whether the jobs is or not controlled and how easy
it is for the person to be absent.
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Paid (hours) 0.123 0.031 0.039 0.086 0.144
(0.077) (0.093) (0.102) (0.145) (0.128)
PaidXPaid -0.006 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.011
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Age 0.081* 0.066* 0.054 0.088*
(0.031) (0.033) (0.061) (0.036)
AgeXAge -0.001** -0.001* -0.001 -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Male 0.226* 0.291** 0.208 0.288*
(0.097) (0.110) (0.154) (0.120)
Dependant -0.280* -0.291** -0.400* -0.172
(0.109) (0.111) (0.178) (0.135)
Partner -0.305 -0.310 -0.278 -0.242
(0.173) (0.177) (0.275) (0.217)
Partner employed 0.302* 0.319* 0.338 0.219
(0.152) (0.157) (0.243) (0.187)
log(Salary) 0.034 0.013 -0.053 0.186
(0.103) (0.125) (0.145) (0.152)
Unpaid (hours) -0.040 -0.016 0.015 -0.070
(0.037) (0.038) (0.059) (0.047)
Weekend -0.023 0.056 0.002 -0.119
(0.118) (0.131) (0.191) (0.143)
Timing -0.033* -0.043* -0.087* -0.007
(0.016) (0.019) (0.035) (0.017)
TimingXTiming 0.000 0.000* 0.001* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Works office+home 0.089 0.131 0.240 0.124
(0.202) (0.210) (0.315) (0.256)
Works at home -0.673* -0.266 -0.638 -0.608
(0.277) (0.304) (0.418) (0.376)
Constant 3.163*** 3.360** 3.645** 6.008** 1.060
(0.319) (1.074) (1.208) (1.835) (1.437)
N 409 391 391 191 200
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note that the regression for employees with extra regressors –“Employees + extras”– does
include additional variables that are not shown in the table due to space limitations. Those
variables are: type of job, schedule, how predictable working hours are, whether the person
works in the evenings, nights or weekends, whether the jobs is or not controlled and how easy
it is for the person to be absent.
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Figure A7: Time crunch and job satisfaction
Source: 2008-2009 French Time Use survey. Includes employees
for whom there is information about their job satisfaction and
time crunch, N=402. The correlation between time crunch and
job satisfaction is -0.22.
217
6.3.1 Who are the likes?
Table A34 shows the cross tabulation between job satisfaction and education level, and
it doesn’t show a very clear relationship between the two. Individuals of higher, medium
and lower education are almost equally likely to be above and below the median in terms
of job satisfaction. For instance, 53% of the individuals with higher education are above
the median in terms of job satisfaction, and 47% are below. The same Figures for the
medium educated and reversed (47% versus 53%) for the lower educated.
Table A34: Job satisfaction and education level
Education level

















Below p50 21 42.9 10.0 105 53.0 50.2 83 52.9 39.7 209 51.7 100.0
Above p50 28 57.1 14.4 93 47.0 47.7 74 47.1 37.9 195 48.3 100.0
Total 49 100.0 12.1 198 100.0 49.0 157 100.0 38.9 404 100.0 100.0
Source: 2008/2009 French Time Use survey. This table includes employees only for whom there is
information about their job satisfaction and their education level, N=404.
Looking at it from another angle, if we explore the composition of the individuals
highly satisfied with their jobs we see that 14.4% come from the lower educated, 47.7%
of the very satisfied come from the medium educated, and almost 38% from the highly
educated. Thus, it does not seem necessary to have higher education to be very satisfied
with one’s job.
Table A35: Job satisfaction and salary
Salary (euros per month)

















Below p50 29 48.3 14.5 139 54.7 69.5 32 41.6 16.0 200 51.2 100.0
Above p50 31 51.7 16.2 115 45.3 60.2 45 58.4 23.6 191 48.8 100.0
Total 60 100.0 15.3 254 100.0 65.0 77 100.0 19.7 391 100.0 100.0
Source: 2008/2009 French Time Use survey. This table includes employees for whom there is infor-
mation about their job satisfaction and their salary, N=391. The correlation between log(salary)
and job satisfaction is 0.03.
The relationship between salary and job satisfaction is not very strong either. For
instance, if we consider the individuals with the highest monthly salaries, that is 2,000
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euros upwards, we find that 41.6% are below the median in terms of job satisfaction, and
51.7% is above. Among the individuals in the lower salary category, 48.3% are below
the median in job satisfaction and 51.7% are above. The correlation coefficient between
log(salary) and job satisfaction is just 0.03.
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6.3.2 Time crunch by gender and the presence of dependants
The main result displayed in section 4.5.2, ‘Hours of work and time crunch’, showed
that time pressure feelings increased with hours of paid work. This was the case before
and after controlling for some socio-demographics, gender among those. Nothing much
changed before and after controls, although some of the socio-demographics had some
effect on time pressure. For instance, women were, ceteris paribus, more rushed than men,
0.71 on average, this is half a standard deviation approximately. Yet one could wonder
whether women are just more rushed for every level of work, or whether the relationship
between hours of paid work and time crunch is different for men and women. Figure
A8 suggests that this is not the case because the curves for the two groups are almost
parallel.
Figure A8: Time crunch by gender and dependant status.
(a) Gender (b) Dependants
Source: INSEE, 2008-09 Time Use Survey. Sample size for the gender graph is 4,616,
with roughly the same number of men and women. The graph by dependant status
contains 4,616 individuals, 55% of which have dependants. These figures are based on a
regression with the following controls: age, partner and their occupational status, salary,
work place, and whether it is a weekend.
Another variable that we could suspect to have an important effect on time pressure
is whether one has children or not, or dependants more generally, to take care of. Figure
A8b compares the relationship between hours of work and time crunch for employees
with dependants and those without, and here we see some differences between the two.
Individuals with dependants are on average more rushed than people without. However,
whereas individuals with dependants immediately start to feel more rushed as they do
more hours of paid work, individuals without children do start to experience increasing
levels of time crunch until 5 hours of paid work. From that point onwards both experience
a very similar increase in time pressure for every additional hour of paid work.
In the analysis made in Chapter 4, we controlled also for the amount of time spent in
unpaid work, since it seemed important to take into account that not all time spent out of
work is leisure time, the amount of leisure would depend on how much unpaid work one
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carries out. The regression analysis showed that every hour of unpaid work would increase
time pressure by 0.13, which is less than one tenth of a standard deviation. However here
again one could question whether the effect on unpaid work is the same at all levels of
work. In particular, we are going to explore whether that is the case for a special group,
which could seem in principle to be at greater risk of time pressure (and therefore of
not achieving balance): individuals with dependants. Figure 6.3.2 tries to shed light on
this by comparing the relationship of interest for individuals with dependants, above and
below the median in terms of hours of unpaid work. It turns out that the effect seems quite
constant across levels of paid work since the two curves are quite parallel. As expected,
the curve for individuals doing more unpaid work is above the one for individuals doing
little unpaid work, and the difference between the two groups is non negligible.
Figure A9: Time crunch for employees with dependants by amount of unpaid work
Source: INSEE, 2008-09 Time Use Survey. The sample size is 2,525.
2 hours of unpaid work is the median of unpaid work. These figures
are based on a regression with the following controls: age, partner
and their occupational status, salary, work place, and whether it is
a weekend.
Figures A8 and suggest that the results presented in Chapter 4, at least those con-
cerning time pressure, are quite robust, and therefore applicable to not only the general
sample of French employees, but also to specific population subgroups like men and
women, caregivers and adults living alone, and individuals doing different amounts of
unpaid work. I find this last result particularly interesting because it is suggestive of
what things may be like in other countries.
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